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 Introduction
The extensive literature on risk, risk society and the welfare state sug-
gests that fundamental transformations are taking place that affect the 
social solidarity (Taylor-Gooby 2004, 2011) and the class compromise 
(Baldwin 1990) on which the welfare state rests. Post-industrial society 
produces new social risks (Bonoli 2004) that are not covered or can even 
be aggrevated (Cantillon, Elchardus, Pestiau and Parijs 2003) by the tra-
ditional risk protection programmes of the welfare state. Modern risk 
society (Beck 1992) is characterised by a new logic of social production 
of risks in which the welfare state itself has become a producer of risks, 
because it perversely aff ects the structure of employment, family life and 
marriage. Diversity, fl exibility and uncertainty are increasing in social re-
lations but also at the level of ideas. Consequently, the life course is seen 
to be the result of the choices made by individuals throughout their lives 
and therefore the structure within the individual life weakens (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 2002). All these transformations are suggested to erode 
welfare state solidarity. Notions of individual choice, individual failure 
and individual responsibility become more important in people’s views 
about risks and the welfare state and therefore traditional welfare state 
solidarities are dissolving.
 It is this line of reasoning that is investigated in this book. By analys-
ing the changing perceptions of risks and the changes in the willingness 
to show solidarity with others, we investigate whether traditional welfare 
state solidarities are dissolving and whether a new basis for solidarities is 
coming into being.
 The welfare state was founded on a shared perception of the social na-
ture of risks people encounter in everyday life and the willingness to take 
some form of collective responsibility for these risks. This responsibility 
is subsequently translated into collective strategies of risk management: 
the social policies of the welfare state.
 In the main institutions of industrial society, the firm and the city, the 
risks of poverty, sickness or unemployment became systemic risks, that is: 
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the unintended result of production processes, economic cycles, life cy-
cles and of processes of urbanisation. The welfare state is in the first place 
founded on the perception of these risks as social risks, that is: the risks 
arising from the main institutions of industrial society gradually came to 
be seen as produced by ‘the system’ and not by individual failure. These 
risks can only be handled adequately on a collective level. The taking of 
collective responsibility for social risks is the second foundation of the 
welfare state. Managing the risks of poverty, sickness or unemployment, 
or as Beveridge (1942) called them, the ‘five giant evils’ of Want, Disease, 
Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness, requires a collective effort. These collec-
tive efforts boiled down to risk management through public systems of so-
cial insurance, health care, education and housing in the socio-economic 
systems of organised capitalism that together make up the third and final 
foundation of the welfare state.
 Since the 1970s, however, the welfare state has constantly been ‘in cri-
sis’. On the one hand, this crisis is the result of the gradual transformation 
of western economies towards a post-industrial, service-based knowledge 
economy and on the other hand the result of the accompanying processes 
of globalisation and individualisation. These economic and social trans-
formations affect the fiscal basis of the welfare state and the institutional 
capacities of the welfare state to manage social risks collectively and affect 
public support for the welfare state as well.
 This book investigates the consequences of changing social and eco-
nomic conditions, defined in terms of individualisation and globalisation, 
for the social foundations of the welfare state. The literature on changing 
welfare states often focuses on processes of policy change and the mecha-
nisms that cause or block these changes (Esping-Andersen 1990, Pierson 
1994, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992). 
Path dependency, veto-points and processes of increasing returns are the 
mechanisms used to explain these impediments to change. The actual 
change observed is often interpreted as resulting from external crises that 
open up avenues for change (Hall 1993) or as the result of more gradual 
processes of policy change (Hacker 2004). In this book we take a different 
perspective and turn to theories and processes of social change that are 
hypothesised to have important consequences for the social foundations 
of the welfare state. Our perspective is of a more sociological nature.
 In sociology, it is the ‘logic of industrialism’ (Skocpol 1990) that pro-
duced the modern welfare state. From this perspective, the social prob-
lems and the functional prerequisites of an industrial society are re-
sponsible for the birth of the welfare state. Institutional differences in 
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the administrative make-up of nation states and in the arrangement of 
the political system consequently explain the differences between exist-
ing welfare states (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1990; 
Korpi 1983). However, the ‘logic of industrialism’ has been replaced by a 
‘logic of post-industrialism’, which is the focus of our investigation in this 
book. As suggested above, the social and economic changes that result 
from the transition towards a post-industrial society have weakened the 
social foundations of the welfare state (Offe 1985; Lash and Urry 1987). In 
this book we will examine this claim.
 We do this by asking three questions central to understanding the social 
foundations of the welfare state. Th is fi rst concerns the manifestation and 
perception of risks. Th e question is whether social risks are changing and 
whether they are still perceived as risks that deserve collective attention. 
Th e second question concerns the willingness to share risks. Are people still 
willing to take some responsibility for others through solidaristic arrange-
ments or do processes of individualisation undermine the previous foun-
dations of solidarity? We turn thirdly to the issue of risk management and 
policy change. When people are still willing to share risks, how is this trans-
lated into a strategy of risk management and into welfare state policies?
 We investigate the social foundations of the welfare state with all the ac-
tors that play a role in the institutions of the welfare state: the nation state, 
employers and employees, firms and unions, citizens and political parties. 
We expect to find the following changes in the perception of social risks 
and in the willingness to share risks. First, sociological theory predicts 
that individualisation and globalisation will produce (new) social risks 
which are of a less collective nature or will be perceived in a less collective 
manner. This will, secondly, gradually undermine the social solidarity on 
which the welfare state is based. When, thirdly, the perceptions of risks 
and the willingness to share risks of the involved participants change, this 
will gradually influence the policies they develop, support and implement 
to deal with these risks. As a consequence, the social foundations of the 
welfare state are changing.
 This book is based, in part, on research about (changes in) the opinions 
of different actors. But we have also researched actual processes of risk 
sharing and risk management in different contexts. Our research focuses 
thus mainly on the hypothesised consequences of individualisation and 
globalisation for risk perception, the willingness to share risks and risk 
management. We investigate these consequences and consider what they 
mean for the social foundations of the welfare state and the possible shift 
towards a new welfare settlement in the 21st century.
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 The research on which this book is based was carried out predomi-
nantly in the Netherlands. In addition, the research presented here rep-
resents work from numerous research projects executed by a research 
team at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, projects 
which are part of a larger research programme on Labour, firms and so-
cial security, financed by the Dutch Gak Foundation (Stichting Instituut 
Gak).
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1 Risk and the Welfare State
 Risk, Risk Perception and Solidarity
 Romke van der Veen
In this chapter we give a short summary of the literature on changing risks 
and the welfare state. The welfare state is presented here as an institution 
which deals with the social risks of an industrial society. Organised social 
solidarity, institutionalised in the provisions of the welfare state, are used 
to cope with the social risks of an industrialised society. It is often argued 
that the social solidarity of the welfare state is being eroded. New risks, 
a new logic of risk production, and a new risk culture are undermining 
the social foundation of welfare state solidarity. The changes in risks, risk 
production and risk culture are attributed to social and economic change, 
which resulted from the transformation towards a post-industrial society. 
Individualisation and globalisation are the key processes in this transfor-
mation. In this book, we investigate whether risk perception is changing 
and whether this undermines welfare state solidarity. Changes in risk per-
ception and in solidarity will affect the way risks are dealt with. This is the 
third issue on which this book focuses: the changing nature of risk manage-
ment in post-industrial society. We do not simply expect to see an erosion of 
solidarity. Therefore we want to investigate how changes in risk perception 
and solidarity affect the welfare settlement and whether a new welfarism, 
as is often suggested, is coming into existence.
1 Introduction
The welfare state and its programmes of social insurance and social 
protection are intended to deal with the risks encountered in the typi-
cal life-course of a worker in an industrial economy: the risks of unem-
ployment, disability and old age. However, processes of individualisation 
and globalisation that are part and parcel of a transformation towards a 
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post-industrial society have revolutionised social and economic relations. 
The transformation towards a service-economy goes hand-in-hand with 
a change in cultural values in the direction of a so-called post-materi-
alist culture. This implies a switch from materialist values, emphasising 
economic security, to post-materialist values emphasising autonomy and 
self-expression (Inglehart 1977).
 It is often suggested that these social and economic developments un-
dermine the foundations of the welfare state (Taylor-Gooby a.o. 1999, 
2011). The welfare state is based on a notion of social solidarity that bridg-
es social divisions between classes, solidarity that binds the fates of the 
lower and the middle classes, the poor and the rich, the young and the old 
and the sick and the healthy together in welfare programmes based on 
risk-sharing between high- and low-risk categories. Economic and social 
processes of globalisation and individualisation are thought to weaken 
these bonds of solidarity between different social groups and to under-
mine the willingness of people to support each other in times of bad luck.
 In this book we investigate whether people’s understanding of risk has 
changed in ways that undermine the social foundations of the welfare 
state. To do this, we must first consider the perception of risks. The ques-
tion is whether risks encountered by workers are still perceived as social 
risks. Social risks are risks that do not result from individual choice but 
are (also) produced by the social system of production. Social risks de-
serve collective attention because they can only be handled collectively, 
for example by the firm or the state. The social foundation of the welfare 
state concerns, secondly, the willingness to share risks. The question we 
ask is whether people are still willing to take (some) responsibility for the 
fate of others through welfare state arrangements based on solidarity or 
whether the changing perception of risks undermines the willingness to 
share these risks. Finally, we investigate the issue of risk management and 
policy change. When people are willing to share risks, how is this trans-
lated into a strategy of risk management and into welfare state policies?
 In this introductory chapter we will elaborate on these questions, but 
first we consider the role of risk, risk perception and the willingness to 
share risks in the development of the modern welfare state. In the sections 
that follow, we will subsequently discuss three different, but related ap-
proaches to the sociological development of risks and the consequences 
of these developments for the perception and willingness to share risks. In 
section three we discuss the social and economic developments towards 
an open society and an open economy: individualisation and globalisa-
tion. In section four we discuss the idea of a risk society as developed by 
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Luhmann, Beck and Giddens. In section five we discuss the idea of new 
social risks. Following these discussions, we consider what these develop-
ments mean for the management of social risks in section six. Finally, in 
section seven, we outline the remaining chapters of the book.
2 Social risks and the welfare state
The welfare state can be seen as a solution to the problem of coping with 
the risks workers encounter in everyday life. As such, the welfare state is 
a product of industrial society. Industrial society produced (new) risks 
such as occupational disability and unemployment and at the same time, 
existing risks such as poverty, old age or sickness were seen through a new 
lens of institutions associated with industrial society, such as factories 
and cities.
 In industrial society risks gradually came to be seen as social risks and 
not as individual problems. Unemployment, occupational disability and 
industrial accidents were increasingly perceived as unavoidable (system) 
risks produced by the industrial economy and industrial production pro-
cesses and not as a result of individual failure (Schwitters 1991). This fu-
elled a dynamic collectivisation of these risks.
 The dynamics of the welfare state as a system through which people 
share socially produced risks and thus take (some) responsibility for each 
other is best illustrated in the system of social security. This dynamic is 
characterised by a collectivisation of social insurance, increasing compre-
hensiveness of risk protection and the increasing coerciveness of social 
insurance programmes (De Swaan 1989). Social insurance (for unemploy-
ment, disability, sickness, healthcare) is based on the actuarial notion of 
calculable risks. As such, markets can produce social insurance. But these 
markets are plagued by problems of adverse selection relating to the ex-
clusion of high-risk categories (for example the elderly or the sick) from 
social insurance, and by free rider problems that limit the comprehensive-
ness of social insurance. These problems have caused the state to inter-
vene in social insurance markets in order to create more comprehensive 
systems of social insurance than markets can produce. Unless insurance 
is, to some extent, made to be compulsory and in the absence of an obliga-
tion for insurance companies to accept all individuals, social insurances 
would be (too) socially selective.
 Systems of social insurance are systems of (compulsory) risk sharing. 
High-risk and low-risk categories are brought together under the same 
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insurance in order to carry the total costs of damage experienced by the 
insured group. Risk-sharing between high- and low-risk categories cre-
ates solidarity: solidarity between young and old or between the healthy 
and the sick. This solidarity is formal and detached, which means that it is 
the enforced product of a (comprehensive) system of social insurance.
 Other parts of the social security system, social assistance for exam-
ple, can also be characterised as programmes through which people take 
responsibility for each other. However, need, not risk, is the central cat-
egory around which these programmes are organised (Kemshall 2002). 
This type of responsibility-taking organises solidarity between the haves 
and the have-nots; it organises solidarity around society’s most vulner-
able groups and individuals. Need-based solidarity in social assistance is 
as formal as the solidarity organised in social insurance systems because 
social assistance in a welfare state is financed using general fiscal rev-
enues.
 As welfare states developed, the dynamics of the collectivisation of so-
cial risks produced increasingly universal programmes. The dynamics of 
collectivisation can explain why social insurance has become increasingly 
universal. However, it cannot explain why social insurance, or welfare 
state programmes in general, came into being. This question is answered 
by Baldwin in his book The Politics of Solidarity (1990) in which he de-
scribes the forces that gave birth to the modern, universal welfare state. 
In the first place, these forces are economic ones. The programmes of the 
welfare state, for example, social insurance, housing and health care, fulfil 
an economic function in the sense that they contribute to the optimal 
functioning of the economy. But this is not nearly enough to create a uni-
versal welfare state. The second mechanism that contributed to this is the 
political process in which the legitimacy of the modern state is produced. 
By developing a welfare state, the nation state attempted to organise its 
own legitimacy, as Bismarck tried to do when he introduced social insur-
ance in Germany in the nineteenth century. But again, this mechanism is 
not nearly enough to explain the birth of the modern universal welfare 
state. A third and important mechanism is what Baldwin calls the logic of 
social interests. One needs the support of the middle class to develop a 
broad welfare state. Therefore, coalitions of both working class and mid-
dle class parties lie at the foundation of broad, universal welfare states in 
which welfare state programmes not only cater to the working class but 
also to the middle class. Finally, administrative factors play a role in this 
development. The history and administrative capacities of nation states 
can limit or fuel the development of a universal welfare state.
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 Hence, the welfare state that developed in industrial society is a com-
plex system of services and provisions, from health care and education 
to housing and social security. First and foremost, this system of services 
provides citizens with social security, ranging from income support when 
needs are not met by the market, to housing subsidies when housing is 
too expensive. Secondly, and to a certain extent, the welfare state equal-
ises life chances through meritocratic education policy or universal health 
care services. Thirdly, the welfare state promotes social integration, that 
is, participation in dominant social institutions. The services and provi-
sions of the welfare state facilitate social integration, for example through 
education or labour market participation, but social integration is also 
produced by the obligations that always accompany social rights. Rights 
to housing, education, health care or social security are matched by obli-
gations to pay taxes, to work, and more generally, to conform to the social 
norms embedded in dominant social institutions. Thus the welfare state 
is also a disciplinary state.
 When we define the welfare state as an institution that provides so-
cial security, equalises life chances and promotes social integration, this 
definition implies that the welfare state is much more than an institu-
tion that protects the vulnerable and the needy (Goodin 1985, 1988). What 
distinguishes the welfare state of the twentieth century from nineteenth-
century poor laws and the first social security laws, is the fact that it pro-
vides services and provisions to all, not only to the poor. The growth of 
the welfare state in the twentieth century, especially during ‘the golden 
age’, was made possible by conditions of stable nuclear family structures 
and economic stability, resulting in stable employment and high levels 
of family-wage employment. National governments were able to manage 
their national economies through neo-Keynesian policies, policies based 
on a political coalition between the working and middle classes that fa-
voured state action for managing the economy as well as the organisation 
of social services and provisions (Taylor-Gooby 2004: 1-2).
 As noted above, since the golden age of the welfare state, the social 
and economic context of welfare states has changed fundamentally. These 
changes can be expected to affect the perception of risks, the willing-
ness to share risks and consequently the management of social risks. In 
the next three sections we will discuss risk perception and risk sharing 
from three different perspectives. We will investigate the possible con-
sequences of processes of individualisation and globalisation on the per-
ceptions of risks and the willingness to share risks. In addition, we will 
turn to the idea that the welfare state has become a risk society as a result 
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of processes of globalisation and individualisation, which has led to the 
birth of a new ‘risk culture’. The perception of risks and the willingness to 
share risks is fundamentally different in a risk society as compared to a 
traditional welfare state. We also consider the concept of new social risks. 
Once again, new social risks become manifest as a result of processes of 
individualisation and globalisation. New social risks differ fundamentally 
from old social risks and this is expected to affect the perception of these 
risks as social risks as well as the willingness to share these risks and the 
management of these risks. Having sketched the possible developments 
concerning risk perception and risk sharing, we turn to the expected 
consequences of these developments for the management of social risks. 
Risk management strategies of the old welfare state – redistribution and 
universal services – are expected to give way to a new welfarism that is 
characterised by investment in human capital and the enhancement of 
individual opportunities.
3 Individualisation and globalisation
The welfare state is the product of the long-term processes of collectivi-
sation of both risks and responsibilities. These processes of collectivisa-
tion took place within the context of an industrial economy and alongside 
the evolution of nation states and Fordist firms. These processes were 
favourable to the birth of the welfare state. In the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century, however, these conditions changed. According to Anthony 
Giddens (1980, 1994) for example, the process of social and economic 
modernisation first facilitated the evolution of the welfare state but is 
nowadays undermining the social foundations of the welfare state. This 
weakening of the social foundations of the welfare state is the result of two 
developments. The first is a political and economic development towards 
an open economy; the second is a related social and cultural development 
towards an open society. The first is associated with processes of globali-
sation, the second with processes of individualisation.
 To start with the latter, individualisation concerns the freedom of in-
dividuals to organise their own life as social relationships become less 
intense and coercive. Individualisation is operationalised sociologically 
along different lines. First, it is operationalised in terms of changing val-
ues. In this manner, so called post-materialist values, with a focus on 
individual freedom and self-expression, become increasingly important 
(Inglehart 1977). Secondly, individualisation is operationalised in terms 
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of changing dependencies between individuals. Individualisation implies 
a loosening of the ties between individuals. The social bond becomes less 
coercive and, following Durkheim, this implies an increase in individual 
freedom (Putnam 2000). Thirdly, individualisation is operationalised as 
increasing social reflexivity: “… individuals (…) become used to filtering 
all sorts of information relevant to their life situations and routinely act 
on the basis of that filtering process” (Giddens 1994: 6). Individualisa-
tion defined as increasing social reflexivity therefore concerns increasing 
choice and knowledge and implies what Giddens calls ‘detraditionalisa-
tion’, whereby the role of tradition is replaced by knowledge.
 Globalisation, on the other hand, has to do with increasing social and 
economic mobility (Urry 2007). Giddens defines globalisation as ‘action at 
distance’: “Our day to day activities are increasingly influenced by events 
happening on the other side of the world. Conversely, local lifestyle hab-
its have become globally consequential” (Giddens 1994: 5). Globalisation 
has two faces. On the one hand, it destroys boundaries between localities 
and as such, it contributes to the process of individualisation because it 
increases individual freedom of choice. On the other hand, it creates new 
bonds between distant actors as they become increasingly interdependent 
within a global network.
 Globalisation and individualisation open up national economies and 
societies. The welfare state is built around the nation state, which makes 
it vulnerable to processes of globalisation. Economies are organised and 
controlled within the territorial boundaries of nation states. Globalisation 
can diminish the institutional capacities of national states, thereby un-
dermining the fiscal foundation of welfare states as capital and financial 
markets become increasingly global and mobile. Individualisation is like-
wise a possible threat to the welfare state. Shared risks, shared preferenc-
es and shared fates are the social foundation of the welfare state. When 
these shared understandings fade away, it is possible that the perception 
of risks as social risks as well as the willingness to share risks collectively 
will diminish. This diminished willingness to share risks collectively can 
be the result of a shift towards post-materialist cultural values, but can 
also be the result of what Giddens terms the rise of manufactured risks, 
that is, risks that are produced by the reflexivity of social institutions. 
Both processes stimulate a perception of social risks as being the result 
of (individual) choice. Consequently, this perception of social risks can 
diminish either the willingness to share risks or the way in which risks are 
managed, for example by paying greater attention to the choices people 
make and trying to influence these choices.
 ROMKE VAN DER VEEN
4 Risk society, risk syndrome and the willingness to share risks
The idea of changing social risks and changing risk perceptions not only 
plays a central role in the debate about the welfare state; in sociology, the 
notion of risk and the social manifestation of risks is also discussed on a 
more fundamental level. We now turn to this discussion about risks and 
the risk society.
 What do we mean by the concept of risk? In general, the risk of a cer-
tain event, for example the risk of occupational disability, is the prob-
ability of a dangerous event such as an industrial accident, multiplied 
by the amount of expected damage connected to this event, the loss of 
income (Bora 2007). This information-theoretical concept of risk is the 
concept used by insurance companies. The extent of risk, then, is a ques-
tion of complete or incomplete information. Risk is therefore opposed to 
certainty (Blom and Nijhuis 1996: 278). Risk management has to do with 
acquiring as much information as possible regarding risk probability and 
damage. This probabilistic concept of risk is at the heart of the economic 
model of rational action on which actuarial science is founded, the sci-
ence on which (social) insurance is founded.
 Next to the information-theoretical concept of risk, a decision-theoret-
ical concept of risk can be distinguished. Th is decision-theoretical concept 
of risk was developed by Luhmann (1991). For Luhmann, risks have to do 
with actions and decisions that can have future consequences. In other 
words, risk is caused by social decisions. Risks are entered into, dangers we 
undergo (Blom and Nijhuis 1996: 278). Risk, as well as danger, is uncertain, 
but risks are the consequences of choice and social action whereas danger 
can be attributed to the (external) environment, to nature. According to 
Luhmann, modern society is a risk society. Th e combination of increasing 
social complexity and increasing choice creates a greater number of risks. 
Increased complexity also creates an increase of risk because complexity 
intensifi es the possibility that (unintended) interferences between actions 
and the environment will occur. According to Luhmann, modern society 
is therefore characterised by its risk culture. He even speaks of a ‘risk syn-
drome’, which makes people extremely aware of and averse to risks.
 Related to the distinction between the information-theoretical and de-
cision-theoretical concept of risk is the distinction between objective and 
subjective definitions of risks. The traditional information-theoretical 
concept of risk is based on an objective notion of risk. Luhmann’s ‘sociol-
ogy of risk’, on the other hand, is about subjective perceptions of risk and 
a risk syndrome, which is an exaggerated sensitivity to risks.
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 Luhmann’s sociology of risk is directly related to the notion of the risk 
society, as introduced by Ulrich Beck (1986). Central to Beck’s concept of 
the risk society is the notion of reflexivity. The institutions and technolo-
gies of modern society have developed to a point where we are increasing-
ly confronted with unintended technical and social consequences, such 
as pollution and welfare dependency. Initially, during the first phase of 
modernisation, institutions and technologies facilitated (social) control 
– for example the social control of risks. But as social control increased, 
unintended consequences increased as well. These unintended conse-
quences were reinforced by ongoing processes of individualisation and 
globalisation. Modernity has therefore entered a second phase in which 
the (negative) unintended consequences of institutions and technologies 
overshadow the (positive) intended consequences. This second phase is 
called reflexive modernity, or second modernity, which is characterised 
by a loss of control and a loss of faith in the beneficial workings of institu-
tions, technologies and expert knowledge.
 In Beck’s notion of the risk society the negative consequences of tech-
nology and institutions, for example nuclear fall out, environmental pol-
lution, or the decreased efficiency of the welfare state, overshadow the 
positive consequences. In this respect, Beck differs fundamentally from 
Luhmann because Luhmann’s conceptualisation of risk is led by a more 
subjective notion of a risk culture and the idea of a risk syndrome, where-
as Beck concentrates on objective changes in risks.
 In the theoretical discussion about risk, Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006: 
12) observe (among others) the following trends:
– a rapid expansion of interest in and awareness of risk;
– a shift from a reliance on expert perspectives to much greater recog-
nition of the independent value of lay perspectives in the understand-
ing of risk;
– an associated move from rational actor approaches to more socially 
informed approaches;
– a shift away from approaches directed at the elimination or reduction 
of risk towards interest in the management of risks as they can be 
identified;
– new policy approaches which empower individuals as the respon-
sibility for coping with risks shifts from the state to citizens, which 
runs parallel to a greater sophistication in identifying risk factors 
and a greater sophistication in regulating and governing particular 
groups.
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These developments represent a shift towards a more decision-theoretical 
and subjective interpretation of the notion of risk. And this is where the 
sociological discussion on risk and discussions on changing welfare states 
overlap. The notion of a risk society, as developed by Luhmann, Beck 
and Giddens, suggests that risks are increasingly perceived as internal, 
or manufactured risks. This perception can undermine the willingness 
to share risks. But, following Luhmann, this change in perception does 
not necessarily lead to decreased support for risk sharing. The hypoth-
esis that support for risk sharing is diminishing dominates the debate on 
changing welfare states and is supported by Beck. But Luhmann’s idea of a 
risk syndrome suggests that people experience risks more intensively and 
therefore seek protection for these risks, which, on the contrary, might 
increase support for risk sharing.
5 New social risks
In Beck’s notion of a risk society, both the subjective perception of risks 
and the objective manifestation of risks are changing. This idea of objec-
tive transformations in the character of social risks is also present in the 
debate on social risks and the welfare state. This is the debate on so-called 
new social risks (Taylor-Gooby 2004), or risks more commonly associated 
with a post-industrial economy. The question, then, is whether the risks 
people encounter in a post-industrial economy and an individualised so-
ciety can be compared to the risks people experienced in traditional, in-
dustrial economies, and if not, whether this justifies the creation of differ-
ent social welfare services and provisions (Kemshall 2002).
 Three approaches can be distinguished in the discussion on new so-
cial risks. The first approach observes a different manifestation of so-
cial risks in post-industrial society. Traditional risks such as unemploy-
ment and old age are replaced by new social risks, risks often centred on 
work-life arrangements (Esping-Andersen 2000). Within this approach, 
Bonoli (2004) defines new social risks as situations in which individu-
als experience welfare losses, which have arisen due to socio-economic 
transformations, including most importantly, the growth of service sector 
employment and the large number of women that have entered the la-
bour market. These new social risks are the result of a combined effect of 
family and labour market events and tend to affect (low-skilled) younger 
people, families with young children and working women. Bonoli distin-
guishes the following new social risks (2004: 4-5):
RISK AND THE WELFARE STATE
– reconciling work and family life: the increasing participation of wom-
en in the labour market has undermined the traditional division of 
labour within families. Domestic work and childcare therefore often 
need to be externalised. An inability to reconcile work and family life 
can lead to a risk of poverty, especially for lower-income households.
– single parenthood: changes in family structures have resulted in in-
creased rates of single parenthood. Single parents face greater dif-
ficulties in reconciling work and family life, which again creates an 
increased risk of poverty.
– having a frail or elderly relative: the massive entry of women into the 
labour market not only necessitates the externalisation of childcare 
but also the externalisation of elderly care and care for disabled fam-
ily members. This development can also result in important welfare 
losses.
– possessing low or obsolete skills: in a post-industrial economy, low-
skilled individuals are most often employed in the service sector. 
These services provide little scope for increases in productivity. Em-
ployment in this low value-added sector comes with a higher risk of 
poverty, in part if no minimum wage is guaranteed, but also due to 
the considerably higher risk of unemployment associated with service 
sector work.
– insufficient social security coverage: social security coverage in most 
European welfare states, notably pension schemes, is still based on 
notions of traditional, full-time, continuous employment that starts 
at an early age and includes a salary that grows over time. New career 
profiles and the massive occurrence of part-time work may result in 
new risks of poverty for (older) people.
A related but nevertheless different approach to new social risks is used 
by Elchardus (2003). He states that in a knowledge economy risks con-
centrate with specific vulnerable groups and that these risks have become 
more predictable. The combination of an increased concentration and 
predictability of risks with welfare programmes that increasingly expect 
individuals to act more responsibly, to be employable and to take more 
initiative, undermines the solidarity on which welfare programmes rest. 
It is those individuals who have the most difficulty meeting these new ex-
pectations that run the highest risk of welfare losses. A new social cleav-
age is created between those capable of meeting the new expectations and 
those who are not. This is mainly a cleavage between the high and the low 
educated.
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 The third approach to new social risks has already been mentioned 
– the idea of manufactured risks: due to increasing knowledge and (indi-
vidual) choice, social risks become manufactured risks. On the one hand, 
manufactured risks are the product of choices and lifestyles because 
choice and lifestyle can affect individual health, making the risk of sick-
ness and disability to a certain extent a manufactured risk. On the other 
hand, manufactured risks are the product of individuals’ willingness to 
learn and adapt. Their ‘employability’ is dependent on this and so are (to a 
certain extent) their labour market chances. In this sense unemployment 
can be viewed as a manufactured risk as well.
 The changing character of social risks can affect the willingness of 
people to share risks. Esping-Andersen (2000), Bonoli (2004) and El-
chardus (2003) all point to the fact that the categories of people who are 
affected by new social risks are often the politically weakest categories, 
individuals often not mobilised by trade unions. Following Baldwin’s ear-
lier mentioned logic of social interests, this lack of mobilisation will un-
dermine the forces that support universal social security coverage. The 
hypothesis of diminishing willingness to share risks is also supported by 
power resource theory (Korpi 1985), which explains welfare state devel-
opment from a perspective of how power is distributed among different 
social groups. New social risks tend to concentrate with the weakest so-
cial groups, groups traditionally not mobilised by unions, such as young 
workers and women. As a result, insider/outsider problems manifest 
themselves between traditional union members and the groups affected 
by new social risks.
 Having discussed the different perspectives on risk perception and risk 
sharing we now turn to the issue of risk management. We expect that the 
changes sketched in the previous sections fuel fundamental changes in 
the way risks are dealt with. It is suggested that old welfarism, based on 
redistribution through social security and universal services, is giving way 
to a new welfarism based on notions of investment and inclusion.
6 Towards a new welfarism?
The changing character of risks affects the management of risks too. The 
welfare state is an institution that is meant to protect against and control 
risks. Within the welfare state, the traditional solution to risk manage-
ment is to provide citizens with social security. But risk management can 
also take place by investing in people’s ability to deal with risks (Bonoli 
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2004). Taylor-Gooby expects this strategy for dealing with social risks to 
become dominant. He defines this new welfarism as the notion that:
(...) economic globalization, labour market fl exibility, more complex 
patterns of family life and the dissolution of traditional class structures 
require a new welfare settlement. Since full employment, redistribu-
tion and expensive universal services are no longer seen as feasible, the 
new welfarism can only justify social spending as investment in hu-
man capital and the enhancement of individual opportunities. Welfare 
states are all driven in the same direction by the imperatives of interna-
tional competition. (Taylor-Gooby 1997: 171)
A welfare state that focuses on investment in human capital and the en-
hancement of individual opportunities is often called a social investment 
state (see, for example, Giddens 1998; Esping-Andersen 2001). Giddens 
still sees the social investment state as a welfare state, but as a welfare 
state in which public responsibility has changed from protective to pre-
ventative, in which public policies are directed at empowering people 
and communities and in which notions of ‘positive welfare’ prevail. In 
his book, The Transformation of the Welfare State (2002), Gilbert prefers 
to talk about the enabling state. Gilbert characterises the transformation 
towards an enabling state as a shift “... from the ideal-type Scandinavian 
model of social welfare to a market-oriented version, which is identified 
with the Anglo-American approach” (2002: 4).
 Taylor-Gooby (1997) suggests that welfare states are unavoidably de-
veloping in the direction of a new welfare settlement characterised by 
the ideology of new welfarism. The logic of international competition re-
quires a welfare state that is lean, flexible and suited to a post-Fordist, 
post-industrial economy. This perspective follows the so-called ‘There is 
no Alternative’ (TINA) approach: globalisation washes over local econo-
mies making the erosion of the welfare state inescapable.
 The idea of new welfarism also fits Giddens’ notion of manufactured 
risks. This perspective on social risks places more emphasis on individual 
responsibility in the manifestation of risks in comparison to the old wel-
farist notion of risk, which focuses on the collective and systemic char-
acter of risks. Giddens’ new welfarism is characterised by prevention and 
‘positive welfare’. On the one hand, policies directed at prevention are 
meant to influence the choices people make. On the other hand, positive 
welfare refers to all kinds of policies that invest in people in an attempt 
to make them better equipped to deal with risks. Both Taylor-Gooby and 
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Giddens contend new welfarist policies to be better equipped to deal with 
new social risks. Given the earlier mentioned tendency towards diminish-
ing support for risk sharing, the question is, however, whether the ideol-
ogy of new welfarism is also affected by this process of diminishing soli-
darity.
 The idea behind the ‘new welfarism’ thesis is that changing social prob-
lems make fundamental changes in social policies inevitable. The obvi-
ous rebuttal against this TINA argument is the fact that national welfare 
trajectories remain very distinct; in other words, politics still appear to 
make a difference. The continued importance of national politics suggests 
that new welfarism, or the ‘logic of international competition’, is just as 
politically mediated as the ‘logic of industrialism’ was. After all, the logic 
of industrialism produced distinctly different welfare states and the logic 
of international competition can likewise affect various welfare states in 
different ways. Therefore the conclusion must be that although a tenden-
cy towards ‘new welfarism’ may exist, it does leave room for alternative 
developments. However, this is highly dependent on the strength of the 
logic of international competition. The strength of this logic is probably 
most dependent upon the extent to which economic sectors are exposed 
to international competition. Employers, unions and workers in exposed 
sectors are much more concerned with containing upward pressure on 
labour costs than their equals in sheltered sectors are (Katzenstein 1985, 
Schwartz 1994, Clayton and Pontusson 1998).
 The reversal of the TINA argument, which predicts unavoidable chang-
es in risk management in the direction of new welfarism, is that despite 
changing conditions, little change is to be expected. According to Pierson 
(1996), the logic of increasing returns hinders fundamental change in wel-
fare programmes, especially in the direction of retrenchment. Sunk costs 
and vested interests make it very difficult to organise political support 
for programmatic changes. Pierson predicts strong opposition to welfare 
state change, either from working-class parties or from groups with vest-
ed interests in existing welfare programmes.
 However, we must take into account the fact that despite political op-
position to restructuring and retrenchment, fundamental change is not to 
be excluded. As Pierson has argued (1994), programmatic change – that 
is, change that affects the content, level and range of social rights – is not 
easy to realise. Systemic change, however, change that primarily affects 
the administration, financing or implementation of programmes is easier 
to realise, and can have important programmatic consequences that are 
not directly visible, but manifest themselves in the long run. For example, 
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systemic change in the organisation and political structure of social insur-
ance in the Netherlands during the 1980s enabled programmatic change 
during the 1990s (Van der Veen et al. 2000). More generally, Bonoli and 
Palier (1998) suggest that a first wave of welfare reform during the 1980s 
left social protection arrangements largely intact, but a second wave of 
reform during the 1990s was more substantial. The interaction between 
systemic and programmatic changes made this substantial change pos-
sible.
 The fact that although welfare states are to some extent change-resis-
tant, this does not prevent change in the long run, was recently under-
scored by Streeck and Thelen (2005; see also Hacker 2004), who have 
introduced the notion of gradual change. In contrast to the dominant in-
stitutional theory of policy change, which sees many obstacles to policy 
change requiring external crises to make policy change possible, the au-
thors observe many instances of policy change not produced by external 
crises but as a result of more gradual changes. Streeck and Thelen distin-
guish five institutional mechanisms that can bring about policy change 
independently of external crises. For example, policy change can take 
place when new institutions are introduced alongside older institutions, 
in this way preventing political opposition, or by introducing new prac-
tices within existing programmes that gradually take over the function of 
older institutions or mechanisms. These forms of change are the result 
of the mechanisms of layering and displacement. Policy change can also 
be the result of the strategic use of existing institutions to achieve new 
policy goals: drift and conversion. Finally, policy change can be the result 
of ‘decreasing returns’: the gradual collapse of existing institutions that 
makes policy change possible.
7 The research and outline of the book
Having sketched the sociological background to our research it is neces-
sary to stress that this book is about risk perception and risk sharing and 
that we do not investigate processes of globalisation and individualisation 
and the manifestation of risks itself. Rather, we investigate the theoreti-
cally assumed changes that have taken place in people’s understanding of 
risks as a result of these processes as discussed in the previous sections. In 
this book we analyse the perceptions various actors have regarding social 
risks, the willingness of these actors to share risks and thirdly, we investi-
gate how risks are shared and managed in a variety of contexts.
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 Our study is based on research into (changes in) the perceptions and 
opinions of different actors, but we have also researched actual processes 
of risk sharing and risk management in different contexts. The different 
research projects that make up this study have all been executed in the 
Netherlands.
 This book attempts to answer three empirical questions:
– concerning risks:
1 What changes can be observed in the perception of social risks?
– concerning social solidarity (risk sharing):
2 What changes can be observed in the willingness to share risks? and
– concerning risk management:
3 Given these changes in social risks and social solidarity, what are the 
consequences for the management of social risks?
As far as risk perception and risk sharing are concerned, based on the lit-
erature we expect to find a diminishing perception of risks as social risks 
as well as a diminishing willingness to share risks. There is one exception 
in the literature: Luhmann predicts the development of a risk syndrome, 
which makes people increasingly risk averse, which in turn might stimu-
late individuals’ willingness to share risks. Given the expected diminish-
ing willingness to share risks, it is likely that risk management will be-
come individualised and will be oriented towards prevention. The same 
consequences are to be expected in the development of social policies.
 We start by investigating the perceptions of risks and the willingness to 
share risks. Chapters two and three analyse citizens’ perceptions of social 
risks and their notions of social solidarity based on data collected in a 
large survey (N = 2500) among Dutch citizens. Chapter two concentrates 
on welfare state support and Chapter three analyses how individualisation 
affects the perceptions of risks and the willingness to share risks. In Chap-
ter four, we once again analyse the perception of risks and the willingness 
to share risks, but now based on a much more detailed investigation of 
temporary and flexible workers. We analyse, in particular, how their la-
bour market position affects their opinions about social security. In the 
following chapters we turn from opinions and perceptions to practices. 
In Chapter five, the introduction of employability – a new form of risk 
management – is investigated within the context of firms and collective 
bargaining. Chapter six focuses on strategies of risk management in col-
lective labour agreements and Chapter seven focuses on labour policies 
in transnational firms. We are also interested in the implementation of 
new strategies of risk management in the administration of social policy; 
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therefore in Chapter eight we investigate the implementation of activation 
and labour market reintegration policies in a welfare agency. In Chapter 
nine, we bring the arguments developed in these chapters together in a 
final, concluding chapter.
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2 Contested Solidarity
 Risk Perception and the Changing Nature of Welfare State 
Solidarity
 Romke van der Veen, Peter Achterberg and Judith Raven
Social solidarity is one of the central pillars of the welfare state. In this 
chapter, we investigate to what extent the welfare state is supported by pub-
lic opinion. We see support for the welfare state as an important indicator 
of social solidarity. First, we investigate whether welfare state support is 
diminishing, as is often suggested. We fi nd that in reality, welfare state sup-
port is not decreasing. Rather, it has been constant or has even increased 
during the last ten to fi fteen years. Given the fact that welfare state policies 
are changing, what does this high level of welfare state support mean? Does 
it mean the public opposes the retrenchment taking place in social policies, 
or does it mean the public supports these changes? To answer these ques-
tions, the second part of this chapter focuses on investigating the nature of 
social solidarity: Under which circumstances and with whom are people 
willing to share risks? We try to answer this question by investigating how 
people think about social risks, about deservingness and about the norma-
tive foundations of social policy. Our conclusion is that the welfare state is 
still fi rmly supported by public opinion because the developments in social 
policies are in line with developments in public opinion. Both are develop-
ing in the direction of increased conditionality and obligatory reciprocity.
1 Support for welfare state (reform)
It is often argued that developments in Dutch public opinion are diamet-
rically opposed to the direction in which Dutch welfare policy is chang-
ing. Research from the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal 
Cultureel Planbureau; SCP) demonstrates overwhelming welfare state 
support among the Dutch population and suggests that people more or 
less reject ongoing efforts to reform and retrench the Dutch welfare state 
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(Becker 2005). Various authors have pointed to comparable circumstanc-
es abroad: high levels of welfare state support are accompanied by policies 
aimed at reform and retrenchment (Ringen 1987; Kaase and Newton 1995; 
Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999).
 Allegedly high welfare state support is also contrary to predictions in 
academia, which claim there is an emerging ‘crisis of the welfare state’. So-
cial scientists and economists have long argued that there are certain per-
verse mechanisms within the system that undermine the welfare state and 
its legitimacy (Murray 1984; De Swaan 1988; Hirschman 1980). Declining 
welfare state support is the supposed inevitable result of rising costs and 
increased claims on welfare state arrangements. However, these negative 
tendencies in welfare state support have not been observed empirically. 
Welfare state support in the Netherlands rose between 1975 and 2004 
(from 71 to 91, compare to Becker 2005). In other European countries, 
the level of welfare state support is also notably high – as can be seen 
from research in Great Britain, Germany and Italy. An increase in support 
is discernable in these countries, as is the case in the Netherlands (Kaase 
and Newton 1995: 83).
 However, this strong and increasing welfare state support needs to be 
re-examined. After all, the welfare state is not a stable subject: welfare 
state policies have changed considerably since the 1980s. When people 
are asked to give their opinion about the welfare state, the subject they are 
talking about is in constant flux. A question about welfare state support 
thus means something else in 1985 than in 2010, for example, because the 
welfare state in 1985 was different than the welfare state of today. Increas-
ing levels of support are therefore likely to indicate a growing consensus 
about changes that have occurred across time. People are possibly sup-
porting a new type of welfare state, one which is better suited to their 
ideas about an ideal welfare state.
 In the Netherlands, the changes undergone by the welfare state dur-
ing the past decades can be summarised by two developments. First, the 
Netherlands has witnessed a decrease in welfare expenditure, which is 
partly the result of the fact that the level of generosity of welfare arrange-
ments has decreased. This means that the Dutch welfare state has re-
trenched over the years (Green-Pedersen 2002). At the same time, how-
ever, there has been a small increase in the share of people who support 
the welfare state. These observations combined lead us to hypothesise 
that welfare state support is in fact increasing because the welfare state is 
being retrenched. Table 1 shows the trends in welfare state support for the 
years 1981 to 2000, controlled for expenditure and generosity.
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The table above shows that welfare state support is indeed increasing due 
to the changing nature of the welfare state. We see a significant increase 
in support for the welfare state between 1981 and 2000. Our conclusion 
is that people increasingly support the welfare state because the wel-
fare state has been retrenched. We deduce this based on the significant 
decrease in support found when controlled for generosity. This means 
that if generosity had stayed the same from 1981 to 2000, support would 
have decreased. In reality, generosity decreased, hence the rise in sup-
port. This means that large-scale reforms of social security have been, by 
and large, supported by the public (Achterberg, Van der Veen and Raven 
2010).
 Although this conclusion provides a striking contradiction in compari-
son to other literature on the subject, it is not very remarkable. For exam-
ple, information on electoral support for parties that support neo-liberal 
policies (welfare retrenchment and less state intervention) shows that the 
public has generally become increasingly supportive of welfare state re-
trenchment (see Figure 1, next page). Support for parties that underscore 
a generous welfare state and more state intervention has gradually dimin-
ished (Achterberg 2006).
 Our conclusion that the public increasingly supports the welfare state 
due to retrenchment would only be remarkable if electoral support for 
parties underscoring neo-liberal policies were to remain unmatched by 
equivalent support for welfare state retrenchment. In short, the discrep-
ancy between public opinion and developments in actual policies may be 
smaller than is often suggested.
Table 1 Trends in support for the welfare state (correlations with year; 1981-2000; 




















1 controlled for unemployment and GDP; * p< 0.05
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands (1981-2000)
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2 Public opinion on social security
To research public opinion about social security, we carried out a survey 
among a representative sample of the Dutch population in 2006. Many of 
the questions we asked were the same as questions posed in a comparable, 
representative sample in 1995 (van Oorschot 1999). We asked respondents 
about support for various kinds of welfare arrangements and also about 
their motivations to support the welfare state. Social security arrange-
ments are targeted at different social groups and public opinion dem-
onstrates varying feelings towards different social groups in society. We 
investigated the support for four arrangements: social assistance, unem-
ployment benefits, old age pensions and sickness/disability benefits. The 
next table (Table 2) shows the support for these four arrangements in 1996 
and 2006. Support is measured by asking people whether they thought 
entitlements should stay the same, should decrease or should increase. 
We observe few significant changes between 1995 and 2006, although the 
support for an increase of entitlements rose between 1995 and 2006. Most 
important, however, is the fact that a large majority supports the arrange-











1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 1 Electoral popularity of neoliberal policy in the Netherlands from 
the 1970s onwards
Source: Political Manifesto Data (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum 2001)
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confirms our conclusion that people support the policy changes that have 
taken place in the Netherlands.
In addition, we asked our respondents how they felt about four different 
aspects related to the recipients of these benefits. First, we asked about 
the degree of control respondents think beneficiaries have over their situ-
ation. For example, control over ageing is generally considered to be ab-
sent; individuals do not control whether they will become a beneficiary of 
old age pensions. However, this cannot be expected for other social secu-
rity schemes; perhaps the public thinks people have a great deal of control 
over needing unemployment assistance. We expected that the more the 
public felt people were in control of specific risks, the less supportive 
public opinion would be of sharing these risks. In other words, if the pub-
lic feels individuals are in control of social risks, they are likely to be less 
supportive of social security schemes that manage these risks. Opinion 
on control, that is the extent to which people are held responsible for be-
ing dependent on social security, has not changed and swings around the 
theoretical mean, meaning the respondents have no clear opinion on this 
either way (see Table 3). However, this varies when we look at different 
risks.
 In 1995, 35 per cent of the Dutch public thought being employed was 
something an individual had under his or her own control; in 2006, this 
was 62 per cent. In terms of unemployment, in 1995, 13 per cent of the 
Dutch public thought unemployment was something an individual could 
control; in 2006, this rose to 26 per cent. Finally, perceived responsibility 
Table 2 Support for decreasing, increasing or stable entitlements to social security 
benefi ts (1995/2006)
decrease remain stable increase
1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006
Social assistance 
benefi ts
14 13 58 53 28 34
Unemployment 
benefi ts
30 24 61 62 9 14
Disability benefi ts 3 2 56 49 41 49
Old-age pensions 11 5 63 56 26 39
Source: Tisser solidarity study, Tilburg University, 1995; Arbeid, Bedrijf en Sociale Zekerheid 
(Labour, Organization and Social Security), SIG/Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2006
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for being a single mother on welfare increased from 15 per cent in 1995 
to 25 per cent in 2006. Second, we asked about trust: Do people think 
beneficiaries will act according to the rules of the welfare system? We 
expect that as trust in welfare beneficiaries increases, so will the support 
for social security schemes aimed at trustworthy beneficiaries. In general, 
our respondents think there is a lot of misuse, so trust is relatively low. 
Third, we asked about the level of identification with beneficiaries. Our 
idea is that the willingness to share risks collectively is more prevalent 
when benefits are targeted at individuals with whom the public identifies 
or shares similarities. This expectation is confirmed: our respondents are 
more willing to share risks with others with whom they identify. Lastly, 
we asked about the level of neediness: do our respondents think welfare 
beneficiaries really need welfare assistance? We expected that when peo-
ple regard social categories as particularly needy, they will support wel-
fare arrangements targeted at these categories. This relationship between 
need and support was confirmed as well, and even though many people 
think welfare beneficiaries misuse social security arrangements, they also 
think many of these beneficiaries really need social assistance. We found 
no major changes in these opinions between 1995 and 2006. The next 
table shows how the Dutch public thinks about control, trust, need and 
identity.
Next, using the concept of reciprocity, we analysed whether the public 
at large supports recent welfare reforms in the Netherlands. The level of 
reciprocity is basically determined by the balance between the rights and 
obligations of beneficiaries incorporated into a social security scheme. 
Table 3 Opinions about the norms of control, trust, need and identity in 1995 and 
2006 in the Netherlands
1995 2006
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Control (1-5) 3.13 (0.58) 2.93 0.65)
Trust (1-5) 2.44 (0.57) 2.48 (0.59)
Need (1-10) 6.99 (1.74) 7.13 (1.58)
Identity (1-5) 3.61 (0.85) 3.56 (0.94)
Source: Tisser solidarity study, Tilburg University, 1995; Arbeid, Bedrijf en Sociale Zekerheid 
(Labour, Organization and Social Security), SIG/Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2006
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Following Mau (2003, 2004) we distinguish four types of reciprocity: 
generalised, balanced, risk, and obligatory reciprocity. If a scheme can 
be characterised by generalised reciprocity, it means the arrangement 
is generous and does not ask beneficiaries for much in return. Balanced 
reciprocity can be found in arrangements that are based on the principle 
of equivalence: the output is dependent on what people have contributed 
(the input). The more and the longer people have contributed, the higher 
their benefits will be. Risk reciprocity is based on the idea of a safety net, 
which is designed to help people who are likely to encounter certain so-
cial risks. The level of conditionality associated with a safety net is very 
limited, but this means that the actual level of the benefits is also rather 
limited. Obligatory reciprocity, finally, is based on a strict connection 
between social benefits and social obligations. There is strict monitor-
ing of compliance with individual obligations. We find that the Dutch 
public increasingly thinks reciprocity in social security is important. We 
find some change in the way in which the Dutch public underscored 
these reciprocity principles between 1995 and 2006: support for the 
principle of obligatory reciprocity increased and support for the prin-
ciple of generalised reciprocity decreased (Achterberg, Van der Veen 
and Raven 2010).1 This increase in support for obligatory reciprocity was 
matched by actual changes in public policy: as obligatory reciprocity is 
increasingly underscored by the public, public policy increasingly and 
more strongly incorporates these principles. The inevitable result is that 
support for social security arrangements based on obligatory reciprocity 
rises.
 From this we can conclude that public opinion about the principles 
underlying social policies, together with developments in social policies, 
determine, to a great extent, whether the public at large supports social 
policy. This means that increasing support for a welfare state which is 
being retrenched essentially means something else than increasing sup-
port for a stable (in terms of expenditures and generosity) welfare state. 
In the latter, this would signify growing support for an extensive welfare 
state, whereas in the former it means the exact opposite. Therefore, it is 
important to study how the public at large supports welfare reform.
 To that end, it is imperative to elaborate briefly on welfare state re-
forms. Welfare state reform is often discussed in terms of retrenchment 
(Pierson 1994) and recommodification (Gilbert and Gilbert 1989). When 
we look in more detail at the actual policies of welfare reform, four dif-
ferent but connected transformations can be observed (Gilbert 2002). 
The first major transition is privatisation, which basically entails less 
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emphasis on the role of the state in delivering social protection and more 
on the role of the market and private organisations. Secondly, there is in-
creasing selectivity, which implies a restriction of universal social rights 
to an ever-more select group of people in need of social and economic 
support (Pierson 1994). In this way, governments attempt to restrict sup-
port to those who really need it and to avoid giving social support to 
those who do not need it. Third, services are increasingly directed at 
activation in order to enhance labour market participation. In this way, 
dependency on welfare or social security is prevented. Finally, there is an 
increasing tendency to discipline those who are dependent on the wel-
fare state. Rights to social security are increasingly combined with cer-
tain reciprocal obligations (Turner 1997; Van der Veen 2009). If people 
do not comply with these reciprocal obligations, they may be sanctioned, 
e.g. cutting benefits in order to coerce recipients into more desired be-
haviour.
 A detailed analysis of support for these four processes of welfare re-
form shows that two latent, ideological dimensions can be found (see 
Table 4). The first dimension refers to support for redistributive reform; 
that is, reform that affects the redistributive effects of welfare state poli-
cies: in this case, retrenchment. The second dimension refers to support 
for reciprocal reform, that is: reform that affects the relationship between 
rights and duties in social policies: in this case, more obligations and thus 
more reciprocity.





1st factor 2nd factor
Scale for privatisation 0.38 0.28 0.59
Scale for selectivity -0.24 -0.17 0.81
Scale for labour market activation 0.84 0.83 -0.04
Scale for more discipline 0.82 0.85 0.02
Eigenvalue 1.59 1.59 1.15
R2 0.40 0.40 0.27
N 1739
Source: Arbeid, Bedrijf en Sociale Zekerheid (Labour, Organization and Social Security), SIG/
Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2006
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This table shows that both dimensions are independent of each other and 
that activation and more discipline belong to the same normative dimen-
sion (when people score high on the one, they also score high on the oth-
er), as do privatisation and selectivity.
 These two types of support for welfare reform can be related to two 
types of beliefs regarding social justice: beliefs that emphasise distributive 
justice and beliefs that emphasise reciprocal justice. The former ques-
tions whether social rights are distributed in a just manner and the lat-
ter questions whether obligations are distributed in a just manner. The 
table above suggests that the opinions of respondents on these two types 
of social justice are independent of each other. In other words: people 
who support extensive redistribution in welfare policies do not necessar-
ily oppose extensive obligations and a high level of obligatory reciproc-
ity (or vice versa). Our research indicates that the Dutch public is more 
inclined to support reciprocal reform, that is, reform that increases the 
obligatory reciprocity between rights and duties. In Dutch social policy, 
this implies a strengthening of duties among those who receive benefits. 
However, support for and opposition to redistributive reform are evenly 
distributed. Redistributive reform is about increasing or decreasing the 
level of redistribution by means of the range or value of benefits. That the 
public at large is supportive of (obligatory) reciprocal reforms is mainly 
due to the fact that people with different ideological positions (both left 
and right on the political spectrum) are supportive of these types of poli-
cies. Above, we concluded that increased welfare state support can be ex-
plained by the way in which the welfare state itself has developed. Now we 
can refine our conclusion: support is particularly high because the public 
supports reforms of a more reciprocal nature that emphasise obligations. 
And, indeed, reciprocal reforms have occurred often in the Dutch welfare 
state during the past decades.
 Finally, we studied ideas about justice by asking our respondents about 
the way in which they feel various social categories deserve financial assis-
tance from the welfare state. Our research indicates that social categories 
are considered to be deserving if those social groups are perceived to be 
needy and cannot be blamed for their welfare dependency. For instance, 
individuals who become sick or the elderly are generally perceived to be 
the most deserving categories of welfare benefits. On the other hand, if 
people do not want to work, or have become unable to work because of 
something perceived to be their own fault, the public at large thinks they 
do not deserve much financial assistance (see Figure 2).
 ROMKE VAN DER VEEN, PETER ACHTERBERG AND JUDITH RAVEN
Our conclusion, based on the public opinion about social rights, the nor-
mative foundations of social policy and deservingness, is that welfare 
state support as such remains high. The Dutch public is not massively 
abandoning the welfare state. Some are more in favour of the welfare state 
than others, but welfare state support depends upon the type of policy 
being investigated as well as the social categories being targeted by those 
policies. What must be emphasised however is that welfare reforms that 
are aimed at increasing reciprocity between rights and duties, particularly 
when those reforms concern policies aimed at obligatory reciprocity, are 
broadly supported.
3 Explaining welfare state support
While the above findings provide interesting insight, into welfare state 
support and support for welfare reforms, it is also important to investi-
gate the reasons that lie behind this support. One of the most frequently 
used explanations for welfare state support is economic (Gilens 1995; Lip-
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Figure 2 Deservingness perceptions of the Dutch public
Source: Arbeid, Bedrijf en Sociale Zekerheid (Labour, Organization and Social Security), SIG/
Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2006
CONTESTED SOLIDARITY
set 1960; Van Oorschot 2002) or primitive (Campbell et al. 1960) self-
interest. This explanation is straightforward and fairly simple. Those in 
precarious socio-economic positions tend to benefit more from the wel-
fare state than those in strong socio-economic positions. Traditionally, 
welfare state support is, as Svallfors argues ‘[o]ne of the most important 
arenas for contemporary class politics’ (Svallfors 1999: 203). Indeed, peo-
ple in precarious socio-economic positions tend to support economic re-
distribution, government intervention in the economy, and a strong and 
substantial welfare state more than those in favourable economic posi-
tions (Lipset 1981). Svallfors: ‘… people who by virtue of their greater as-
sets are the market winners will look upon the market’s transactions as 
more legitimate and be less inclined to redress market’s distributions than 
those who wield less power upon the market’ (2007: 189). The fact that 
those in precarious economic positions have always been the main con-
stituencies of socialist and leftist parties striving for redistribution and 
economic equality confirms the empirical tenability of this idea (Alford 
1967; Nieuwbeerta 1996; Achterberg and Houtman 2009).
 It can be expected that these class-related relationships are in decline. 
Inglehart, for instance, claims that so-called new, ecological or ‘quality of 
life’ risks are rising in salience at the cost of the old bread-and-butter type 
of risks (loss of property, income and jobs). ‘According to this diagnosis’, 
Inglehart claims, ‘the distributional conflicts over goods that character-
ized industrial society have given way’ (Inglehart 1997: 36). Various au-
thors (Turner 1988; Pakulski and Waters 1996; Hechter 2004) have argued 
that the concept of ‘social class’ in its traditional economic sense is hence 
no longer a valid sociological indicator to describe and explain human be-
haviour (for them, class is dead). Accordingly, one’s position on the labour 
market and one’s economic position supposedly are losing grip on the 
lives of people in post-industrial society. The idea of ‘fluidisation’ (Bau-
man 2000) resonates with this idea. This means that political behaviour, 
political values and public opinion are thought to be becoming increas-
ingly unpredictable. It is argued that people increasingly formulate their 
political ideas without taking their own social risks and class position into 
account (Rose and McAllister 1986). In a similar vein, Pakulski and Waters 
(1996) write about the rise of ‘choice politics’ – purely based on individual 
choice, which is no longer guided by any social factor.
 As ‘old collective identities of class have been displaced by newer 
modes of self-identity’ (Savage 2001: 79), and people are said to have their 
own fragmented ideological profiles, this suggests that collective ideals of 
welfare state support no longer are grounded in a class position and an 
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economic egalitarian ideology. In the words of Atkinson: highly individu-
alised people are individuals who ‘in their quest for self-realization flit 
between attitudes, activities and goods like bees in search of pollen’ (At-
kinson 2007: 362). This would mean that social class no longer determines 
how people think about economic egalitarian policies and that social class 
is no longer directly related to opinions about the welfare state.
 Moreover, there are other indications that views of the welfare state are 
decreasingly framed within the context of class conflicts over a fair dis-
tribution of social rights. Instead, public opinion toward the welfare state 
may be increasingly framed in the context of conflicts over a fair distribu-
tion of social obligations. Mead argues that: ‘... social policy must focus 
on motivation and order rather than opportunity or equality’ (Mead 1992: 
112). Mead’s argument that there is a politics of conduct rather than of class 
and that the issues of class are no longer at the centre of the political stage 
(Mead 1992) resonates with the idea that there is a new political culture in 
which issues of class have given way to new cultural issues about confor-
mity and cultural deviance (Achterberg 2006; Heath et al. 1990). Instead of 
issues of state intervention, and typical bread and butter issues pertaining 
to economic redistribution, new issues such as cultural deviancy, crime 
fi ghting, and the like have moved centre stage (Rempel and Clark 1997; 
Clark 1996, 2001; Hechter 2004). A ‘culturalisation of politics’ may also 
have aff ected the public debate about the welfare state.
 Th e willingness to accept cultural diversity is hence a second explanation 
for welfare state support. In this explanation, support is the result of com-
passion with the fate of others. Th is compassion can be fairly broad – in-
cluding all social categories – or narrow – including only those individuals 
who the public identifi es with, individuals from their own social category. 
To a certain degree, welfare recipients deviate from the dominant ethos 
that one has to work in order to provide for oneself. Reciprocal reform can 
be perceived as a way of adjusting the conduct of welfare recipients in con-
formity with the dominant work-ethos (Mead 1992). So, we expect to fi nd a 
correlation between people having authoritarian opinions that emphasise 
conformity to dominant norms and the support for reciprocal reform.
 Our research (see Table 5) indicates that support for the welfare state can 
still be explained economically. Basic self-interest, for example, appeared to 
explain support for reciprocal and redistributive reform fairly well. Th ere is 
a signifi cant relationship between respondents being dependent upon wel-
fare and their support for reciprocal and redistributive reform. Th is means 
that people who are dependent on welfare state support tend to be unsup-
portive of welfare state reforms that infringe upon their economic posi-
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tion. Also, having an egalitarian economic outlook still determines sup-
port for welfare state reform. Th e analyses also show, however, that support 
for reciprocal reform is explained fairly well by one’s willingness to accept 
cultural diversity. Whether one supports more reciprocity in welfare state 
policies strongly depends on one’s views on order and conformism, as the 
signifi cant correlation between authoritarianism and support for recipro-
cal reform shows. Support for reciprocal reform is hence both rooted in 
class interests but also in cultural interests at the same time.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated people’s perceptions about social risks and 
social solidarity and what this implies for welfare state support and the 
restructuring of the welfare state. Th is chapter presents data from a large 
panel survey executed in the Netherlands in 1995 and 2006, investigating 
public opinion on social security and the welfare state. What these data 
show is that the notion of obligatory reciprocity is taking an increasingly 
central place in the way people think about risks and solidarity. In the words 
of Mead (1992): the policies of conduct are becoming ever more important 
and the politics of class are becoming less important in the opinions peo-
ple have about the welfare state. Th e centrality of the notion of reciprocity 
Table 5 Explaining support for reciprocal and distributive reform (OLS regression, 
method = ENTER; entries are betas)
Support for reciprocal 
reform




Financial insecurity -0.03 0.00
Welfare dependency -0.11** -0.07*
Cultural participation -0.03 -0.03





Source: Labour, Organization and Social Security data (2006)
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does not, however, lead to a rejection of social solidarity. Rather, the will-
ingness to share risks is becoming increasingly dependent upon the type of 
risk and the ‘social character’ of welfare benefi t recipients. In addition, the 
idea of reciprocal solidarity does not lead to diminished welfare state sup-
port. Rather, and contrary to what is expected based on existing research, 
reciprocal solidarity translates itself into support for the restructuring of 
welfare state programmes in the direction of increased reciprocity. Since 
the restructuring of most welfare programmes in the Netherlands is in the 
direction of increased obligatory reciprocity, this means that a majority of 
the Dutch public supports this process of restructuring.
 Our general conclusion is that welfare state support has remained high 
because people support a welfare state which is in transition. People are es-
pecially supportive of the welfare state when it conforms to shared ideals of 
(obligatory) reciprocity, and when the welfare state supports those who are 
dependent on fi nancial support because of reasons beyond their own con-
trol. Moreover, people are more supportive of policies targeted at those who 
are – in a cultural sense – much like themselves, and less supportive of poli-
cies aimed at people who are further away from the cultural mainstream.
 Th is implies that support for increased individual responsibility and 
less social protection is limited. Support for collectively shared protection 
against social risks is still present in the Netherlands. But this support 
varies across risk types and categories of benefi t recipients. Social risks 
perceived to apply to almost everyone – e.g. sickness, ageing – receive the 
broadest support and support for universal and distributive welfare mea-
sures. When more specifi c social categories are targeted, however, support 




Table 6  Opinions on reciprocity norms in 1995 and 2006 in the Netherlands
1995 2006
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Obligating reciprocity (0-1) 0.79 (0.31) 0.83 (0.28)
Risk reciprocity (0-1) 0.74 (0.33) 0.75 (0.34)
Balanced reciprocity (0-1) 0.41 (0.28) 0.43 (0.30)
Generalised reciprocity (0-1) 0.89 (0.21) 0.80 (0.29)
Source: Tisser solidarity study, Tilburg University, 1995; Arbeid, bedrijf en sociale zekerheid 
(labour, organisation and social security), SIG/Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2006
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3 Individualisation: A Double-edged Sword
 Does Individualisation Undermine Welfare State Support?
 Peter Achterberg and Judith Raven
In Chapter two we found that welfare state support is still high in the Neth-
erlands, as it is in many other European welfare states. However, this does 
not imply that people oppose the changes that have taken place in welfare 
state policies during the last two decades. On the contrary. We conclud-
ed that support for the welfare state in transition is based on an increas-
ingly shared normative ideal of obligatory reciprocity and on perceptions 
of deservingness. Public opinion about the welfare state and welfare state 
policies appear to develop in the same direction. In this chapter, we delve 
deeper into the sociology of welfare state support. The social process of 
individualisation is often suggested to undermine welfare state support. 
However, we have not found a decrease in welfare state support. In this 
chapter we therefore investigate in more detail the claim that individuali-
sation undermines welfare state support. We make a distinction between 
cultural (or normative) individualisation and (structural) individuali-
sation in social relations. These processes of individualisation appear to 
have different effects on welfare state support. By making this distinction 
in different processes of individualisation we are able to explain continued 
high support for the welfare state. Individualisation not only appears to 
undermine welfare state support, under certain conditions it can also fuel 
welfare state support.
1 Introduction
In the literature pertaining to the legitimacy of the welfare state, it is often 
implied that there is, or should be, a crisis of the welfare state for many 
different reasons. One of the reasons most often mentioned is the process 
of individualisation (e.g. Giddens 1994; Inglehart 1997; Trommel and Van 
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der Veen 1999). Yet, while most authors use the same term, the conceptu-
alisation of individualisation differs widely, and with that the reasons for 
it causing an alleged decline in welfare state legitimacy. While the number 
of interpretations and conceptualisations of individualisation may be nu-
merous, most explanations boil down to two central ideas of cultural and 
structural individualisation (e.g. Atkinson 2007: 353).
 Cultural individualisation implies growing ideals of individual liberty 
and freedom. A great number of studies have shown that in the Nether-
lands, similar to the rest of the Western world, people increasingly em-
phasise ideals of individual freedom, self-actualisation and individual lev-
el political participation (e.g. Inglehart 1977, 1997; Duyvendak 2004), and 
that the importance of socially collectivist values is diminishing (Flanagan 
and Lee 2003; Houtman 2003; Inglehart 1997). Cultural individualisation 
is said to undermine welfare state support for two reasons. First, and the 
most straightforward reason, is that as the importance of collectivism 
declines and as more and more people emphasise individual freedom, 
collectively organised institutions such as the welfare state come under 
pressure. From this perspective, a system of collectively shared risks is 
becoming obsolete.
 The second reason is based on the suggestion that materialists deeply 
value the welfare state, whereas postmaterialists are not concerned for 
materialist issues, and hence do not care as much about the welfare state 
(Inglehart 1997; see also Van Oorschot 2000: 39). This suggestion is based 
on evidence that when values shift towards individualism, as measured 
using Inglehart’s postmaterialism index, this goes together with a decline 
in materialism. In Inglehart’s index, cultural individualists are viewed as 
postmaterialists and cultural collectivists as materialists. Hence, whether 
cultural individualisation is measured and seen as a decrease in cultural 
collectivism or of materialism, the suggestion is made that this form of 
individualisation seriously undermines support for the welfare state.
 The second concept of individualisation entails a more structuralist, 
or better yet, poststructuralist approach. This approach is concerned 
with the way in which social structures, which surround individuals, give 
guidance to individual lives. It is argued that individualisation means in-
dividuals are less embedded in social structures such as class, religion 
and traditions. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim argue that in modern, individu-
alised societies, individuals are increasingly faced with decisions about 
their own life course; the ‘standard biography’ has been replaced by a 
‘do-it-yourself biography’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). As a result, 
structurally individualised people are no longer members of trade unions 
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and churches, and are no longer integrated into the traditional political 
system. The ultimate consequence is that what people experience, what 
risks they run, and the position they take up in society are no longer in-
stitutionally pre-determined. Rather, these become highly individualised 
and may differ from individual to individual, from situation to situation 
(Beck 1997, see also Leisering and Leibfried 1999).
 According to this line of thought, the disembedding of individuals out 
of once influential institutions such as class, religion and politics has 
swept away traditional collective grounds underlying political and socio-
economic values. As a consequence, people are bound to make their own 
strictly individual and highly volatile choices and have their own opinions, 
even about the welfare state (Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). 
As a result, individualisation theorist Beck (1997: 144) argues, interests, 
opinions and issues of conflict become increasingly fragmented. ‘Society 
can no longer look in the mirror and see social classes. The mirror has 
been smashed and all we have left are the individualized fragments’ (Beck 
and Willms 2004: 107).
 Whereas the welfare state was built by certain interest groups having 
enough political power and resources to build a welfare state (Korpi 1983) 
and maintain it (Brooks and Manza 2007), it is evident that the increased 
fragmentation of risks, interests and opinions will ultimately lead to a 
crisis in welfare state legitimacy. The ultimate consequence is that people 
in lower socio-economic positions, who run a high chance of encounter-
ing socio-economic risks, no longer translate these risks into pro-welfare 
state opinions.
 While both ideas of cultural and structural individualisation are often 
brought together under the term individualisation, and both processes 
can be seen to contribute to a crisis of welfare state legitimacy, they are 
seldom related to one another (see for an exception Pakulski and Waters 
1996), especially in empirical research (Elchardus 2008). As Beck notes, 
‘Individualization can no longer be understood as a mere subjective re-
ality which has to be confronted with objective class analysis. Because 
individualisation not only affects the Überbau – ideology, false conscious-
ness – but also the economic Unterbau of “real classes”… [it] is becoming 
the social structure of … society itself ’ (Beck and Beck Gernsheim 2002: 
xxii). In this chapter, we will investigate whether cultural and structural 
individualists are more negative towards the welfare state than collectiv-
ists and whether it is true, for cultural and structural individualists, that 
the presence of socio-economic risks no longer translates into support for 
the welfare state.
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 In the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss the current state of 
research on welfare state support and individualisation and put forward 
some hypotheses. These will then be tested in the section that follows. 
At the end of the chapter, we will discus the theoretical relevance of our 
findings and relate this discussion to the three central questions to be 
answered in this volume.
2 Individualisation, socio-economic risks and solidarity
2.1 Structural and cultural individualisation and support for the welfare state
A central idea in Beck’s (1992; Beck and Beck Gernsheim 2002) Risk Soci-
ety is that risks are radically individualised and are no longer concentrated 
among the unhappy few. Risks have thus become more pervasive through-
out society, are decreasingly detached from class position and cannot be 
contained by traditional, collective and highly standardised means such 
as the welfare state. If this is the case, we expect that structural individual-
ists do not appreciate the welfare state very much. In contrast, individuals 
still highly embedded in social institutions should be proponents of the 
welfare state. Several studies have determined that a process of structural 
individualisation is taking place in the Netherlands, most notably indi-
cated by processes of depillarisation (Middendorp 1991), secularisation 
(Achterberg et al. 2009) and declining union membership (Visser 2006). 
Whether or not this ongoing structural individualisation really leads to 
declining welfare state support remains an empirical question.
 In addition, several studies focused on the cultural changes taking 
place within Western societies have abundantly shown that there most 
definitely is a shift towards increased cultural individualism (Inglehart 
1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As explained 
above, it can be expected that this noted rise in cultural individualisation 
has gone hand-in-hand with decreased levels of support for the welfare 
state. In a study of 43 countries, Inglehart (1997) shows that in countries 
where individual freedom is high on the political agenda, support for wel-
fare state intervention and expansion is much lower than in other coun-
tries. However, it is not possible to conclude that the rise of cultural indi-
vidualism goes hand-in-hand with decreased levels of welfare legitimacy 
based on this macro-level evidence. Let us explain.
 First, Inglehart himself shows that people who can be classifi ed as post-
materialists, who greatly value individual freedom, are more inclined to vote 
for traditionally leftist parties such as socialist or social democratic parties 
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(Inglehart 1977; 1997, see also Achterberg and Houtman 2006). Th ese par-
ties have traditionally been important players in the rise and maintenance 
of welfare states. Th at these cultural individualists have a favourable ten-
dency towards parties generally seen to be in favour of the welfare state 
places the alleged anti-welfarism of these individualists in question.
 Secondly, a study by Erickson and Laycock (2002) among the mem-
bers of the Canadian Social Democrats shows that a preference for social-
ism and policies focused on decommodification is much more prevalent 
among individualists. Those scoring lower on a scale measuring individu-
alism are generally less supportive of decommodifying policies, policies 
associated with a strong welfare state. The mere fact that individualism 
exists among members of a social democratic party underscores that indi-
vidualism probably does not necessarily lead to a decrease in support for 
the welfare state. What’s more, the fact that individualism leads to more 
support for the welfare state, even among these social democrats, implies 
that it is not self-evident that cultural individualism should lead to a de-
crease in support for the welfare state.
 Th ird, a recent study by Achterberg, Van der Veen and Raven (2010) 
shows Dutch cultural individualists are more supportive of a generous wel-
fare state and less supportive of welfare state reforms than cultural col-
lectivists. Th ey argue, following Houtman, Achterberg and Derks (2008), 
that welfare benefi ciaries are increasingly seen as people with more or less 
‘deviant’ lifestyles – being dependent upon welfare whereas the majority of 
the public is not. Cultural individualists who are more tolerant of deviant 
lifestyles tend to be more lenient towards welfare benefi ciaries and to the 
welfare state in general, whereas cultural collectivists, emphasising confor-
mity and order, are not. In other words, the authors fi nd the exact opposite 
from what is expected, which gives rise to the expectation that cultural in-
dividualists are, in fact, more tolerant of the welfare state. In sum, whether 
or not cultural individualism leads to a decline in welfare state legitimacy 
remains an empirical question, one that will be answered in this chapter.
2.2 Individualisation, the death of class, and welfare state support
Although Inglehart’s work is more focused on describing cultural changes, 
he, like Beck, suggests that the risks of life become incalculable through the 
process of modernisation – and that ironically enough, the focus on social 
risks has risen dramatically (Inglehart 1997: 36). Yet, like Beck, he claims that 
this growing concern for risks mainly concerns so-called new, ecological or 
quality of life risks, and not the old, bread-and-butter type of risks (loss of 
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property, income and jobs). ‘According to this diagnosis’, Inglehart claims, 
‘the distributional conflicts over goods that characterized industrial so-
ciety have given way’ (Inglehart 1997: 36). This development would sug-
gest that there are two marked expectations for highly (structural and/
or cultural) individualised people. The first is that these individuals no 
longer have clearly defined values about their socio-economic fates, also 
termed fluidisation (Bauman 2000). The second is that highly individual-
ised socio-economic risks no longer automatically translate into welfare 
state support. We elaborate on both expectations below.
 First, the idea of fluidisation resonates in the writings of influential 
theorists of political behaviour as well. According to these theorists, po-
litical behaviour, political values and public opinion have become increas-
ingly unpredictable. They argue that people increasingly formulate their 
political ideas without taking their own social risks and class position into 
account (Rose and McAllister 1986). In a similar vein, Pakulski and Waters 
(1996) write about the rise of ‘choice politics’ – purely based on individual 
choice, and no longer guided by any social factor. In this sense, Western 
publics are said to have become ‘fluid’, ‘wobbling’ or ‘adrift’ (Andeweg 
1982). ‘Old collective identities of class have been displaced by newer 
modes of self-identity’ (Savage 2001: 79), and individualised people sup-
posedly have their own fragmented ideological profiles, suggesting that 
collective ideals of welfare state support no longer occupy a clearly de-
fined, ideological dimension for those who are most (structurally and or 
culturally) individualised. In the words of Atkinson, highly individualised 
people are individuals who: ‘in their quest for self-realization flit between 
attitudes, activities and goods like bees in search of pollen’ (Atkinson 
2007: 362).
 The second expectation for highly individualised people is that the 
socio-economic risks they (temporarily) encounter no longer translate 
themselves into clearly defined positions about welfare state protection. 
Various authors (Turner 1988; Pakulski and Waters 1996; Hechter 2004) 
have argued that the concept of ‘social class’, in its traditional economic 
sense, is no longer a valid sociological indicator to describe and explain 
human behaviour; for them, class is dead. According to these authors, 
individual socio-economic positions are no longer the primary deter-
minants of individual behaviour in post-industrial societies. While this 
thought continues to resonate in the writings of several contemporary 
sociologists, surprisingly little effort has been undertaken to empirically 
investigate whether social class is no longer an important factor in the 
organisation and structuring of individual political views.
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 While several authors claim ‘class is dead’, many others continue to ex-
plain welfare state support as stemming from ‘economic’ (Gilens 1995; 
Lipset 1960; Van Oorschot 2002) or ‘primitive’ (Campbell, Converse, Mill-
er, and Stokes 1960) self-interest. This explanation is straightforward and 
fairly simple. Those in precarious socio-economic positions or those ex-
periencing the greatest risk of becoming unemployed, impoverished and 
so on, tend to benefit more from redistributive welfare state policies than 
those in stronger socio-economic positions. Traditionally, support for the 
welfare state is, as Svallfors (1999: 203) argues, ‘[o]ne of the most impor-
tant arenas for contemporary class politics.’ Indeed, people in precari-
ous socio-economic positions tend to support economic redistribution, 
government intervention in the economy and a strong and substantial 
welfare state more than those in favourable economic positions (Lipset 
1981). ‘People who by virtue of their greater assets are the market winners 
will look upon the market’s transactions as more legitimate and be less 
inclined to redress market’s distributions than those who wield less power 
upon the market’ (Svallfors 2007: 189). The fact that those in precarious 
economic positions always have been the main constituencies of socialist 
and leftist parties confirms the empirical tenability of this idea (Alford 
1967; Nieuwbeerta 1996). Individuals in precarious socio-economic posi-
tions and those confronting socio-economic risks tend to vote for leftist 
parties in order to redistribute scarce and valuable resources from the 
haves to themselves, the have-nots, in order to achieve more economic 
equality (Achterberg and Houtman 2009; Achterberg 2006). In short, the 
strength of one’s economic position is therefore directly related to one’s 
ideological values about economic (in)equality, redistribution and welfare 
state support (Middendorp 1991; Svallfors 1991). The weaker people’s eco-
nomic positions, the more they tend to adhere to an egalitarian ideology 
(De Witte 1997; Marshall et al. 1988; Svallfors 1991; Wright 1985). For those 
in stronger economic positions, the reverse is true – they support laissez-
faire values and they support market liberalism rather than a strong and 
expensive welfare state.
 It is questionable whether the process of individualisation has caused 
a decline in the relationship between socio-economic status and welfare 
state support. For instance, Svallfors (1999) has shown that class differ-
ences in welfare state support have not declined at all – a research find-
ing recently replicated by Achterberg and De Koster (2009). Moreover, in 
systematic empirical research, Elchardus (2007) and De Beer (2004; see 
also De Beer and Koster 2009) have shown that the influence of socio-
economic background on welfare opinions has increased – a remarkable 
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finding given the context of ongoing cultural and structural individualisa-
tion. Therefore, the relationship between individualised people, the so-
cio-economic risks they face and support for the welfare state remains an 
empirical question, one which we address below.
2.3 Hypotheses
Various scholars have linked the process of individualisation to a decline 
in welfare state legitimacy. Above, we distinguished two types of individu-
alisation – cultural and structural – the former indicating a growing em-
phasis on individual freedom, the latter indicating a growing detachment 
of individuals from their institutional environment. Following Inglehart 
we should expect to find that culturally individualised people do not sup-
port the welfare state (hypothesis 1). Following Beck, we should expect 
that the same holds true for structurally individualised people (hypothesis 
2). Both Inglehart and Beck claim that preferences about political issues 
are increasingly becoming individualised traits. If this is true, then we 
should expect that welfare values are no longer clearly defined along a sin-
gle ideological dimension for highly (culturally and structurally) individu-
alised people (hypothesis 3). Finally, following the arguments about the 
death of class, we expect that socio-economic risks associated to social 
class no longer translate themselves into support for the welfare state for 
(cultural and structural) individualists (hypothesis 4). We will test these 
hypotheses below using recent data for the Netherlands, one of the most 
highly individualised countries in the world (Inglehart 1997).
3 Data and measures
In order to test the hypotheses proposed above, we used data collected in 
2006 in the Netherlands. These data stem from a representative data panel 
collected by the Centerdata research bureau. A total of 2,682 individuals 
were selected to participate in the study and 1,972 respondents completed 
the questionnaire, providing a response rate of 73 per cent. A comparison 
with official statistics from Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor 
de Statistiek) showed that older people, higher income groups, and higher 
educational groups were overrepresented in the sample, which we cor-
rected using a weighting factor.
 Cultural individualisation was measured by using items represent-
ing postmaterialism. Respondents were asked to indicate which was the 
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most important problem facing our country today: fighting rising prices, 
maintaining order in the nation, protecting free speech or giving people a 
greater say in important political decisions. Next, respondents were asked 
to indicate what the second greatest problem was facing our country. Us-
ing this information we constructed four variables indicating the relative 
importance of the four issues at hand; those not choosing an issue were 
assigned a score of one, those choosing an issue as the second problem 
were assigned a score of two, those immediately choosing an issue as their 
first choice were assigned a score of three. A factor analysis on these four 
items revealed that the individualist items (free speech and a greater say in 
national matters) clustered together, as did the collectivist issues (fighting 
rising prices and maintaining order). These scales were combined to cre-
ate a final scale measuring cultural individualism, whereby higher scores 
indicate a greater degree of cultural individualism.
 As discussed above we chose to measure structural individualisation 
as the disembeddedness of three central institutions: religion, class and 
politics. Religious disembeddedness was measured by asking whether the 
respondent is a member of a religious denomination (1 = no, 0 = yes). 
Class disembeddedness was measured by asking whether the respondent 
has much confidence in trade unions (1 = no, 0 = yes). Finally, political 
disembeddedness was measured by asking whether the respondent in-
tends to vote in the next election (1 = no, 0 = yes). Factor analysis on these 
three indicators revealed one scale measuring structural individualisation 
could be constructed – higher scores on this scale stand for a greater de-
gree of structural individualism.
 Support for the welfare state was measured using three subscales. The 
first subscale taps into respondents’ values pertaining to privatisation of 
social insurances. Using a five-point scale, respondents were asked five 
questions about their thoughts on whether social insurance against 1) un-
employment; 2) occupational disability; 3) ageing; 4) the loss of a spouse 
or partner; and 5) illness should be a government responsibility (1) or an 
individual responsibility (5). Factor analysis on these five items showed 
that a scale measuring a preference for privatisation could be constructed, 
whereby higher scores on this scale stand for support for privatisation. 
The second subscale concerns opinions about deservingness and is con-
structed using 31 items asking respondents whether they think a certain 
social category, such as mothers on social assistance, poor people, or 
foreigners, are entitled to welfare support. Again, factor analysis showed 
that a scale for the degree to which respondents classify these social cat-
egories as deserving could be constructed, whereby higher scores on this 
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scale stand for a greater degree of deservingness. Lastly, the third subscale 
measures support for social security. We did this using six items, on a 
scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). These items 
included: 1) I would gladly take care of my own social insurance; 2) I don’t 
want changes in social security to cost me anything; 3) individuals with 
a low income profit the most from the social security system; 4) receiv-
ing social benefits is something to be ashamed about; 5) if you look at it 
carefully, you’ll see that everybody profits from the social security system; 
and 6) I would gladly pay more than I do right now for a sufficient social 
security system.1 Again, factor analysis showed that a scale ‘support for 
social security’ could be constructed.
 Figure 1 shows the distributions of the three subscales used to measure 
welfare state support.
Figure 1 Distributions of the three subscales used to measure welfare state support
In Table 1, we report on the secondary factor analysis of the three sub-
scales. Higher scores (positive or negative) for the factor loadings rep-
resent a clearer representation of each subscale in the latent ideological 
dimension of welfare state support. From Table 1, we see that it is pos-
sible to create a comprehensive scale measuring welfare state support 
– higher scores on this scale represent more positive views about the 
welfare state.
 We used five indicators to measure socio-economic insecurity. Educa-
tion was measured using a discrete variable equalling the respondent’s 
number of years of schooling. Second, we measured unemployment by 
asking whether a respondent was unemployed at that moment (1 = not 
unemployed, 2 = partially unemployed,2 3 = totally unemployed). Third, 
we measured household income using four categories of self-reported, 
net monthly income: 1) 1,150 Euros or less; 2) 1,151 to 1,800 Euros; 3) 
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1,801 to 2,600 Euros; and 4) 2,601 Euros or more. Fourth, to measure 
the risk of unemployment we asked respondents to indicate what they 
thought the chances were that they would lose their job within the next 
twelve months (1 = no chance at all, through 5 = very high chance). Fi-
nally, to measure welfare dependency, we asked respondents a series of 
eight questions about whether they were dependent on social assistance, 
unemployment benefits, occupational disability benefits, old-age pen-
sions, and so on (0 = no, 1 = yes). The answers to these questions were 
summed up to give an indication of the degree to which the respondent 
is dependent on welfare.
4 Results
We started our analyses by investigating the degree to which cultural and 
structural individualism are related to welfare state support.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these first results. First, cultural 
individualism does not lead to lower welfare state support, causing us 
to reject our first hypothesis. Rather, the results show that culturally in-
dividualised people do support the welfare state. However, this finding 
Table 1 Factor analysis for welfare support
Factor loadings
Privatisation -.78





Table 2 Individualism and welfare state support
Welfare state support N
Cultural individualism .21** 1639
Structural individualism -.15** 1509
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
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does not mean that all sorts of individualisation lead to more support for 
the welfare state. Following Beck, we expected to find low levels of sup-
port among structurally individualised people and this hypothesis is con-
firmed, although it must be noted that in comparison to the strong effect 
of cultural individualism, the effect of structural individualism is lower. In 
sum, given that both types of individualism render radically different ef-
fects on welfare state support, we cannot unequivocally say that individu-
alism is related to lower welfare state support – structural individualism 
is whereas cultural individualism is not. This means that individuals who 
‘feel’ like free individuals are more supportive, whereas individuals who 
‘are’ freer are less supportive.
 Next, the fluidisation hypothesis suggests that political ideological val-
ues pertaining to the ‘good old’ welfare state are no longer grounded in a 
solid, collective, value system. Here we aim to test this idea by determin-
ing whether welfare state ideology is highly scattered among cultural in-
dividualists. Below, in Table 3, we present the results of the factor analysis 
shown in Table 1, but now calculated for three different groups: those who 
have a low score on the cultural individualisation scale, those with an in-
termediate score and those with a high score. Following our third hypoth-
esis, we should expect to find a less coherently ordered value pattern for 
highly individualised individuals, which should amount in lower factor 
loadings and lower eigenvalues (indicating less structure). In fact, follow-
ing our hypothesis, we should expect to find that no clear cut ideological 
dimension is underlying responses to the three subscales for highly indi-
vidualised respondents – amounting in factor loadings close to zero and 
an eigenvalue close to one.
Table 3 The association between the four support scales for three categories of 
cultural individualists
Low CI Medium CI High CI
Privatisation -.79 -.79 -.76
Social security support .62 .67 .73
Deservingness .75 .74 .78
Eigenvalue 1.56 1.62 1.72
R2 .52 .54 .57
N 646 532 460
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Although we expected to find no clear value pattern among individual-
ists (those scoring high on cultural individualism), we found the exact 
opposite. When collectivists (those with a low score on the cultural in-
dividualism scale) are compared to individualists, we find a more co-
herently defined ideological outlook on welfare rather than a lack of 
coherency, which refutes our expectation. In Table 4, we present the 
results of the same analysis for structural collectivists and structural 
individualists.
Again, there is no evidence of a decreased ideological conflict about wel-
fare within the category of structural individualists, unequivocally refut-
ing our third hypothesis. Rather, Tables 3 and 4 both demonstrate that 
conflict about welfare state support is most profound among highly indi-
vidualised respondents. In other words, values pertaining to the welfare 
state are coherently organised among individualised respondents but not 
as much among collectivist ones.
 Next, we want to know whether and how these welfare values are linked 
to the socio-economic risks people encounter. In Table 5, we show the 
results of a linear regression analysis differentiated into three categories 
based on the degree of cultural individualisation. The basic hypothesis 
is that, for individualists, there is no marked influence of these socio-
economic risks (class risks) on the way people think about the welfare 
state. The last column indicates whether the effects between the groups 
are getting stronger (++ = moving away from zero) or weaker (-- = moving 
towards zero) with ongoing individualisation.
 Looking at the results in Table 5, we can draw the conclusion that there 
is hardly any relationship between social risks encountered by collectiv-
ists who are low on cultural individualism and their opinions about the 
Table 4  The association between the four support scales for three categories of 
structural individualists
Low SI Medium SI High SI
Privatisation -.78 -.79 -.78
Social security support .67 .73 .70
Deservingness .76 .73 .76
Eigenvalue 1.63 1.69 1.69
R2 .54 .56 .56
N 795 413 300
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welfare state. Only people with low incomes and people with a high risk 
of unemployment are supportive of the welfare state. Moreover, most of 
the effects found for these structural variables tend to become stronger as 
cultural individualism increases, causing us to reject our last hypothesis. 
The best explanatory model is found for cultural individualists – when 
cultural individualists gave lower levels of education, income, people who 
are unemployed or dependent on welfare, they are more supportive of the 
welfare state. Based on these findings we can conclude that cultural indi-
vidualism does not cause the expected results, rather, those experiencing 
social risks favour the welfare state more than more socio-economically 
secure individuals.
 However, we can confirm our hypothesis in terms of structural indi-
vidualists. In this case, little effect is found when looking at social back-
ground. Remarkably enough, we find that more highly educated struc-
Table 5 Cultural individualisation, socio-economic risks and solidarity (OLS 
regression, betas shown, Method is enter, pairwise deletion)
Cultural individualisation Low CI Medium CI High CI Eff ect increase(+)/
decrease (-)
Education -.04 -.06* -.10** ++
Income -.09* -.07* -.09* +/-
Risk of unemployment .09* .01 .02 --
Unemployment .06 .09* .15** ++
Welfare dependency .00 .18** .15** +
R2 .02 .04 .07 ++
N 646 530 460
Table 6 Structural individualisation, socio-economic risks and solidarity (OLS 
regression, betas shown, Method is enter, pairwise deletion)
Structural individualisation Low CI Medium CI High CI Eff ect increase(+)/
decrease (-)
Education -.04 -.02 .09* +
Income -.02 .03 -.05 +/-
Risk of unemployment .08* .00 .04 -
Unemployment .07* -.04 -.06 -
Welfare dependency .17** .08* .08* -
R2 .05 .01 .02 -
N 793 413 300
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tural individualists are more supportive of the welfare state – a striking 
contradiction to the main class paradigm that those experiencing more 
social risks will be more supportive of the welfare state. Moreover, we find 
the strongest relationship between social background and support for the 
welfare state for collectivists. As expected, those with a greater risk of un-
employment, the unemployed and those dependent on welfare are more 
supportive of the welfare state.
 In short, our fourth hypothesis is rejected in relation to cultural in-
dividualism but is confirmed in relation to structural individualism. In 
regards to cultural individualism, we find that socio-economic insecuri-
ties and social risks play an important role for welfare state support. In 
contrast, these risks are unimportant in explaining welfare state support 
among structural individualists.
5 Summary and conclusions
As the literature discussed in this chapter suggests, the process of indi-
vidualisation has often been linked to a decline in welfare state legitimacy. 
It is commonly argued that individualisation causes a decline in people’s 
appreciation of a collectively organised welfare state. In this chapter, we 
studied whether individualists really support the welfare state less than 
collectivists. Distinguishing between two types of individualism, we found 
that people who are structurally disembedded from their institutional 
environment – the structural individualists – indeed are less supportive 
of the welfare state, giving credence to the aforementioned suggestions 
of declining welfare legitimacy. Moreover, the socio-economic risks en-
countered by structural individualists, which are tied to their actual class 
position, do not translate into welfare state support. Put differently, struc-
tural individualists do not support the welfare state irrespective of their 
socio-economic interests. Resonating with findings in the current ‘death 
of class’ debate – in which class is proclaimed dead or a ‘zombie category’ 
at best (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 203-4; Beck 2002: 47) – the class 
position of structural individualists does not lead them to support the 
welfare state, even though some of them encounter more socio-economic 
risks than others.
 Remarkably enough, we find that people who can be classified as cul-
tural individualists – those who emphasise individuality – are more sup-
portive of the welfare state than those who do not emphasise individu-
ality. Moreover, we find that socio-economic position and interests are 
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more important for the way in which cultural individualists think about 
the welfare state. Hence, cultural individualists are more supportive of the 
welfare state, in particular because their weak economic position gives rise 
to support for more economically protective and redistributive policies.
 Whereas these findings clearly contradict pessimistic accounts con-
cerning individualism and welfare state legitimacy, they also beg for an 
alternative explanation as to why these cultural individualists support the 
welfare state. An obvious explanation might be that since cultural indi-
vidualists emphasise their individuality, they may have come to think that 
they are socio-economically vulnerable because they are not protected 
collectively. To compensate for their increased sense of vulnerability, and 
stemming from their own self-interest, these individualists are more sup-
portive of a collective, protective system of social security (cf. Dekker 
2008; Giddens 1998, Castells 1996). In the next chapter on the flexibilisa-
tion of the labour market we will go deeper into this explanation. Future 
research could elaborate on this aspect further, in an attempt to deter-
mine whether cultural individualists reflect differently on socio-econom-
ic insecurity than collectivists do.
 Returning to the research questions addressed in the introduction of 
this volume: in this chapter we have focused on the willingness to share 
social risks. We have shown that traditional class solidarity, which was 
previously the foundation of the welfare state, has apparently dissolved 
to some extent, as it does not influence welfare state support for struc-
tural individualists. However, it does influence welfare state support for 
cultural individualists. In other words, in individualised societies, part of 
the public (cultural individualists) still supports the welfare state because 
of its insurance of class-related risks, while another part of society (struc-
tural individualists) does not. Our results endorse the hypothesis of di-
minishing support for the welfare state because structural individualism 
causes a decrease in the willingness to share risks collectively. However, 
our results also contradict this hypothesis because cultural individual-
ism causes an increase in the willingness to share risks collectively. With 
regard to the perception and management of risks, we have shown that 
citizens’ support for state responsibility for social risks has become less 
coherent due to the process of individualisation (see also Achterberg and 
Houtman 2009). Some scholars argue that welfare state retrenchment 
is seldom successful because politicians fear electoral punishment for 
unpopular reforms (Pierson 1994, 1996, 2001; Brooks and Manza 2006). 
Our results, however, imply that politicians do not need to fear electoral 
punishment as a result of decreasing support for welfare arrangements 
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due to the process of individualisation. As we have shown, one form of 
individualisation leads to a decrease in support whereas the other form of 
individualisation leads to an increase in support. Nonetheless, due to the 
declining coherence of public opinion, ‘pleasing’ the individualised public 
in order to generate electoral gain has become increasingly  difficult.
 Hence, individualisation is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
structural individualisation is causing a breakdown of welfare legitimacy 
and a weakening of the more or less automatic translation of social risks 
into welfare state support. On the other hand, cultural individualisation 
is having the reverse effect – it is causing an increase in welfare legiti-
macy and a more definitive translation of social risks into support for 
the welfare state. While both processes of individualisation are occurring 
simultaneously, and more or less cancel each other out, no grand changes 
in welfare state legitimacy can be expected as a result of individualisation.
 Notes
 Some items in this subscale were recoded to match the direction of the ma-
jority of the items.
 In the Netherlands, it is possible to be partially unemployed.
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4 Labour Flexibility and Support for Social Security
 Fabian Dekker
In Chapters two and three we investigated risk perception and the will-
ingness to share risks using data from surveys among the Dutch popula-
tion. The analysis of these survey data revealed some surprising facts. 
First, we learned that, contrary to theoretical expectations, welfare state 
support among the Dutch population is still high. However, this does not 
imply that they oppose welfare state reform. The norm of obligating reci-
procity is strongly supported and therefore welfare state reform that re-
inforces this form of obligating reciprocity is also supported. Thirdly, and 
once again contrary to theoretical expectations, we discovered that indi-
vidualisation does not necessarily undermine welfare state support. In-
dividualisation not only strengthens the normative ideals of freedom and 
self-actualisation, it also makes people more aware of their vulnerability. 
It is this awareness of vulnerability that feeds welfare state support.
 In this chapter, we once again investigate risk perception and the will-
ingness to share risks in relation to processes of individualisation. In this 
chapter, we focus on the most important process of individualisation in 
relation to social security: the increase of labour flexibility. We make a 
distinction between different forms of labour flexibilisation and inves-
tigate how these forms of flexibilisation affect support for social secu-
rity among the workers concerned. As in Chapter three, our conclusion 
is that some forms of labour flexibilisation do not undermine, but rather 
fuel support for social security. Again, it is an awareness of vulnerability, 




In recent decades, certain labour market developments have occurred in 
most industrialised western countries, such as a growing labour market 
participation of women and a concentration of the workforce in service-
oriented sectors. Against a background of rapid technological change and 
ongoing economic interdependence, the flexibilisation of labour markets 
has perhaps been one of the most fundamental changes to affect work 
and employment conditions in western economies (Kalleberg 2003; 2001; 
2000). Likewise, flexibilisation of the labour market may have altered the 
risks people encounter, ultimately leading to an adaptation of social wel-
fare services and provisions (Kemshall 2002). Views on the consequences 
of increasing labour market flexibility have been rather diverse up until 
now. Reflecting on this new flexible economy, some expect greater labour 
flexibility to lead to a decline in workers’ dedication levels (Sennett 2006). 
Others, meanwhile, point to the joys and meaningfulness of contempo-
rary work (De Botton 2009). ‘Labour flexibility’ is, however, a widely-
used concept that can assume many different meanings. For example, the 
search for flexibility has resulted in more flexible or ‘atypical’ employment 
relationships. Nowadays, people’s working lives are frequently character-
ised by temporary contracts, agency work and part-time employment. 
Flexible employment relationships allow workers to combine their work 
and private lives, but at the same time, ‘atypical’ employment patterns 
can create precarious employment situations and often expose workers 
to the risk of future job losses. Many commentators have addressed this 
issue in terms of rising employment instability and growing job insecurity 
in modern labour markets (Heery and Salmon 2000; Gorz 1999; Sennett 
1998; Castells 1996).
 In a flexible economy, having multiple skills becomes an important 
means of maintaining stable employment (Schmid 2006; Collins 2006). 
Therefore employees must be increasingly concerned with the continued 
improvement of their (flexible) skills in an attempt to remain employed. 
One potential way of managing these labour market risks is through 
‘functional flexibility’, involving new work practices, such as job rotation, 
task rotation, job enlargement, job enrichment and (semi-autonomous) 
team working. In short, functional flexibility emphasises the development 
of multiple skills, which clearly has the potential to lessen labour market 
risks.
 While many studies have examined the consequences of labour flex-
ibility for how employees perceive risks at work, most have looked at 
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‘atypical’ or flexible employment relationships and so-called ‘internal job 
security’ (see, for example, De Cuyper and De Witte 2006; De Witte and 
Näswall 2003). Studies that examine the relationship between different 
forms of labour flexibility and different aspects of job security are largely 
missing from the literature. The first aim of this study, therefore, is to 
examine the consequences of two types of labour flexibility – flexible em-
ployment relationships and functional flexibility – on employees’ percep-
tions of security in both internal (inside the firm) and external (outside 
the firm) labour markets.
 The second aim of this study is to focus on the specific relationship be-
tween job security and societal legitimacy of various policy arrangements. 
As far as risk coping is concerned, many political economists have as-
sumed that job insecurity plays an important role in understanding indi-
vidual policy preferences (Anderson and Pontusson 2007). Social security 
programmes generally compensate for certain risks, thereby protecting 
individuals in society. For example, the state provides benefits to people 
facing unemployment. At the individual level, one might expect work-in-
secure people to have strong incentives for supporting broad social secu-
rity programmes, due to their higher risk of unemployment. However, lit-
tle empirical evidence is available regarding the relationship between job 
security and public perceptions of social security. Although it is generally 
assumed that economic insecurity affects the need for social protection 
(Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1997; Iversen and Cusack 2000; Burgoon 2001), 
this remains an open empirical question at the individual level. This study 
addresses this lacuna.
 Lastly, this chapter studies the relationship between labour flexibility, 
policy preferences and community feeling. Community feeling, or soli-
darity, can be another important motive people may have for supporting 
social security arrangements next to their own interests (Van Oorschot 
2002a). We will examine whether flexible employment relationships gen-
erate less community feeling among individuals. In a similar way, we as-
sess how functionally flexible work patterns affect individuals’ sense of 
community. Although the literature provides us with several arguments 
regarding possible effects of labour flexibility on community feeling, to 
date, little empirical research has been undertaken on the subject.
 Overall, this study demonstrates how ‘atypical’ and functionally flexi-
ble employees perceive different forms of job security and how their sense 
of community feeling will either increase or decrease. Furthermore, this 
study helps to explain support for various forms of social protection in the 
new flexible economy. Before introducing our data and results, we start by 
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providing an overview of relevant theories on labour flexibility and policy 
preferences.
2 Working in the new economy and policy preferences
The experience of working in the post-industrial economy is considerably 
different from past experiences of work. For a start, there has been a shift 
in employment structures from manufacturing towards a service econo-
my (see, for example, ILO 2006; Esping-Andersen 1993), and employment 
relations have become more flexible (see, for example, Dekker 2007; Auer 
and Cazes 2003). Nowadays, people’s working lives are often character-
ised by ‘atypical’ forms of employment relationships such as temporary 
contracts, agency work and part-time employment. Taking the European 
Union (EU) as a whole, in 2007, 14.5 per cent of the total workforce had 
limited duration contracts, while approximately 18 per cent of employees 
considered themselves to be employed on a part-time basis.
 Another feature of working in the contemporary labour market is the 
growing need to have multiple skills or the need for functional flexibility. 
Functionally flexible work practices can be extremely important when it 
comes to dealing with changing conditions in a more global economy. 
New flexible work arrangements, such as job rotation, task rotation and 
team working, are therefore increasingly being used in most European 
countries (OECD 1999).1 In 2005, for example, 47 per cent of all employees 
in the EU engaged in task rotation with their colleagues, while 60 per cent 
did part or all of their work in teams. Task rotation requires people to per-
form some tasks that lie outside the scope of their main job, while team 
working implies that more discretion is left to team members. Job rota-
tion is another form of functional flexibility, and involves an employee 
moving from one position to another within an organisation.
 In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on the Netherlands on the 
grounds that the Dutch workforce is one of the most flexible in Europe. 
As in many European countries, particularly due to the growing interna-
tionalisation of labour and capital since the beginning of the 1970s, flex-
ible labour has become a central feature of the Dutch labour market (De 
Jong 2008). Approximately 18 per cent of workers in the Netherlands are 
employed in fixed-term positions and approximately 46 per cent of jobs 
are part-time. Furthermore, approximately 62 per cent of all Dutch work-
ers engage in task rotation with colleagues and approximately 75 per cent 
participate in teams.
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2.1 Labour fl exibility, risks and policy preferences
Social security policies embody some kind of solidarity between (future) 
recipients of benefi ts and people who are less dependent on social pro-
grammes (De Beer and Koster 2009). At an individual level, people can 
have diff erent motives for contributing to such programmes. People may 
be motivated by self-interest, or by feelings of moral or emotional commit-
ment to others (Van Oorschot 2002a; 2002b; Van Oorschot and Komter 
1998). However, largely missing from the literature is research that exam-
ines the implications of labour fl exibility for individual policy preferences.
 Th ere are several ways in which labour fl exibility could aff ect individual 
risk perception and policy preferences. For example, there is substantial 
evidence of increased job insecurity among ‘atypical’ workers. Our fi rst 
hypothesis is, therefore, that workers with ‘atypical’ employment contracts 
experience less security at work. Although some authors fi nd no correla-
tion (Böckerman 2004), most of the literature suggests that there is indeed 
a relationship between ‘atypical’ employment and perceived job security 
(see, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay 2005; De Witte and Näswall 
2003; Green 2003). However, while most scholars focus on perceptions 
of internal job security, we diff erentiate between two types of job security 
here: company-specifi c or ‘internal job security’, and ‘external job security’, 
which is the possibility of fi nding a job outside the company.2 We expect 
that in both senses, ‘atypical’ employment contracts are associated with 
increased insecurity. On the one hand, the predetermined duration of the 
contract means fl exible work carries a higher risk of unemployment in the 
near future. On the other hand, having to work for relatively short periods 
of time means ‘atypical’ employees are unable to develop their skills and 
credentials, which is likely to express itself in feelings of insecurity regard-
ing possible employment outside the organisation.
Hypothesis 1: Workers with fl exible employment contracts experience 
lower levels of internal and external job security than other workers.
While ‘atypical’ employment relationships may lead workers to experi-
ence lower levels of job security, functionally flexible employment may 
not have the same effect. Functional flexibility may offer employees an 
important means of obtaining multiple skills, thus making them feel less 
insecure. As suggested in the introduction, functionally flexible work 
practices may counter the risk of skill obsolescence. Functional flexibil-
ity is deemed necessary because of the fact that ‘lifetime employment’ is 
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being replaced with the notion of ‘flexible employment’ (Forrier and Sels 
2003; Moss Kanter 1993; 1991). Nowadays, so-called post-Fordist regimes 
are characterised by flexible career structures and people can no longer 
expect to have a stable, predictable career within the same organisation. 
In other words, people can no longer rely on organisations to provide 
them with traditional job security: ‘jobs for life’ are said to have disap-
peared and skills are becoming obsolete. Workers are increasingly reliant 
upon the need for multiple skills; that is, their employability (Moss Kanter 
1993). One way to ensure ‘employability-security’ in the modern labour 
market is to create challenging jobs and to allow employees to engage in 
assignment rotation (Moss Kanter 1991). In that sense, the development of 
functionally flexible jobs could offer employees opportunities to acquire 
multiple skills to exercise more control over their work than in the past.
 While some remain sceptical about functional flexibility and point to 
the possible exploitation of employees by employers (Hyman 2004) or 
the ‘time-greedy’ nature of the high-performance workplace (Van Echtelt 
2007), functional flexibility does have the potential to offer employees 
new ‘employability-security’ in the labour market. This would mean that 
functionally flexible workers would experience more job security than 
workers without flexible job features. Although empirical evidence is 
scarce, a recent study by Kashefi (2007) shows that in the United States, 
in general, employees who are functionally flexible experience higher lev-
els of job security. In this chapter, we examine this relationship between 
functional flexibility and perceived job security. Again, our research dis-
tinguishes between two types of job security: ‘internal job security’ and 
‘external job security’. We expect functionally flexible work practices to 
be associated with increased feelings of security at work in both regards. 
First, functionally flexible workers are more adaptable in their response 
to demands and are therefore more valuable to organisations. Such work-
ers are unlikely to believe that they would be made redundant in the near 
future. Second, these workers are also likely to feel more secure in the 
external labour market because enhancing their knowledge and skills is 
likely to cause them to feel more ‘marketable’. This, in turn, leads to our 
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Functionally fl exible workers experience higher levels of 
internal and external job security than other workers.
Labour flexibility is not only related to perceived job security but to policy 
preferences as well. However, empirical evidence on the relationship be-
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tween labour flexibility and support for welfare state policies is largely 
lacking at the micro level. As we have seen in the previous chapters, sever-
al authors argue that social arrangements must be legitimised by the pub-
lic to remain sustainable in the long run (see, for example, Burstein 1998). 
An important foundation underlying this support is self-interest (see, for 
example, Hechter 1987). The basic idea is that there is a direct relation-
ship between someone’s position in the stratification structure and their 
support for social security. Following this self-interested perspective, we 
would not expect secure workers to be likely beneficiaries of social securi-
ty protection. In other words, people who do not face labour market risks, 
such as unemployment, are unlikely to protect themselves against these 
risks by taking out social insurance. Hence, these work-secure individuals 
are less likely to support public spending on social security. Building on 
this logic, we hypothesise that this is especially true with regard to spend-
ing on unemployment benefits. Insecurity at work is not related to prefer-
ences about welfare programmes which are unrelated to the importance 
of income protection during working life, such as pensions or healthcare.3 
This, in turn, leads to two additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Experiencing internal and external job security is nega-
tively related to an individual’s support for unemployment benefi ts.
Hypothesis 4: Experiencing internal and external job security is not 
related to support for other social security programmes (pensions and 
healthcare).
2.2 Labour fl exibility, community feeling and policy preferences
As noted in the introduction, labour flexibility can influence individu-
als’ sense of community, which in turn can affect policy preferences. Al-
though individual support for social security is most strongly affected by 
perceived self-interest (Van Oorschot 2002a; 2002b), the experience of 
‘shared identity’ is also a relevant predictor of policy preferences (Van 
Oorschot 2002a; 2002b; Van Oorschot and Komter 1998). This type of 
motivation is grounded in Durkheim’s classical approach to sociology 
(Durkheim 1964), which suggests that a perceived connection with others 
spurs solidaristic behaviour (Polletta and Jasper 2001). However, follow-
ing Richard Sennett (1998) and Zygmunt Bauman (2001), we may assume 
that ‘atypical’ forms of employment relationships have negative conse-
quences for this sense of community.4 In their view, the erosion of long-
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term employment contracts undermines loyalty, trust and the sense of 
belonging to a wider collectivity. The ‘new’ short-term, unstable labour 
market simply leaves no room for long-term social relations and mutual 
commitments. In the flexible economy, there is no ‘shared fate’ (Sennett 
1998: 147), which makes an understanding of community difficult. Ac-
cording to Bauman (2001: 24-25), the flexible labour market ‘(…) feels like 
a camping site which one visits for but a few nights and which one may 
leave at any moment if the comforts on offer are not delivered or found 
wanting when delivered (…)’. Furthermore, flexible labour is associated 
with uncertainties and risks and is expected to be a strong ‘individualiz-
ing force’: ‘It divides instead of uniting, and since there is no telling who 
might wake up in what division, the idea of ‘common interests’ grows ever 
more nebulous and in the end becomes incomprehensible’ (Bauman 2001: 
24). Our fifth hypothesis tests this claim:
Hypothesis 5: Workers with fl exible employment contracts report lower 
levels of community feeling than other workers.
Once again, we expect that the situation for functionally flexible workers 
will differ from that of ‘atypical’ workers. It has been argued that func-
tional flexibility has brought more individual responsibility and an in-
creasing shift towards self-management (Amoore 2002), which results 
in less commitment towards others (Ezzy 2001). However, most of the 
literature states that functional flexibility requires workers to cooperate 
and communicate more to achieve mutual goals than was the case in ‘tra-
ditional’ Taylorist organisations (European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Conditions 2007a; Hempell and Zwick 2005), 
which may improve the likelihood of people feeling a sense of community. 
While ‘Taylorism’ included no extensive job-learning opportunities and 
a high technical division of labour, functional flexibility emphasises em-
ployees’ learning possibilities and common goals. We therefore assume 
that working for a so-called ‘holistic’ organisation5 (Lindbeck and Snower 
2000) enhances an employee’s sense of belonging to a wider collectivity; 
people may learn more about co-workers and their work, and experience 
more collective tasks and needs. In other words, while workers with ‘atyp-
ical’ labour contracts may be less likely to develop a sense of community 
feeling, it can be expected that working in a functionally flexible work 
environment creates a sense of community feeling. We will call this the 
‘integration scenario’:
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Hypothesis 6: Functionally fl exible workers report higher levels of com-
munity feeling than other workers.
Because previous research has shown that community feeling is positively 
related to individual support for social security arrangements, we also as-
sume that community feeling positively affects support for different social 
security programmes:
Hypothesis 7: Community feeling is positively related to an individual’s 
support for social security programmes (unemployment, pensions and 
healthcare).
3 Data and measures
The data in this study are taken from the ‘Labour and Welfare Opinions’ 
survey, and were collected by Centre Data at Tilburg University in the 
Netherlands in May and June 2006. This data set concerns a random sam-
ple of the Dutch population aged 16 and over. The sample comprises 1,801 
valid cases, which corresponds to a response rate of 77 per cent. After 
inactive people (the unemployed, students and retired workers) and the 
self-employed have been excluded from the sample,6 the survey contains 
data on 945 respondents. The data have been weighted against figures 
from Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, or CBS). 
After weighting for age, education and income levels, the dataset can be 
considered representative for the Netherlands.
 The first step of our analysis was to test the hypotheses concerning 
‘atypical’ employment and functional flexibility and perceived security at 
work empirically. Flexible employment contracts include employees with 
fixed-term contracts, agency workers and on-call workers (1); all other 
jobs are non-flexible, including fixed-term jobs that offer the prospect of 
permanent employment (0). While we are fully aware that flexible work-
ers are not a homogenous group (Connelly and Gallagher 2004; Gallie 
et al. 1998), it was not possible to distinguish different types of flexible 
employees statistically. Furthermore, part-time work is not classified as 
flexible employment because this type of employment can no longer be 
considered as ‘atypical’ in the Netherlands (Schulze Buschoff and Protsch 
2008). According to Visser (2002: 33), ‘most part-time employees are cov-
ered by collective agreements and most part-time jobs (…) are standard 
jobs of indeterminate length, subject to full dismissal protection’ in the 
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Netherlands. Functional flexibility was measured using two single items, 
task rotation and job rotation, which cover important forms of functional 
flexibility (unfortunately, no items were dedicated to teamwork, job en-
largement and job enrichment in the questionnaire).7 Internal and exter-
nal job security are defined as an individual assessment of an employment 
situation. While perceived insecurity may not reflect actual risks, ‘subjec-
tive insecurity’ is at least as severe as ‘objective insecurity’ (Lazarus 1991). 
Internal job security was measured as the individual’s perception of the 
likelihood of remaining employed over the next twelve months. We used 
one central indicator of external job security, based on the question: ‘To 
what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I have 
enough skills and experience to find another job without any difficulty.’8
 With regard to perceived internal and external job security, several control 
variables were included in the analysis. We included age as a control variable 
because levels of perceived job security are likely to diff er among age groups. 
Previous research has shown that older employees experience higher levels 
of job insecurity (Hartley, Jacobsen, Klandermans and Van Vuuren 1991). We 
anticipated that a person’s level of education might also be associated with 
perceptions of job security (Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall 2006).9 Gender is 
another factor that may infl uence perceptions of security at work, but this 
remains a point of debate (Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall 2006). In addition, 
working in the private sector decreases the likelihood of job security (Clark 
and Postel-Vinay 2005), therefore we control for sectoral diff erences between 
public and private sector employment. We also created a dummy variable for 
ethnicity to determine whether immigrant workers feel more insecure. Fur-
thermore, we were interested in the infl uence of household income levels on 
job security. One might expect people living in households with higher income 
levels to feel less insecure (Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall 2006). Moreover, 
because we are interested in attitudes towards public spending, we control for 
benefi t dependency. In relation to job security, we assumed that people who 
had received no social security transfers in the past were more work-secure 
than workers with a history of receiving benefi ts. Finally, one would expect 
people who feel that they have no control over their lives to be more insecure 
(Ashford, Lee and Bobko 1987).10 In the next step of the analysis, we tested 
the hypotheses on community feeling.11 In addition to the other control vari-
ables, we included political preference as a control factor. In general, it can be 
expected that people on the political left adhere more to the collective than 
individuals on the right (Van Oorschot 2002a). Finally, we used support for 
diff erent social security programmes as the dependent variable.12 All eff ects 
were calculated using multiple regression models.
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4 Results
The results of our analyses are presented in Table 1.














Task rotation -0.026 0.183*** -0.054 0.020 0.027 0.010
Job rotation -0.018 0.074* 0.015 -0.016 0.048 0.022
Type of contract (1 = 
fl exible)
-0.288*** 0.004 0.018 -0.022 -0.010 -0.024
Age (actual age) -0.076* -0.111** 0.157*** 0.078* 0.081* 0.101*
Education (ref = 





-0.107* 0.017 -0.034 -0.102* -0.010 -0.011
Higher vocational and 
university education
-0.044 0.097* -0.038 -0.166*** -0.210*** -0.128*
Gender (1 = female) -0.070* -0.049 -0.024 0.008 0.061 0.043
Sector (1 = private) -0.070* 0.025 -0.015 -0.096* -0.014 -0.106**
Ethnicity (1 = born 
outside Netherlands)
-0.083* -0.020 -0.043 0.015 0.042 0.051
Net household 
income
0.020 -0.063 -0.031 -0.119*** -0.037 -0.044
Benefi t dependency 
(1 = no dependency)
0.134*** 0.062 0.017 -0.012 0.033 0.044
External locus of 
control 
-0.125*** -0.172*** 0.027 -0.044 0.103** -0.021
Political preference 
(1 = political left, 11 
= right)
-0.254*** -0.139*** 0.012 -0.094*
Internal job security -0.083* -0.021 -0.050
External job security 0.030 0.038 0.043
Community feeling 0.260*** 0.092* 0.068
N 785 775 779 710 715 715
Adjusted R-squared .12 .11 .09 .15 .06 .04
Signifi cant coeffi  cients (standardised eff ects): * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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In line with our first hypothesis, people with ‘atypical’ employment con-
tracts feel less secure in their current jobs. Being an ‘atypical’ worker is re-
lated to a decrease of perceived internal job security (0.288). This finding 
corroborates results from earlier studies: job insecurity is greater among 
‘atypical’ workers (e.g. Heery and Salmon 2000). However, our findings 
also indicate there is no relationship between the type of employment 
contract and external job security. This means that flexible and perma-
nent workers are not distinct from one another in their external job se-
curity expectations. Our first hypothesis, that workers with flexible em-
ployment contracts experience lower levels of internal and external job 
security, is thus partially confirmed.
 This contrasts with the findings on functional flexibility: while func-
tionally flexible workers consider themselves more ‘employable’ on the 
external labour market, there is no effect on their future career expecta-
tions regarding the internal labour market. Thus, our second hypothesis, 
that functionally flexible workers experience higher levels of internal and 
external job security, is also partly confirmed. A possible explanation for 
these findings is that these workers experience functionally flexible work 
practices as primarily designed to make them more capable of switching 
between jobs, and having little to do with their security in the internal 
labour market.
 Other significant predictors of job security are age (older people feel 
less secure in both internal and external labour markets) and education 
(individuals who have completed secondary general and secondary vo-
cational education feel less secure in their jobs than people with lower 
educational levels, a result that is somewhat unexpected). One possible 
explanation for this latter finding is that less well-educated workers have 
already accepted, as a way of coping with the situation, that they are more 
vulnerable in the internal labour market. However, more research is need-
ed to determine the validity of this argument. In addition, we found the 
following: individuals with higher vocational and university qualifications 
feel more secure in the external labour market; women feel more insecure 
in their current jobs; employees working in the private sector feel less in-
ternally work-secure; individuals who were born outside the Netherlands 
experience more internal job insecurity; not being dependent on benefits 
has a positive impact on an individual’s perception of their internal secu-
rity; and individuals with an external locus of control feel more insecure 
in both labour markets. In general, the findings on ‘internal job security’ 
are consistent with findings from previous studies discussed above. The 
most interesting finding, however, is that different types of labour flex-
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ibility are associated with different forms of perceived security at work. 
Previous studies focused mainly on ‘atypical’ forms of employment and 
‘internal job security’. In doing so, these studies have largely ignored the 
importance of differentiating between internal and external job security. 
The findings presented here demonstrate the necessity of doing so.
 With regard to our third and fourth hypotheses, that experiencing job 
security is negatively related to support for unemployment insurance and 
not related to support for other social security programmes, we see that 
feelings of security at work are not related to individual support for wel-
fare spending in the case of pensions or healthcare. We also find that 
internal job security has a significant and expected effect on support for 
unemployment spending. However, external job security does not affect 
support for unemployment spending. This result implies once again that 
differentiation between types of job security is important and must also 
be included in studies that explain people’s opinions on welfare spending. 
Previous research into economic insecurity and political attitudes does 
not link different forms of job insecurity to support for different aspects 
of social security.
 We now turn to the effects of labour flexibility on community feeling. 
Many social scientists assume that workers with flexible employment con-
tracts are less inclined to support the notion of collective interests. Our 
data does not support this view. The data presented in Table 1 show there 
is no association between contract type and community feeling, meaning 
we should reject our fifth hypothesis. In contrast, we do see significant 
differences based on age and political beliefs. Older people show higher 
levels of community feeling, while individuals on the right of the political 
spectrum show lower levels of community feeling. Van Oorschot (2002a; 
2002b) finds similar results. Furthermore, the results show that the level 
of community feeling does not increase when individuals are functionally 
flexible; hypothesis six is thus rejected. In other words, there is no empiri-
cal evidence to support the notion that working in ‘holistic’ or integrative 
work settings is associated with a heightened sense of community feeling.
 The results also show that in general, community feeling is a signifi-
cant source of motivation for supporting social security arrangements.13 
This means that our last hypothesis is confirmed, in line with the exist-
ing literature. The data also reveal a number of significant effects with 
our control variables. Older people are more inclined to support social 
security spending in all three areas and more highly-educated individuals 
show lower levels of support for unemployment, pensions and healthcare. 
In addition, private sector workers show less support for spending in the 
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areas of unemployment and healthcare and higher net household income 
levels negatively affect support for spending on unemployment benefits. 
Individuals’ sense of control in their lives is also significantly associated 
with policy preferences (individuals with an external locus of control are 
more in favour of spending in the case of pensions). Finally, political pref-
erence is significant as people on the political right are less inclined to 
support spending on unemployment and healthcare. These results are in 
accordance with the findings of earlier studies on attitudes towards wel-
fare state policies (see, for example, Yang and Barrett 2006; Blekesaune 
and Quadagno 2003; Shivo and Uusitalo 1995; Pettersen 1995).
5 Conclusions and discussion
The aim of this chapter was to examine the impact of labour flexibility on 
job security, levels of community feeling and policy preferences. Although 
these links have been widely discussed in the literature, very little empiri-
cal research exists to support such discussions. The findings presented 
here move research in this area forward by pointing to the importance of 
differentiating between internal and external job security. Our empirical 
results show that internal job security is negatively related to the type of 
employment contract, while external job security is positively related to 
functional flexibility. At the theoretical level, these findings suggest that 
labour flexibility creates different categories of workers: ‘atypical’ (in-
ternal) insecure employees and a multi-skilled workforce that perceives 
(external) security. This finding corresponds to the different strategies 
employed by ‘the flexible firm’ (Atkinson 1984); that is, the notion that 
flexible organisations feature a functionally flexible core and an ‘atypical’ 
peripheral workforce.
 Differences also exist with regard to types of job security and support 
for social security spending. We found internal job security to have a sig-
nificant negative effect on support for spending on unemployment ben-
efits. This negative link between internal job security and preferences for 
unemployment benefits spending can be seen as a rational decision made 
by work-secure people. However, a comparison of external work-secure 
and work-insecure individuals revealed no significant differences in sup-
port levels. One possible explanation for this that draws on cognitive de-
cision theories is that people pay more attention to the (consequences of ) 
risks in the near future (the chance of becoming unemployed in the next 
twelve months) than to long-term risk situations (the possibility of find-
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ing a new job) (for the literature on evaluating risks, see Kahneman and 
Tversky 1974). We also presented evidence that shows labour flexibility is 
not related to community feeling. This suggests that community feeling is 
neither being eroded (‘atypical’ employment) nor increasing (functional 
flexibility) in the new, flexible economy.
 In sum, labour flexibility brings both opportunities and risks for em-
ployees. As far as the welfare state is concerned, labour market flexibility 
spurs support for unemployment spending, due to higher levels of internal 
job insecurity. Because public opinion seems to matter when it comes to 
the expansion of the welfare state (Brooks and Manza 2007; 2006; Burst-
ein 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983), it can be expected that in times of in-
creased labour flexibility, individuals are likely to demand higher levels of 
spending on unemployment benefits. Depending on whether individual 
policy preferences are represented by larger groups, such as trade unions 
or political parties, policy-makers may consider no further expenditure 
retrenchment regarding the risk of unemployment. As we have seen, the 
changing nature of work shapes workers’ perceptions of risks, fostering 
a growing need for risk reduction through social policy. While Taylor-
Gooby (see Chapter 1) seems to argue that the process of increasing la-
bour market flexibility seems to spawn some sort of new welfarism, in 
which social spending is only feasible as investments in human capital, 
and where others like Giddens (1998), in a similar vein, write about social 
investment states, for the flexible workforce under observation here, we 
continue to find evidence for support of old welfarism – because workers 
are internally flexible, their internal job insecurity leads them to support 
old welfare benefits.
 Notes
 Job enrichment and job enlargement are two other characteristics of func-
tional flexibility. However, questions used to obtain data on these two types 
of functional flexibility are generally lacking in available comparative survey 
data. 
 See also Groot and Maassen van den Brink ().
 Macro-level research in this area indeed indicates that economic insecurity 
affects support for public spending (Katzenstein ; Rodrik ; Iversen 
and Cusack ; Burgoon ). At the individual level, meanwhile, some 
studies provide information on specific labour market risks and policy pref-
erences. Cusack et al. (), Kramer and Stephenson () and Iversen and 
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Soskice () point out that working in occupations with higher unemploy-
ment rates and a higher level of skill specificity spurs support for govern-
ment redistribution. Nevertheless, with these few exceptions, the micro-level 
picture remains largely unstudied (see, for example, Scheve and Slaughter 
), as does, in particular, the relationship between individuals’ insecuri-
ties about their jobs and policy preferences. However, several other studies 
include ‘class position’ as a factor in work on policy preferences (see, for ex-
ample, Svallfors, ; ; ).
 In this study, we refer to the experienced shared connection among citizens 
within one country. At the organisational level, Koster () has shown that 
‘atypical’ and permanent workers do not differ in their solidarity toward co-
workers. 
 The ‘holistic’ organisation is defined by a lower task specialisation among 
workers, featuring job rotation, integration of tasks and learning across tasks 
(Lindbeck and Snower, ).
 In explaining self-perceived job security, these groups are not included be-
cause they are not employed by organisations.
 We measured task rotation by asking employees how often they had been 
shifted towards tasks that lay outside their own job descriptions during the 
last twelve months ( = never,  = seldom,  = sometimes,  = often,  = very 
often). Job rotation was measured by asking how often they had been shifted 
between jobs during the last twelve months ( = never,  = seldom,  = some-
times,  = often,  = very often).
  = strongly disagree,  = disagree,  = neither agree nor disagree,  = agree, 
 = strongly agree.
 We thus created two dummy variables: one for secondary general and sec-
ondary vocational education and one for higher vocational and university ed-
ucation. Workers with lower general and vocational education levels formed 
the reference category.
 This external locus of control was measured by a scale of three items (alpha 
reliability = .), which focused on a individual’s perception that they have 
no control over their own personal life ( = totally disagree,  = disagree,  = 
agree nor disagree,  = agree,  = totally agree). 
 Community feeling was defi ned using the statement: ‘For me, paying social 
insurance premiums is something that I do because I personally sympathise 
with the benefi ciaries and their situations’ ( = totally disagree,  = disagree,  
= agree nor disagree,  = agree,  = totally agree). Although the notion of ‘com-
munity feeling’ can be defi ned in various ways (McMillan and Chavis George 
), our measure seems to be common in research on attitudes towards 
social security spending (see, for example, Van Oorschot a; b).
LABOUR FLEXIBILITY AND SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
 We used survey questions about support for spending on unemployment 
benefits, pensions and healthcare. The following question was asked: ‘Would 
you like to see more, the same, or less government spending in the case of 
unemployment/pensions/healthcare? Remember that if you say more, this 
will require an increase in taxation’ ( = spend much less,  = spend less,  = 
spend the same as now,  = spend more,  = spend much more).
 Although support for healthcare spending is significant at the  per cent 
level (not shown).
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 The Conditions for Success of an Investment Strategy1
 Hans Pruijt and Pascal Dérogée
After having investigated attitudes towards risks and the willingness to 
share risks in the previous chapters, we now turn to the actual practices of 
risk sharing and risk management. Perceiving risks as social risks and be-
ing willing to share social risks is one thing, being able to transform these 
perceptions and willingness into actual policies is another. This is depen-
dent, among other things, on the institutional environment in which these 
policies have to be developed and is dependent upon the organisations – 
firms and administrative agencies – in which they are to be implemented. 
We will investigate these processes in the following chapters.
 We start our investigation of the actual practices of risk sharing and of 
risk management in this chapter by analysing the introduction of the idea 
of increased job security through enhanced employability in the Nether-
lands. We will look into the development of the policy discourse, the intro-
duction of employability in collective labour agreements and the practice 
of employability policies in firms. Employability is introduced as a means 
to increase the job security of workers by investing in their capabilities in-
stead of providing them with social security protection. However, this in-
vestment strategy creates collective action problems: Why invest in work-
ers and consequently run the risk that they will leave the firm and that 
another employer reaps the rewards of this investment? What we learn in 
this chapter is that the ‘old’ institutions of the social security state – for 
which employability is often presented as an alternative – have fulfilled 
an important role in making the introduction of employability a relative 
success, because these ‘old’ institutions have helped overcome the collective 
action problems presented by the new strategy of enhancing employability.
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1 Introduction
The risk of losing one’s capability to secure attractive employment, or to 
maintain sufficient ‘employability’, has gained more attention during the 
last decade. In the debate on the transformation of the welfare state the 
loss of the capability to secure employment is seen as one of the “new 
social risks” that result from the transition to a post-industrial society 
(Taylor-Gooby 2004). When it comes to managing this risk, it is now as-
sumed, at least in the Netherlands, that enhanced employability is the 
new job security – in short: employacurity. Employability offers a means 
for risk management in the Dutch welfare state. In this chapter, we take 
a closer look at the use of employability as a means of risk management. 
The guiding question is: how realistic is the idea of employacurity and 
how and to what extent are strategies of securing or enhancing employ-
ability implemented in collective labour agreements and in firms?
 After some conceptual clarification, we investigate the original core 
of the employability discourse, focusing on its built-in attractions. This 
discourse is the product of American management gurus who present the 
employment system of Silicon Valley as a model that, in their view, can 
be generalised to society as a whole. Accepted theory, however, suggests 
that collective action problems are associated with employability, which 
detracts from the realism of the gurus’ visions. We attempt to shed light 
on the extent to which collective action problems hamper the strategy of 
increasing job security by enhancing employability and on the mecha-
nisms that may alleviate such collective action problems. We do this by 
examining the paradoxical reception of the frame in the Netherlands. It 
is paradoxical, since it took root in a context that is the opposite of its 
context of origin: in contrast to Silicon Valley, the Dutch employment 
relations system is firmly based on the norm of job security. Empirically, 
we base our argument on an analysis of agenda-setting documents pro-
duced by the main Dutch trade union confederation and the main Dutch 
employers’ association, a database of collective labour agreements and 
a case study of a Dutch organisation that exhibits a high level of activity 
regarding employability.
 The concept of employability, roughly meaning the capability to be em-
ployed, often comes across as fuzzy, slippery, complex and variegated. 
Therefore, some conceptual clarification is necessary. In the conceptual 
literature we see several attempts to create order by constructing typolo-
gies. Tamkin and Hillage (1999), who reviewed the literature and inter-
viewed experts, distinguish five basic strands of employability. Gazier 
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(1999) distinguishes seven main concepts of employability. There is, how-
ever, no need for an explosion of complexity here. In the conceptual lit-
erature, some authors go beyond differentiating the concept and look for 
the one leading interpretation. Gazier notes, for example, that there is 
a development in the way in which employability tends to be seen, and 
suggests, as the most up to date definition of employability, that it is what 
makes ‘each worker a more aware and a more independent organizer of the 
succession of activities and commitments that, combined, constitute his/
her working life’ (2001: 23). Schmid (2006), in the same vein, stresses that 
autonomy is an important component of employability. In general terms, 
the integrative defi nitions of employability amount to empowerment in 
matters of career development. We take the above as a starting point and 
we will analyse employability from the perspective of empowerment.
2 Framing employability
The concept of employability and its acceptance as a form of risk manage-
ment can be traced back to American management discourse. In this dis-
course, employability and creative destruction are linked in an attractive 
frame. The structure of the discourse is the following. First, a process of 
creative destruction is observed, i.e. the disappearance of old economic 
structures which frees (financial and human) resources for new enter-
prise endeavours (cf. Schumpeter 1942), causes social problems in the 
sense that employment security is decreased substantially. Adapting an 
organisation to creative destruction thus entails the disappearance of job 
security (Kanter 1991). To thrive in an era of creative destruction, compa-
nies need to be nimble. This involves moving into territories where the 
existing workforce may not be able to follow. Therefore, employers can 
no longer promise job security; job security is obsolete (Ghoshal et al. 
1999: 15; Herriot and Pemberton 1996) and long-term secure employment 
is a thing of the past (cf. Kanter 1993). Employability is then launched as 
a concept that promises, when wholeheartedly applied, to help solve or 
alleviate the problem of lost job security. They argue that if workers are 
employable, then they are protected against risks such as the loss of em-
ployment. Gaspersz and Ott (1996), inspired by Kanter, announced the 
death of job security in the Netherlands, notwithstanding their note that, 
at the time of writing, people were clinging to their jobs more than ever 
before in the Netherlands. The number of people switching employment 
in one year had declined from 15 per cent in 1990 to just eight per cent in 
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1994. The solution to the problem of creative destruction is enhanced em-
ployability. Kanter (1989) lifted the term employability from the context 
in which it was normally used, that of people without work (cf. Orr 1973), 
and applied it to employees.
 Right from the beginning, employability was seen as a form of empow-
erment. Kanter describes how employees ‘create their own opportunities’ 
in organisations of which ‘entrepreneurialism’ is a defining characteristic 
(1993: 305). Littleton et al. (2000) speak of ‘boundaryless’ careers that de-
velop in a context structured by the actions of employees. Savickas sees 
individuals as ‘managers of their own worklives’. He maintains that the 
new pattern is best understood from a constructivist perspective because 
such a perspective concentrates on ‘self-conceiving, self-organizing pro-
cesses’ (Savickas 2000: 59). Waterman and colleagues approvingly quote 
managers of companies that have employability policies in place as say-
ing: ‘we became convinced that we had a responsibility to put employees 
back in control of their lives’ and ‘the new covenant is about empowering 
people so they have job choices when circumstances change’ (1994: 88-
89). These authors also tell us that companies on the cutting edge ‘give 
employees the power to assess, hone, redirect, and expand their skills so 
that they can stay competitive in the job market’ (1994: 88). Conversely, 
authors tend to describe what they see as the disappearing pattern of em-
ployment as the opposite of freedom. Littleton et al. (2000) depict the 
development of a working life in the old pattern as ‘pre-ordained’ and the 
careers as ‘bounded’ i.e. prescribed by organisational structures. Ghoshal 
et al. (1999) suggest that the new type of human resource management 
puts an end to the dependent position of employees.
 A second characteristic of enhanced employability, as prescribed 
against the woes of creative destruction, is that it is something that can 
be created. The idea is that employability is amenable to substantial en-
hancement through investment (Kanter 1993). Possible assets to invest 
in are: awareness of marketable skills and talents, self-presentation effi-
cacy, actual levels of skill, knowledge and experience (Ghoshal et al. 1999). 
In addition to this, some theorists emphasise that cultivating a personal 
network is key to a successful ‘boundaryless’ career, because of the value 
of network ties and the learning opportunities they can provide (Arthur 
and Rousseau 1995). Kanter suggests that a viable strategy for organisa-
tions is to provide ‘ample learning opportunities, from formal training to 
lunchtime seminars – the equivalent of a month a year’, ‘challenging jobs 
and rotating assignments that allow growth in skills’ and ‘three months 
educational sabbaticals or external internships every five years’, as well 
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as to ‘retrain employees as soon as jobs become obsolete’ and to ‘find job 
opportunities in the organization’s network of suppliers, customers, and 
venture partners’ (1991: 9). Waterman et al. (1994: 89) add that organ-
isations can make employees aware of their ‘skills, interests, values, and 
temperaments’. They mention benchmarking, self assessment and estab-
lishing a career centre that offers testing, counselling, seminars and infor-
mation about jobs in and outside the organisation as suitable instruments.
 Th ere are several other features of this line of thinking that make it attrac-
tive. One of its attractions is that the prescription of enhanced employabil-
ity is universally applicable; there is little contemplation about what works 
where. Beginning with Kanter (1991), advocates of stepped-up investment 
in employability seem tacitly to assume that it will benefi t anyone, and that 
this will be so from school-leaving age to retirement age. Statements such 
as ‘from full employment to full employability’ and ‘from lifetime employ-
ment to lifetime employability’ also suggest universal applicability.
 A further attraction of this type of thinking is that a win-win situation 
for all parties is painted, de-emphasising or bridging contradictions. In 
their analysis of the employability discourse, Hallier and Butts (1999: 6) see 
it as a rhetoric aimed at defusing intensifying antagonisms by suggesting 
an area of parallel interests between employers and employees. Th ey also 
see it as a legitimisation strategy in regard to public opinion: it shows com-
panies making investments in people that benefi t the economy as a whole.
 The present discourse seems to mask a shift in power to the advantage 
of employers. Psychological contract theory plays a role in this. A psycho-
logical contract is a set of expectations that the employer and employee 
have of each other. The theory is that the ‘old psychological contract’, in 
which the employer was expected to try and maintain a permanent em-
ployment relationship with the employee in exchange for loyalty and per-
formance, is giving way to a ‘new psychological contract’ where the above 
no longer holds. The use of the word ‘contract’ here suggests that it is 
somehow binding for both parties in the employment relationship, i.e. 
that the employee is not completely at the whim of the employer. In the 
new psychological contract, the expectation is that employers will invest 
in their employees’ employability, in exchange for employee commitment 
(Ellig 1998). Commitment, in this context, is thinking of opportunities 
instead of entitlements (Ellig 1998) and thriving in a ‘performance cul-
ture’ (Rajan 1997). Anderson and Schalk tell us that commitment entails 
‘intrapreneurship, innovation, enacting changes to improve performance, 
excellent performance’ whereas previously ‘loyalty, attendance, satisfac-
tory performance, compliance with authority’ sufficed (1998: 642).
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 Finally, the idea of employability is associated with tremendous busi-
ness success and prestigious dynamism. Credibility is derived from an em-
pirical basis: in this case, Silicon Valley. In the 1990s, Silicon Valley was, 
like Japan in the 1980s, in terms of economic dynamics, the most widely 
respected territory on the planet. Kanter’s heroes were the ‘roving engi-
neers’ who created Silicon Valley. Th e same people provided the prototype 
for Littleton’s (2000) ‘boundaryless’ careers. Waterman et al. (1994) give 
examples of employability policies in renowned Silicon Valley companies, 
based on their own experience: Judith Waterman and Betsy Collard were 
involved in Silicon Valley-based organisations that provided career coun-
selling. To summarise: management gurus have created a distinctive, con-
sistent frame that promotes continuous investment in employees’ employ-
ability as the key to long-term security. It is built on an empirical reference, 
Silicon Valley, and on a set of beliefs centred on learning, networking and 
win-win relationships between employers and employees.
 After surveying these characteristics, it seems legitimate to ask what 
was new here. After all, that being attractive to employers is a source of 
security, and that learning opportunities are valuable can hardly count 
as spectacular insights. What was new, however, was the connecting of 
a specific conception of employability, seen as the empowerment of em-
ployees, and creative destruction, and packaging this in a voluntaristic 
discourse, framed in terms of a new psychological contract.
3 Potential wishful thinking and a collective action problem
Following the theory of collective action (Olson 1965), the employacurity 
model presents a serious collective action problem. This is because it in-
volves creating a skills formation system that can be seen as a public good, 
which creates free rider problems: for an employer, investing in his/her 
employees is less rational than poaching trained staff from competitors 
(Crouch 2006). These free rider problems will undermine the strategy 
of employacurity. The management literature exhibits little awareness of 
this. It promotes investing in employability as a tool for retaining valued 
employees (Ghoshal et al. 1999: 17; Vries et al. 2001: 1193), and as a way 
for a corporation to establish a reputation as an interesting potential em-
ployer. Ghoshal et al. (1999: 16) mention the example of Motorola with 
its ‘Motorola University’. The theory of the new psychological contract 
also hints at a private good that the employer can gain when investing in 
employees’ employability: a non-sticky type of employee commitment.
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 Several authors suggest that enlightened entrepreneurship can play a 
role in a decision to invest in employability. Ghoshal et al. (1999) assert 
that top managers who want to create more value beyond shareholder 
value can do this by investing in employees. It also unleashes innovation, 
cooperation and the sharing of knowledge from the boundaries formed 
by pure self-interest as an organisational guiding principle (Ghoshal et al. 
1999). Kanter (1993) speaks of creating ‘social value’.
 How valid is the claim that Silicon Valley’s (probably stylised) model 
can be generalised to society as a whole? The Silicon Valley model exhib-
its specific characteristics that are often cited as being able to help solve 
or alleviate the collective good dilemma. One of these is Silicon Valley’s 
nature as an industrial district. Porter (1998: 78) argues that in industrial 
districts, defined as ‘geographic concentrations of interconnected com-
panies and institutions in a particular field’, the ties between companies 
make the potential for collective benefits more easily recognised. There-
fore, private investments in public goods, such as training programmes, 
are more likely to happen in a tightly-knit industrial district than in areas 
where at best, arm’s length market relationships between organisations 
exist. In addition to this, one may expect that networks also facilitate a 
flow of people across opportunities (Kanter 1995).
 Another factor which may help solve or alleviate the collective good 
dilemma is the knowledge-intensity of the work being carried out. Crouch 
(2006) mentions the knowledge-intensity of the work as a factor contrib-
uting to private investment in a public good skills formation system. This 
applies particularly to the Silicon Valley case because in the innovative 
ICT industry, getting the work done and creating a learning environment 
are two sides of the same coin. Looking at the question of possible gener-
alisation of the Silicon Valley employment model, Kanter (1995) realises 
that generalisation would not be straightforward. She concludes that col-
lective action would be necessary, specifically in the form of providing 
supporting networks between firms.
4 The paradoxical rise of employacurity in the Netherlands
In the United States, following the 2000 dot-com bust, the appeal of em-
ployacurity faded. Instead, the general prospect became just heightened 
mobility combined with insecurity (Katz and Wheeler 2004). In contrast 
to this, in the Netherlands, the vision of employacurity not only became 
popular in the late 1990s, but its star has continued to rise. We will argue 
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that there is a paradox: although employacurity aims to generalise an em-
ployment system that is the total opposite of job security, it is most pro-
ductive in an employment system (the Dutch system) based on the norm 
of job security.
 The rise of employacurity in the Netherlands began when the Dutch 
discovered the untranslatable word ‘employability’. This happened in the 
early 1990s when a leading consultancy firm, Berenschot, began promot-
ing the concept to human resource management professionals and labour 
market specialists. The word ‘employability’ appeared for the first time 
on a Dutch newspaper page in 19932 when Joep Bolweg, consultant and 
managing director at Berenschot Social Management Group, voiced his 
opinion about standardised career tracks: ‘Extremely dangerous, because 
they create false expectations. The organization of the near future is un-
known, as are the positions in it that have to be filled. There is no resort 
other than increasing the versatility and employability of the employees’ 
(Meijnen 1993: 23). In response to a query in 2009 regarding where he had 
first come across the term employability, Bolweg explained that it was in 
the US (oral communication).
 Heleen Mes (1995), also from Berenschot, published the first Dutch 
article on employability, and in the section that explains the concept of 
employability, the author quotes sources such as Robert Saldich, presi-
dent of Raychem, a Silicon Valley company, and management guru Robert 
Waterman. The first Dutch book on employability was published in 1996 
(Gaspersz and Ott 1996). It quotes and builds on Kanter’s ideas. In short, 
the two seminal Dutch texts on employability are exclusively based on US 
sources.
 The next phase in the diffusion process in the Netherlands involved 
the adoption of the concept by key Dutch labour market and economic 
institutions. When explaining employability, policy documents from this 
phase refer to the two seminal Dutch texts mentioned above. In late 1996, 
the Dutch Labour Foundation, the joint institution of employers’ associa-
tions and unions that sets the agenda for collective bargaining, produced 
a policy document on employee training (Stichting van de Arbeid 1996). 
Referring to the Gaspersz and Ott (1996) book, the authors adopted the 
perspective of ‘employability’, noting there is not a good Dutch equivalent 
for the term. In 1997, the Ministry of Economic Affairs organised an ‘Em-
ployability Conference’, where Prime Minister Wim Kok spoke about the 
topic. In the conference documents, the source referred to the meaning of 
employability is again the Gaspersz and Ott book (Andriesse and Planken 
1997). The Dutch Socio-Economic Council and the Central Planning Bu-
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reau followed with policy documents that exhibit the same pattern (SER 
1998; CPB 1999).
 References to employability recommendations made by international 
institutions only occur in Dutch policy documents post 2001, that is, only 
after the employability discourse and policy were firmly established in the 
Netherlands. Here, the context of references to documents from interna-
tional bodies is one of justification rather than discovery. One example is 
a 2002 Dutch Labour Foundation report that focuses on EU recommen-
dations (Stichting van de Arbeid 2002). This report notes that the Labour 
Foundation had already been working on the issue of employability for the 
past six years, and that the EU recommendations were, to an extent, based 
on the Dutch experience. In short, during the phase in which employability 
policy became established, the policy documents of key Dutch institutions 
exclusively refer to a small, Dutch base of seminal literature. Th is seminal 
literature, in turn, is based on what we have called American guru think-
ing, thinking that has an empirical background in Silicon Valley.
 More recently, the concept of employability has started to inform the 
debate about the future of the welfare state in the Netherlands. Think-
ers on this subject tend to emphasise investment in employability rather 
than consumption, with the popular metaphor used of the welfare state 
moving from a ‘safety net’ to a ‘trampoline’ (Leijnse et al. 2002). In ad-
dition, in 2007, the concept of employability was incorporated into the 
coalition agreement that formed the basis of the new Dutch government 
(Balkenende IV).
5 Trade unions and employers’ associations
In the Netherlands, both employers’ representatives and union leaders 
tend to be adamant about employability. We can take this as a consensus, 
however with one qualification: when unions and employers’ associations 
speak about employability, they are not entirely speaking about the same 
thing. During the 1998 collective bargaining round, it became apparent 
that employers and the trade unions did not agree on how to translate the 
word ‘employability’.
 Dutch union representatives chose ‘weerbaarheid’ meaning empower-
ment (Veenis 1998), while employers thought of ‘inzetbaarheid, mobilit-
eit, flexibiliteit’, which means availability or usability, mobility, flexibility. 
Defining employability in this way, employers stressed traits they felt were 
desirable in employees.3 The differing ways in which employability has 
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been interpreted in the Netherlands have persisted throughout the devel-
opment of employability policy. We analysed a database containing pro-
grammatic texts produced by the trade union confederation FNV (Fed-
eratie Nederlandse Vakbeweging) and the employer’s association VNO/
NCW (Verbond Nederlandse Ondernemingen/Nederlands Christelijk 
Werkgeversverbond).4 Our research strategy consisted of examining ev-
ery document for sections containing the word ‘employability’, and then 
determining how the authors had defined employability in each case. The 
results are summarised in Table 1.
The concept of employability became evident in Dutch industrial relations 
in 1997. At first, the unions voiced reservations about the term. Eventu-
ally, however, they began associating it with training, which led to their 
Table 1 Defi nitions of “employability” in programmatic texts produced by the trade 
union confederation FNV and the employers’ association VNO/NCW
FNV VNO/NCW
1996 term does not occur term does not occur
1997 no defi nition, keeps the term 
at arm’s length by putting it in 
inverted commas
qualifi cations, training beyond actual 
function requirements, usability, physical 
and intellectual mobility, fl exible attitude
1998 usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
1999 usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
2000 associated with training usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
2001 usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
2002 usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
2003 usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
2004 associated with training usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
2005 usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
2006 “employability is the right to 
personal development”
usability, physical and intellectual mobility, 
fl exible attitude
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embracing of the employability concept as a form of employee empower-
ment. In contrast, employers began using a definition that included us-
ability, mobility and flexibility and have kept to this. The inclusion of the 
terms usability, mobility and flexibility in the definition of employability 
favoured by the employers is crucial. It creates an image of employability 
that can help employers overcome the collective good dilemma that in-
vestment in employability entails. This is due to the promise of a private 
advantage of employability investments, i.e. that it will make it easier for 
employers to move their employees around.
 The Dutch employment relations system is based on an implicit norm 
of job security, i.e. the idea that employees must be provided with a se-
cure job, leaving employers with a craving for more flexibility. The inclu-
sion of usability, mobility and flexibility in the employers’ definition of 
employability speaks to their desire for increased flexibility, producing a 
discourse that might lower barriers preventing investment in the public 
good. Moreover, and as a result of Dutch central coordination of collec-
tive bargaining through bipartite institutions, this discourse is visible in 
collective labour agreements as well.
 It is important to realise that employers’ inclusion of usability, mobility 
and flexibility in their definition of employability only has consequences 
at the level of ideology. Increased usability, mobility and flexibility are 
aims, not assets that lend themselves to direct investment. At the practi-
cal level, assets that do lend themselves to direct investments are skills, 
knowledge, insights and contacts. There are no indications that Dutch 
employers and unions feel differently about this. The central part of our 
argument here can be summarised as follows: the inclusion and confusion 
of usability, mobility and flexibility promises a private advantage to em-
ployers – a way around the collective action dilemma. The proposition of 
such a private advantage is possible because Dutch employers crave flex-
ibility, and this, in turn, is because the Dutch system is based on the norm 
of job security.
6 Collective labour agreements
Collective labour agreements can also help solve the collective action 
dilemma, provided that they cover a sufficient number of employers in 
a given industry. In the Netherlands, this coverage is generated in part 
by law, which makes industry-wide enforcement of collective labour 
agreements possible (CPB 1999). In this section, we present an analysis 
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of collective labour agreements demonstrating a relationship between 
investments in employability and items that regulate and make flexible 
employment possible. The existence of this relationship suggests a quid 
pro quo. It is easier to reach an agreement on investments in employ-
ability, in this case training that is not job-related or function-specific 
and the creation of personal development plans, when simultaneously 
catering to the employers’ craving for flexibility. Again, this development 
signals a mechanism that can make employacurity productive in a system 
based on the norm of job security. We will cover the analysis in some 
detail below.
 Our analysis is based on the FNV Ducadam database (see Chapter six 
in this volume for more information). It covers nearly all collective labour 
agreements concluded in the Netherlands from 1995 onwards and spans 
all sectors of the economy. Collective labour agreements are coded on 650 
main variables (Schreuder and Tijdens 2004). We used the data from 1995 
up to 2003.5 The total number of cases in our analysis is 2162.
 When it comes to finding indicators on employability investments, 
the subject of training presents something of a problem. We can pic-
ture training in a continuum. At one extreme, training is completely 
job and company specific, at the other extreme of the continuum there 
is general, non job-related training. In between these two extremes we 
find training that is multifunctional. Such training can help someone’s 
performance on the job, and, at the same time, boost the employee’s 
employability. We would not regard job and company-specific training 
as an investment in employability. Conversely, it is straightforward to 
see training that is general and not job-related as an investment in em-
ployability. In short, taking all training as investment in employability 
would lead to an overestimation. Thus, because we prefer to err on the 
safe side, we decided to restrict ourselves to the extreme of general and 
non job-related training. Luckily, the designers of the database created 
an indicator for non job-related training, which we used. An additional 
advantage of taking only clearly non job-related training into account is 
that it provides a focus on investments that are strictly aimed towards 
the public good of an employable workforce, which is at the heart of our 
argument.
 Apart from this indicator, we included an indicator measuring the oc-
currence of personal development plans in collective bargaining. Again, 
we see this indicator as unambiguously investing in employability as a 
public good. Together, both indicators make up a dichotomous variable 
for employability policy. It has the value of one if job-unrelated training 
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and/or personal development plans are included in the collective labour 
agreement (26.0).6
 Suitable indicators for flexibility clauses are also present in the data-
set. There are two indicators that correspond to the concept of numeri-
cal flexibility, i.e. management’s ability to vary the number of employees 
working for the organisation. One of these records whether the collec-
tive labour agreement makes it possible to conclude fixed-term employ-
ment contracts. Another indicator captures clauses that make it possible 
to offer zero-hour contracts, i.e. contracts that entail that the work week 
counts a variable number of hours, which may be zero. Using these indica-
tors, we created a new variable for numerical flexibility. Its score is zero 
if none of the items were found within the collective labour agreement 
(50.6) and one if either one or both of the items were found within the 
collective labour agreement (49.4).7
 A cross tabulation of employability and flexibility within collective 
labour demonstrates a possible relationship between the two (Table 2). 
If no arrangements are made about investments in employability, the 
majority of collective labour agreements will not contain arrangements 
about flexible labour contracts (57.8). In contrast, if there are employ-
ability arrangements within the collective labour agreement, the majority 
contain flexible employment contract arrangements (69.8). We found 
a correlation between the two variables of .24, significant at the p<.05 
level.
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The data cover the years 1995 through 2003. The proportion of collective 
labour agreements with clauses on employability investments grew over 
time, from 5.7 per cent in 1995 to 31.4 per cent in 2003. The proportion 
of collective labour agreements with clauses on numerical flexibility also 
grew during this period. The increase in these variables across time intro-
duces a possible problem of spurious relationships. It could be that both 
factors have increased across time, but independently. A way to account 
for this possibility is to perform a linear regression analysis in which time 
is included as an independent variable. When we do so, our analysis shows 
a significant effect of flexible labour contracts remains (Table 3).
To summarise: the regression analysis shows that collective labour agree-
ments containing clauses on employability investments are also more 
likely to have arrangements that focus on numerical flexibility, an indi-
cation that employability investments are traded for flexibility arrange-
ments. The small percentage of the total variance explained is inherent 
to the method being used. It also reflects that contingent factors play 
a large role. There are indications that employability, apart from its in-
trinsic value, is a convenient bargaining chip in the final phase of wage 
negotiations. Joep Bolweg provided the following example. Say, for ex-
ample, that the unions ask for a three per cent wage increase, while the 
employer is reluctant to agree. It is not unlikely that the parties will agree 
to a two per cent wage increase and one per cent allocated for investment 
in employability. Unions can claim the success of obtaining a three per 
cent increase for employees, while the employer maintains control over 
Table 3 Employability predicted on the basis of fl exibility, controlled for changes 
across time
Dependent variable:
Employability within collective labour 
agreement
Standardised coeffi  cients
Beta
Independent variable:










one-third of the financial space for wage increases. Once such an agree-
ment is reached, both sides tend to extol the virtues of employability. As 
Bulmahn and Kräkel (2002) show, in cases where jobs are associated with 
high risks, employers prefer to have over-educated workers because they 
are more capable of taking appropriate measures and improvising if nec-
essary, when something goes wrong.
7 Case study of a large bank
In this section we will explore how employacurity guides actions at the 
level of the organisation. To do this, we present a case study of a large 
bank based in the Netherlands, ING, which has considerably enhanced 
its employability policy. Brakenhoff, Dusschooten et al. (2008) presented 
ING as a best practice case in terms of social innovation. The sources 
used here are the employability sections of a succession of six collective 
labour agreements at ING covering the time period 2000-2010, and in-
terviews with protagonists, the top human resources manager for ING 
operations in the Netherlands consisting of 28,000 employees and the key 
trade union negotiator. Specifically, we were interested in how the collec-
tive action problem was managed.
 ING employability arrangements consist of the following aspects: in 
every part of the organisation, employability consultants provide coach-
ing to employees, employees have to make personal development plans 
that are discussed and evaluated on a yearly basis and job rotation ex-
ists to enhance experience. There is a website that offers employability 
and development tests and an ‘e-coach’ (Bosveld 2009). In one year this 
website received 77,000 hits and users downloaded 50,000 test reports. 
Employability arrangements also come into play when ING is faced with 
downsizing. For example, if a reduction of 100 jobs is planned, an entire 
department of upwards of 1000 employees is declared to be ‘preventative-
ly mobile’ and a social plan is created to train and coach employees poten-
tially at risk of losing their job. In short, everyone’s job within the chosen 
department is theoretically at risk, meaning that the facilities provided by 
the social plan, such as training and coaching, are open to all. The idea 
is that by taking a broad approach, employees will see investment in em-
ployability as a preventative measure, rather than as a way of softening the 
blow when downsizing.
 ING earmarks ten million euros annually for investments in employ-
ability not related to the work that employees are doing or are planned to 
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be doing in the future. This is on top of the employability arrangements 
already in place. Based on this arrangement, an individual employee can 
spend up to 1200 euros over the course of three years on activities, in 
particular training, as long as they are related to work in general and to 
employee development. Part-time employees are also entitled to 1200 eu-
ros of this arrangement, regardless of the amount of their working hours. 
Willem Daalder, the top human resource manager of the Dutch part of 
ING sees the 1200 euro plan as a ‘means to create a shift in mindset’ (inter-
view). The arrangement was modelled on an arrangement used internally 
by trade union FNV Bondgenoten. A union official from FNV Bondgeno-
ten, Fred Polhout, confirmed this, and expressed that it was important to 
him that he knew the 1200 euro plan could be implemented successfully, 
because ‘otherwise you are organising your own defeat’ (interview).
 Essential to this scheme, as implemented by ING, is that employees 
take the initiative. They start by entering their proposals on-line. A spe-
cial team evaluates the proposals; evaluation is swift and without going 
into details. Review teams consist of two people: a second level manager 
and the HR manager of the business unit. The HR manager especially has 
little time to spend on each application, since the unit for which he or she 
is responsible, retail for example, may comprise as many as 12,000 em-
ployees. The review teams review applications via computer only. If their 
assessments differ, they then discuss the case.
 One valid reason for turning down a proposal is that it is too closely re-
lated to the actual work an employee does, and therefore within the realm 
of the budget for regular training. Th e employee’s supervisor has no say in 
the spending of the 1200 euros for employability. Th e activities are under-
taken in the employee’s own time. A communications campaign ‘me and 
my employability’ supports the programme. It includes a magazine that 
portrays employees who worked on their development. It shows, for ex-
ample, a call centre agent who learned truck driving and aspires to become 
a truck driver. Th ere are on-line 90-second movies in which employees talk 
about what they are going to do in the 1200 euro scheme and their motiva-
tion for it. A set of posters depicts employees and their various viewpoints. 
Examples include: ‘I want to get more out of my job’, put forward by a sup-
port worker, who is ‘investigating what else is possible’. ‘For years I have 
been wanting to do something else’, stated by a commercial clerk, ‘soon to 
be the owner of a hotel for dogs’. ‘For the moment I want nothing’, which 
is the reaction of a product manager who wants ‘to continue with this em-
ployment for some time’. ‘I don’t want to lose my people’, a statement made 
by a manager (Brakenhoff , Dusschooten et al. 2008: 173-175).
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 In 2008, there were 4,900 applications, spread among all levels of the 
organisation, of which 72 per cent were accepted. The top human resource 
manager has found some resistance among managers, to which he tends 
to react by telling them that if they see good people leave after taking 
advantage of all the opportunities for development, capable replacements 
are bound to turn up: ‘In a way, it is the psychological contract’ (inter-
view). The Dutch Tax Administration is also a source of some resistance, 
due to a tendency for it in some cases to see the employability money as 
taxable income.
 What made this enhancement of employability policy possible? There 
were several ingredients that came together. One is the clear vision of 
the protagonists. The HR manager views employability as empowerment: 
‘Make sure that people become resilient, that they can take responsibil-
ity. This is much better than when someone cares for them. Thus, what I 
am trying to do is to make people take responsibility, to be in control of 
their own career.’ He takes care to avoid confusion with mobility: ‘Often, 
what you see is that employability is synonymous to mobility. Here, that 
is absolutely not the case. Employability may lead to mobility, but it is not 
the same’ (interview). The FNV trade union negotiator: ‘Employability is 
the way to keep people in employment longer. Give people opportunities. 
Of course, some people will take care of themselves and other people will 
need help. If you invest as much as possible, some people will see the light. 
We are trying to do this within ING, with the employability budget, for 
which the FNV has made a big effort’ (interview).
 Then, there was the window of opportunity that opened in 2006 with 
the bargaining about the Social Plan, i.e. a plan that stipulates how layoffs 
will be handled. At ING, large reorganisations, plus outsourcing, loomed 
on the horizon, and negotiations took a full year. This prompted a desire 
to stop managing the consequences of change exclusively at the ‘back end’, 
and instead also do something at the ‘front end’. The goal was to avoid 
sending employees into unemployment by facilitating transitions from 
‘work to work’. Thus, this window of opportunity was opened in a quest 
for flexibility without violating the norm of job security.
 The same holds true in the justification process for the 10 million per 
year expenditure for the employability budget. This justification process 
involves reporting inter-divisional mobility and lay-off costs as key per-
formance indicators. These are both indicators of flexibility. Again, we see 
a private payoff for the organisation in conjunction with investment in the 
collective good. This private payoff, flexibility, is valuable in the context of 
an employment system that is based on the norm of job security.
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8 Concluding notes
Th e fact that the introduction of the strategy of increasing job security by 
enhancing employability – employacurity – has been a success in the Neth-
erlands can be viewed as an instance of institutional complementarity. In-
stitutional complementarity exists in ‘situations in which the functionality 
of an institutional form is conditioned by other institutions’ (Höpner 1995: 
331.) In employacurity, the norm of job security conditions the function-
ality of policies for investment in employability. Th is complementarity is 
unintended, but, as far as institutional complementarities go, this seems to 
be more the rule than the exception (cf. Crouch et al. 2005: 365).
 The Dutch employment system solves the public good problem related 
to investments in enhanced employability in several ways. Foremost is 
that it creates the perception among employers that enhanced employ-
ability, apart from being a public good, entails private benefits for em-
ployers, in the form of flexibility.
 Additionally, the coordinated nature of the collective bargaining pro-
cess, in which the bipartite Dutch Labour Foundation sets the agenda, cre-
ates institutional pressure and coordinated wage setting helps limit the 
poaching of employees. Th ese factors operate regardless of whether collec-
tive labour agreements cover entire industries or, in the case of ING, just 
one company. Dutch law makes industry-wide enforcement of collective 
labour agreements possible, cutting out free-rider behaviour. Th e fact that 
the strategy of employacurity is made possible by Dutch corporatist insti-
tutions not only results from the bargaining system but also from the fact 
that ‘sector funds’ exist, which engage in a variety of activities, of which 
training is the most notable. Th e main source of income of these sector 
funds is a percentage of the wage sum contributed by the employers in a 
particular sector, as agreed to in collective bargaining. Generally, employ-
ers have no option but to pay the contribution: 92 per cent of Dutch sector 
funds have their funding written into a collective labour agreement and 79 
per cent of the collective labour agreements are enforced industry-wide.
 Finally, employacurity, paradoxically, seems productive when it builds 
on a system based on the norm of job security. In thinking of a new sce-
nario for managing collective risks it may be straightforward to accord 
an important role to firms as investors in employability. However, there 
is no reason for employers to take on this responsibility. Employers in 
the Netherlands did develop an interest in employability – pushed in this 
direction by the corporatist bargaining system – because employers were 
eager to remedy a perceived lack of labour flexibility.
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 Notes
 This chapter is derived form our article “Employability and job security, 
friends or foes? The paradoxical reception of employacurity in the Nether-
lands”, Socio-economic Review, , -: -, Oxford University Press 
and The Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics. We are grateful to 
Mara Yerkes for granting access to the database of programmatic documents, 
and for introducing us to the DUCADAM database. Sander Quak provided 
vital information. We thank our fellow members of the project team “Work 
and Social Security”, and three anonymous reviewers for their feedback on an 
earlier version of this paper.
 This was determined through a search in the Lexis-Nexis database.
 We traced the employer-favoured defi nition back to the Berenschot consul-
tancy fi rm. In his  interview, its managing director/consultant Joep Bol-
weg defi ned employability as ‘willingness to take training, usability, geograph-
ical mobility and positive attitude towards change’ (Meijnen : ). When 
Heleen Mes (), from the same consultancy fi rm, elaborated on this defi -
nition in a Dutch management journal, she described the origin of the term 
employability as a combination of the words employment and adaptability. 
According to Gaspersz and Ott (), however, this is an etymological myth.
 This database was created by Mara Yerkes and Marco Veenstra. See Yerkes 
 for more information.
 The reason for this restriction is that after , coding of employability in-
dicators is inconsistent. The complete dataset can be downloaded from the 
website: http: //www.fee.uva.nl/aias/Ducadam/.
 To illustrate, an example of a clause in a Dutch collective labour agreement 
that underpins investments in employability reads: 
 ‘Both the employer and the employee have their own responsibilities in rela-
tion to development efforts. The responsibilities of both parties are expressed 
in development policy targets: 
 – to keep the knowledge of the employees up-to-date, as a means of improv-
ing their preparation for their job or to enhance their multi-functionality.
 – in the long run, employees should be able to move to a different job.
 – there will be additional training efforts for employees who are at a risk of 
becoming under-trained in their job. There will also be extra training ef-
forts aimed at employees who are sufficiently qualified but who are no longer 
used to learning.’ (Collective labour agreement of Croda, formerly Uniquema 
: ).
 An example of a Dutch collective labour agreement clause that entails nu-
merical flexibility reads: ‘The work schedule depends on the supply of work 
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for on-call workers. It will be distributed one week in advance’ (collective 
labour agreement of ABP Loyalis : .).
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6 Corporatism and the Mediation of Social Risks
 The Interaction between Social Security and Collective Labour 
Agreements1
 Mara Yerkes and Kea Tijdens
The level of protection against social risks that is organised in a welfare 
state is not only dependent upon the arrangements of the welfare state 
itself, but also, as we have seen in the previous chapter, on arrangements 
organised in firms or in collective bargaining. The previous chapter inves-
tigated the introduction of the idea of employability as a strategy to en-
hance job security and concluded that the collective bargaining process fa-
cilitated the introduction and relative success of this strategy in collective 
labour agreements and in the labour policies of firms. This was explained 
by the institutional complementarity that exists in the Dutch corporatist 
welfare state between the norm of job security and the normative ideals of 
the strategy of enhancing employability.
 In this chapter, we focus on the corporatist institution of collective bar-
gaining that is so important to Dutch labour policy and investigate the role 
this institution plays in risk management and the contribution it makes to 
the protection against old and new social risks. In this chapter, we investi-
gate the interaction between risk protection by the welfare state and provi-
sions in collective labour agreements. If one diminishes, how does the other 
react? We investigate this interaction in relation to welfare state retrench-
ment (is this compensated for in collective labour agreements?), in relation 
to old and new social risks (to what extent do collective labour agreements 
and the traditional institution of social security protect against new social 
risks?) and in relation to the decentralisation of collective labour agree-
ments (does decentralisation lead to a decrease in risk-protection?). We 
learn that, as was the case in the previous chapter, the ‘old’ institutions 
of the (corporatist) welfare state play a decisive role in the birth of a ‘new 
welfare settlement’.
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1 Introduction
As we have seen in Chapter one, within the welfare state literature there 
has been increased attention for the discussion of social risks. This dis-
cussion often focuses on the difference between ‘old’ versus ‘new’ social 
risks (Bonoli 2005; Taylor-Gooby 2004). ‘Old’ social risks are risks associ-
ated with industrial society in which a main breadwinner was protected 
against sickness, old age and disability. These risks were often seen to lie 
outside the responsibility of the individual, hence some call them ‘exter-
nal’ risks. ‘New’ social risks are risks such as care risks and insufficient 
education or training, and are often referred to as ‘manufactured’ risks 
(Giddens 1998), given greater emphasis on individual responsibility.2
 Increased attention for social risks is, in part, a consequence of the 
dual processes of globalisation and individualisation as outlined in Chap-
ter one. Open societies and open economies challenge the collective na-
ture of social risk protection within welfare states. At the same time, 
the changing nature of social risks has and will continue to put pres-
sure on welfare states to create new policies and to adapt existing risk 
protection policies. There is a vastly growing literature that investigates 
social risks and welfare state responses (Bonoli 2007; Esping-Andersen 
2002; Taylor-Gooby 2004). Cross-country comparisons have highlighted 
the variation in risk protection across welfare states (see, for example, 
Brandl and Traxler 2005; Siegel 2005). Yet welfare states are not the only 
providers of welfare, a point not often reflected in the literature. There 
is also a growing industrial relations literature on the role of the social 
partners in welfare state reforms (Baccaro and Simoni 2008; Ebbinghaus 
and Hassel 2000; Visser 2007). And while collective bargaining institu-
tions are included in some welfare state analyses, collective bargaining 
outcomes are often excluded. One of the few exceptions to this is a study 
by Trampusch (2006). In her historical analysis of collective bargain-
ing in the Netherlands and Germany, Trampusch finds that collectively 
negotiated benefits are an important factor in welfare provision. This 
is important, because as Brandl and Traxler (2005) have convincingly 
argued, collective agreements can supplement or oppose welfare state 
policies in many countries. Within the industrial relations literature, 
however, there is little attention for the role of collective agreements 
as welfare protection; much industrial relations literature is focused on 
the supposed decentralisation of collective bargaining (Katz 1993; OECD 
1994), an argument for which there is much rhetoric but little empirical 
evidence (Traxler 1999).
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 We address both of these issues in this chapter. We start by concentrat-
ing on the shortcoming in the literature by researching the outcome of 
collective labour agreements (CLAs) in terms of the protection of social 
risks in the Netherlands. We make an empirical comparison of the cover-
age of old and new social risks in collective labour agreements, focusing 
on one ‘old’ social risk – occupational disability insurance, and one ‘new’ 
social risk – the need for an improved work-life balance. This compari-
son is a logical starting point given the current challenges facing welfare 
providers today. This analysis contributes to the third question posed at 
the beginning of this book, aimed at risk management: to what extent do 
collective agreements provide collective solutions for risk management 
in the Dutch welfare state? In this chapter, we also focus on the issue 
of decentralisation, empirically determining whether this is taking place 
within Dutch collective bargaining and whether this process strengthens 
or weakens the protection afforded social risks (in terms of more or less 
collective solutions to risks) in collective bargaining arrangements.
 We have selected the Netherlands as our case study due to its strong cor-
poratist structure, in which both the government and collective bargain-
ing structures play an important role in the creation and implementation 
of social risk protection. Collective labour agreements are important de-
terminants of working conditions in the Netherlands, and despite the de-
cline in trade union membership during the 1970s and 1980s (Visser 2006) 
coverage of collective labour agreements remains high in the Netherlands 
(OECD 1994). In fact, it is estimated that 80 to 85 per cent of all Dutch 
employees are covered by a collective labour agreement (Rojer 2002; Van 
Klaveren and Tijdens 2008; Vossen and Engelen 2002). A minor share of 
employees is covered by collective labour agreements as a result of the ap-
plication of general extension practices, whereby collective labour agree-
ment coverage is extended to all companies within an industry. Moreover, 
there is a unique opportunity to closely examine social risk protection in 
collective labour agreements in the Netherlands given the existence of a 
detailed collective labour agreement database; comparable databases are 
only available in Australia, Austria, Switzerland and Germany.
 In the next section, we review the literature on Dutch welfare state dis-
ability policy and work-life balance policy. We draw four hypotheses from 
this discussion. In section three, we introduce the data before moving on 
to the empirical section. The empirical section starts with a focus on the 
protection of occupational disability and work-life balance arrangements 
in collective labour agreements from 1995-2009. Which collective labour 
agreements offer the most protection for these social risks and why? We 
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then turn to the issue of decentralisation. Has decentralisation taken place 
since 1995 in Dutch collective labour agreements? Is risk-sharing affected 
by this process? The empirical section deals with each of these questions 
in turn. Finally, some conclusions are provided.
2 Collective bargaining and social risk protection
As noted in the introduction, while there are many studies that focus on 
the protection of social risks in welfare states or on the importance of 
industrial relations for welfare reform, there are few studies that focus 
on collective bargaining as a means of protecting against social risks. A 
study by Budd and Mumford looks at the availability of work-life balance 
policies as a result of trade union representation in the UK (2004). They 
find that trade union representation increases the chance that employers 
will offer parental leave, special paid leave and job-sharing possibilities. 
Heywood and Jirjahn (2009) find similar results for works council repre-
sentation in German workplaces. However, the focus of these studies is 
the effect of workplace representation, not collective bargaining arrange-
ments as an instrument of social protection.
 We start our analysis where a study by Trampusch leaves off (2006). 
From this literature, we know that collective bargaining arrangements are 
connected to welfare state reform. During the 1980s, occupational disabil-
ity insurance had become the focal point of Dutch welfare state reform. 
Following decades of generous income protection, it had become clear 
that occupational disability insurance had increased disproportionately 
to other welfare programmes. Occupational disability insurance had be-
come a means of dismissing older workers and generally circumventing 
less attractive exit routes, such as unemployment. To combat the ever-
growing number of benefit recipients, a number of laws were passed at 
the start of the 1990s, just prior to the starting point of our analysis in 
1995. In 1992, legislation was passed to reduce the volume of disability 
benefit recipients by introducing a bonus-malus system (Aarts, de Jong, 
and van der Veen 2002). The legislation failed and was abolished three 
years later. Of more importance, however, was the legislation of 1993, the 
Act on Reducing Disability Claims (TBA). This law tightened disability 
screening and clearly marked a shift towards a policy of activation rather 
than a policy of passive income protection in the welfare state.
 As the 1990s progressed, more reforms were undertaken. These includ-
ed the Act on Extending Salary Coverage during Illness (Wet Uitbreiding 
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Loondoorbetalingsplicht bij Ziekte, WULBZ) in 1996, which visibly rede-
fined individual rights to collective insurance and shifted responsibility 
for income protection to employers. Employer responsibility for income 
protection during sickness or disability was extended from one year to 
two years with the renewed Poortwachter legislation of 2004 (Yerkes 2011) 
and in 2006, disability reform was completed with the Work and Income 
according to Labour Capacity Act (Wet Werk en Inkomen naar Arbeids-
vermogen, WIA). This law, valid since 2006, replaced the Occupational 
Disability Insurance Act (Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, 
WAO) that had been in place since 1967. In addition, the law created more 
distinct and restricted categories of benefit recipients, reducing collec-
tive protection within the welfare state and increasing employer and in-
dividual responsibility. Under the new legislation, it was assumed that 
employers would not compensate for more than 170 per cent of lost earn-
ings in two years time (100 in the first year and 70 in the second year). 
However, if Trampusch (2006) is correct that welfare state retrenchment 
is compensated for in collectively negotiated benefits, we can expect that 
Dutch collective bargaining will attempt to compensate for these cuts in 
public disability arrangements.
 The compensation thesis can also be extended to the coverage of all 
social risks, including new social risks, hypothesising that coverage in col-
lective labour agreements is dependent upon what is available at the level 
of the welfare state. In contrast to occupational disability, work-life bal-
ance issues were not on the government agenda during the early 1990s in 
the Netherlands. Part-time work was increasing during this period (Yer-
kes and Visser 2006) but was considered to be primarily a collective bar-
gaining issue, not an issue of the welfare state. This perspective changed 
in 2000, with passage of the Adjustment of Working Hours Act (Wet 
Aanpassing Arbeidsduur, WAA), which guaranteed workers the right to 
increase or decrease working hours following one year of employment, 
dependent upon the situation in the firm. In addition, little childcare was 
available at this time (Tijdens and Lieon 1993) and parental leave was not 
provided for by the welfare state. Childcare policy, like part-time work, 
was also considered to be an issue for the social partners (Yerkes 2011). 
However, legislation creating a tripartite approach to financing childcare 
was implemented in 2005, making childcare partially a state responsibil-
ity. The new law was based on the idea that the welfare state, employers 
and parents would each be responsible for one-third of childcare costs. 
Employer subsidies were voluntary under the legislation, but became 
mandatory in 2007, effectively removing childcare from the collective 
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bargaining table. Finally, parental leave was not provided for by the welfare 
state during the mid-1990s (Yerkes 2006), also being considered a collec-
tive bargaining issue. Parental leave legislation was not introduced until 
2001, under pressure to conform to European regulations. Part of a larger 
Act on Work and Care (Wet Arbeid en Zorg), the legislation guaranteed 
parents the right to 13 weeks of unpaid parental leave. Leave legislation was 
changed in 2009 so that the right to parental leave is calculated as 26 times 
an employee’s weekly working hours and can be taken up until the child’s 
eighth birthday. Th e subsidising of parental leave and/or an extension of 
the duration of parental leave remains an issue for collective bargaining.
 Given these developments, and the importance of collective bargain-
ing arrangements as a provider of welfare, as well as the interaction be-
tween the welfare state and collective bargaining institutions (Brandl and 
Traxler 2005; Rein 1982) we expect that the coverage of social risks is 
dependent upon welfare state protection. We differentiate between the 
public and private sector here to allow for possible differences between 
sectors in which the government has indirect input (such as education 
and health care) versus the private sector where this is not the case. This 
leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: If the state does not provide risk coverage for new social 
risks, or cuts existing coverage for old social risks, this role will be taken 
up by collective labour agreements, and it is assumed that these provi-
sions do not diff er between public and private sector collective labour 
agreements.
Second, some empirical evidence has been found to demonstrate that in a 
number of countries, a decentralisation of collective bargaining structures 
has occurred (Katz 1993; OECD 1994). In its basic form, the decentrali-
sation thesis assumes, “that the locus of collective bargaining is shifting 
downward in a number of countries, often from a national or multi-com-
pany level to the firm or plant level” (Katz 1993: 3). A variety of explana-
tions have been offered to elucidate the presence or absence of decentrali-
sation, including expected effects from the decline of union membership, 
leading to increased employer influence (Katz 1993), increased competi-
tion within countries, variation in forms of governance, the growth of the 
service sector or the internationalisation of markets (Traxler and Kittel 
2000; Zagelmeyer 2007). The most pronounced reason we should expect 
decentralisation, though, according to the literature, is due to a process of 
neo-liberalisation.
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 Decentralisation is assumed to be a consequence of the neo-liberalisa-
tion of socio-economic policies, which reduced collective responsibilities 
and increased individual responsibilities. Initially, following the crises of 
the 1970s, corporatism and corporatist strategies became of increasing 
importance (Berger 1981; Goldthorpe 1984). In countries like Germany, 
Norway, Austria and Sweden, governments attempted to mediate inequal-
ities between capital and labour through the use of corporatist policies, 
whereas other countries followed a market-driven neo-liberal path (Bam-
ber, Lansbury, and Wailes 2004). Yet as economic pressures continued into 
the 1980s, and as a consequence of socio-economic changes, countries 
supposedly began shifting away from corporatism and moving towards 
neo-liberalism (Traxler 1999). In that vein, neo-liberalisation is meant ‘to 
dismantle and deregulate collective labor market institutions in order to 
boost performance’ (Traxler 1999: 57). One of the most glaring problems 
with the decentralisation argument, however, is a lack of convincing em-
pirical evidence (Traxler 1999). We investigate decentralisation by looking 
at the development of industry-wide and company-level bargaining across 
time. If the assumptions put forth in the literature hold, decentralisation 
should be visible in collective labour agreements from 1995 onwards.
Hypothesis 2: If decentralisation is evident, we should see a signifi cant 
increase in the number of company-level collective labour agreements 
in comparison to industry-wide collective labour agreements between 
1995-2009. Decentralisation should be evident in both public and pri-
vate sector collective labour agreements.
Another concern with the decentralisation argument is the assumption 
that decentralisation will lead to neo-liberal strategies in industrial re-
lations. Following the period of neo-liberalisation during the 1980s, we 
have witnessed a revival of corporatist strategies and a broadening of the 
scope of collective bargaining structures. Scholars are in agreement that 
we are witnessing a renewed interest in corporatist institutional strate-
gies (Mailand 2007). Governments increasingly seek concertation with 
employers and/or trade unions (Baccaro and Simoni 2008). In some coun-
tries, governments increasingly seek out the assistance of the social part-
ners as a means of blame avoidance in their quests for welfare reform 
(Baccaro and Simoni 2008; Visser 2007). Bi- and tripartite forms of con-
certation are even visible in countries lacking a corporatist industrial rela-
tions history, such as Italy and Ireland (Baccaro 2003). Moreover, various 
manners of tripartite policy-making began to emerge in post-communist 
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European countries (Avdagic 2006). The consequences of this develop-
ment have not been discussed in terms of decentralisation.
 At the same time, the scope of collective bargaining has widened in many 
countries. Collective bargaining is no longer restricted to wage determina-
tion and policies associated with the industrial economy, such as pensions 
and disability coverage. Rather, collective bargaining increasingly deals with 
a range of social protection and welfare state issues, ‘such as the introduc-
tion of new technologies, health and safety issues or the allocation of work-
ing hours across days of the week’ (Wallerstein, Golden, and Lange 1997: 
381). In fact, in some countries collective bargaining has been expanded to 
include protection for a wide variety of labour market risks, not only work-
ing time arrangements and health and safety issues, but employability and 
work-life aspects as well (Budd and Mumford 2004; Schreuder 2008).
 In addition, company-level collective labour agreements are assumed 
to be more attuned to the changing needs and preferences of employers 
(Nagelkerke and de Nijs 2003). Company-level collective labour agree-
ments provide employers with room to customise collective labour agree-
ments to their needs, allowing them to respond quickly to the changing 
work environment. Given this increased ability to customise collective 
labour agreements, it is plausible that company-level collective labour 
agreements will be able to respond to new social risks more quickly as the 
need arises than industry-wide collective labour agreements. In contrast, 
decentralisation is – as said before – also assumed to go hand-in-hand 
with neo-liberalisation. If this is true, we should see decreased social risk 
protection, in particular in company-level collective labour agreements, 
not increased protection in the case of customisation. To determine which 
hypothesis is more valid, we test both:
Hypothesis 3a: If decentralisation leads to customisation in collective 
labour agreements, there will be a diff erence in risk protection provided 
by company-level and industry-wide collective labour agreements, with 
company-level collective labour agreements providing more protection 
for social risks than industry-wide collective labour agreements.
Hypothesis 3b: If decentralisation goes hand-in-hand with neo-liberal-
ism, there will be an overall decrease in risk protection in company-level 
collective labour agreements, more so than in industry-wide collective 
labour agreements.
We examine these hypotheses in section four.
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3 Data
We use data from the longitudinal panel database FNV CAO-Database 
(Ducadam), which contains detailed information on collective labour 
agreements concluded in the Netherlands from 1995 onwards (for more 
information see Schreuder and Tijdens 2004). The FNV CAO-database 
includes both textual and coded information on all collective labour 
agreements bargained by the largest Dutch trade union confederation, 
the FNV. The textual part is an online database that stores texts of col-
lective agreements, bargaining agendas, pamphlets and legal docu-
ments. The coded part of the database covers information for more than 
a thousand variables, whereby the FNV codes each new or prolonged 
collective agreement according to these variables. The data include de-
tailed information about the protective clauses included in collective 
labour agreements. One of the authors has supplemented this data with 
information on the division of collective labour agreements into the 
public and private sector and with information on the level at which the 
collective labour agreement was concluded (company level or industry-
wide).
 This data project began in 1995, and FNV gradually completed the da-
tabase. The database was converted to a statistical database (in SPSS) in 
2003 by the University of Amsterdam and the Amsterdam Institute for 
Labour Studies (AIAS). In 2009, the dataset held 1765 unique collective 
labour agreements, which represent a total of 8030 consecutive agree-
ments, covering the years 1995 to 2009. On average, a collective labour 
agreement lasts for one to two years, and is then renewed. On average, 
each collective labour agreement is present 7.3 times in the database.
 Although the exact number of collective labour agreements is not 
known in the Netherlands, and this number varies over time, a rough es-
timate indicates that trade union confederation FNV is a bargaining part-
ner in 90 per cent of all collective labour agreements, and thus the FNV 
CAO-database covers 90 per cent of all agreements. Taking into account 
that 80 to 85 per cent of all Dutch employees are covered by a collective 
labour agreement, the FNV CAO-database is estimated to hold informa-
tion on collective labour agreements covering more than two-thirds of 
the Dutch labour force in dependent employment. The collective bargain-
ing agreement is our unit of analysis here, focusing on the share of agree-
ments that offer a specific arrangement, the level at which the agreement 
is concluded (industry-wide versus company-level) and sector of agree-
ment (public versus private).
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 The empirical analysis is divided into three parts. First, we look at the 
share of occupational disability and work-life balance arrangements in 
collective labour agreements. To measure protection of the combination 
of work and care, we look for evidence of the following three arrange-
ments: 1) the right to part-time work, demonstrating the right to reduce 
one’s working hours but keep the same job; 2) childcare arrangements; 
and 3) supplemental (beyond legal requirements) parental leave. To mea-
sure occupational disability coverage, we focus on financial support, look-
ing for evidence of: 1) supplemental income during the first year of illness 
or disability; 2) supplemental income during the second year of illness or 
disability and 3) the percentage of supplemental income provided for dur-
ing the second year of illness or disability. Second, we consider whether 
decentralisation has taken place by looking at the share of agreements 
concluded at the company level and industry level from 1995 onwards. 
Lastly, we measure the share of collective agreements that offer occupa-
tional disability and work-life balance arrangements in both company-
level and industry-wide agreements.
4 Results
4.1 Do collective labour agreements protect against social risks?
Starting with work-life balance arrangements, the data show that collec-
tive bargaining agreements in the Netherlands already offered a particu-
larly high share of protection for the right to part-time work and childcare 
prior to legislation being introduced in 2000 and 2005 respectively (see 
Figure 1). Supplemental parental leave is provided for in only a small share 
of collective agreements. The latter is possibly explained by the gendered 
nature of work and care in the Netherlands; women are more likely than 
men to take on caring duties in the Netherlands (Yerkes 2009). Given 
Dutch women’s propensity to work part-time and to use part-time child-
care to combine work and care (SCP 2006), parental leave is not as well-
developed as childcare and part-time work arrangements. This question 
remains an issue for further research. We also note that while collective 
agreements compensate for a lack of government policy in work-life ar-
eas, they also appear to respond to legislation once it is developed. Fol-
lowing the introduction of working hours legislation in 2000, the share of 
collective agreements providing a right to part-time work increased from 
48 per cent to 88 per cent in 2009.
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Figure 1 Work-life coverage in collective bargaining in the Netherlands, across all 
industries, 1995-2009
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ducadam dataset (1995-2009)
A similar decrease is visible with childcare. Following the childcare legisla-
tion of 2005, the share of collective agreements off ering childcare arrange-
ments decreased from 73 per cent in 2006 to 50 per cent, and following the 
legislation of mandatory employer subsidies in 2007 it continues to decline 
even further. In sum, our data confi rm and further develop earlier conclu-
sions by Trampusch (2006), showing that compensation for public welfare 
through collective bargaining can occur both in areas of reform as well as 
under-developed policy areas, as is the case with many new social risks.
 In terms of occupational disability, we see that at the start of our analysis 
in 1995, less than fi ve per cent of all collective agreements off ered supple-
mental disability benefi ts in the fi rst or second year of illness or disability (see 
Figure 2). Th ese initial results are not surprising, as the reform of disability 
policy in the Dutch welfare state had, until that point, remained limited. 
However, we see that starting in 1998, two years following the legislative re-
form requiring employers to cover the fi rst six weeks of illness or disability, 
that the share of collective agreements with supplemental disability benefi ts 
is rising. Th e share of agreements off ering these benefi ts continues to rise 
as employers and individual employees are increasingly held fi nancially re-
sponsible for the initial period of sickness or disability. As discussed above, 
in 2002, employers were mandated to cover fi nancially the fi rst full year of 
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see a clear response in collective agreements to off er supplemental income 
protection in these two years. Moreover, the data demonstrate that the share 
of collective agreements that off er 70 per cent income supplement or higher 
in the second year grew from 56 per cent in 2004 to 71 per cent within two 
years, compensating for cuts in public benefi ts.
Figure 2 Disability coverage in collective bargaining in the Netherlands, across all 
industries, 1995-2009
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ducadam dataset (1995-2009)
Does this protection vary across sectors? Th e data demonstrate that in 
terms of disability coverage, initially a greater share of public sector col-
lective agreements provided compensation for changes in welfare state 
provision (see Table 1). However, following 2001, we see a decline in cover-
age in public sector collective agreements while the share of private sec-
tor agreements with supplemental coverage continued to increase. Th e 
smaller share of collective agreements in the public sector goes against 
earlier fi ndings (Boyne, Jenkins, and Pools 1999). In terms of work-life ar-
rangements, a greater share of public sector collective agreements provide 
supplementary parental leave, but private sector collective agreements 
provide a greater share of collectively negotiated part-time work rights and 
childcare arrangements. Our fi rst expectation is therefore partially con-
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in or lack of welfare state policy, yet some diff erences are visible between 
the public and private sector. Th ese sector-level diff erences are in contrast 
to recent fi ndings from Schils and Houwing (2010), who fi nd evidence of 
convergence across sectors in collectively bargained fl exicurity arrange-
ments, with some persistent variation evident in the utilities, education 
and services sector. We discuss the implications of our fi ndings below.
Table 1 Share of disability arrangements in public and private industry collective 



















1995 Public 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0  0.0  0.0
Private 3.4 2.6 2.6 44.6 31.3 1.7
1996 Public  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private 3.8 3.0 3.0 40.8 33.8 1.5
1997 Public 40.0 40.0 40.0 22.2 33.3 11.1
Private 5.8 2.8 2.8 41.9 31.0 2.8
1998 Public 54.5 45.5 40.9 31.8 27.3 13.6
Private 13.8 10.7 10.3 41.9 35.7 5.5
1999 Public 50.0 40.9 40.9 34.1 27.3 27.3
Private 27.1 19.7 19.0 42.1 34.7 5.9
2000 Public 74.0 60.0 56.0 38.0 28.0 10.0
Private 49.3 40.1 39.2 48.8 46.2 10.7
2001 Public 88.1 76.2 76.2 42.9 47.6 23.8
Private 79.4 61.4 59.0 56.3 55.2 9.0
2002 Public 71.7 60.4 60.4 43.4 58.5 22.6
Private 81.6 66.7 63.8 59.2 62.6 11.5
2003 Public 62.1 58.6 55.2 43.9 65.5 17.5
Private 81.1 62.5 59.1 59.3 62.0 11.3
2004 Public 71.0 62.3 44.9 47.8 75.0 22.4
Private 86.7 71.5 56.7 58.1 69.7 12.3
2005 Public 79.0 74.2 46.8 42.6 73.8 19.7
Private 93.7 88.1 71.6 62.5 76.8 11.1
2006 Public 92.5 89.6 49.3 51.6 72.3 20.6
Private 96.5 94.2 74.1 64.0 73.4 10.1
2007 Public 95.4 93.8 41.5 69.0 48.1 11.3
Private 97.8 97.0 73.3 77.9 49.9 15.2
2008 Public 98.1 96.2 36.5 80.4 45.9 24.1
Private 98.2 97.6 76.5 90.6 57.9 17.2
2009 Public 97.1 97.1 42.9 78.1 62.5 30.0
Private 99.5 99.0 73.7 89.9 46.5 15.0
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ducadam dataset (1995-2009)
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4.2 Is decentralisation evident?
Next, we consider the decentralisation thesis. We start by measuring de-
centralisation as an increase in the proportion of company-level collec-
tive labour agreements in relation to the proportion of industry-wide 
collective labour agreements each year. We analysed a total of 8,411 
collective labour agreements present in the database between 1995 and 
2009.3 On average, 77 per cent of these collective labour agreements 
were company-level collective labour agreements and 23 per cent were 
industry-wide collective labour agreements during this period. Hence, 
it seems there is a greater propensity towards collective labour agree-
ments at lower levels of collective bargaining (see Figure 3).4 Taking a 
closer look, however, we see that these averages do not tell us the whole 
story. By 2009, only 64 per cent of collective labour agreements were 
company-level collective labour agreements, a 24 per cent decrease from 
1995. This represents a significant decrease across time (measured as the 
correlation between the percentage of company-wide collective labour 
agreements and year) and is indicative of a clear overall trend of centrali-
sation in Dutch collective bargaining, rather than decentralisation as is 
assumed in hypothesis two.
Figure 3 Annual percentage of company-level CLAs in relation to all CLAs in the 
Netherlands, public and private sector combined, 1995-2009 (N = 8,411)
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ducadam dataset (1995-2009)
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Next, we look at the number of company and industry-wide collective la-
bour agreements in greater detail, differentiating between the public and 
private sector. When we do this, we see that the private sector is charac-
terised by a large number of company-level collective labour agreements. 
On average, from 1995-2009 79 per cent of collective labour agreements 
in private industries were company-level collective labour agreements. 
Only 21 per cent of collective labour agreements in the private sector were 
industry-wide collective labour agreements during this period. In com-
parison, the public sector had nearly twice as many industry-wide collec-
tive labour agreements. On average, 39 per cent of public sector collective 
labour agreements were agreed upon at the industry-wide level. An aver-
age of 61 per cent of public sector collective labour agreements were at the 
company level during this same period.
 Taking a closer look at the relationship between the percentage of com-
pany-level collective labour agreements and year, the data demonstrate a 
small increase in company-level collective labour agreements in the pub-
lic sector (see Figure 4; measured as a correlation between the proportion 
of company-level collective labour agreements and year, not significant at 
the 0.10 level). We cannot say the same for private industries (see Figure 
5). In private sector collective labour agreements, the data demonstrate a 
significant increase in industry-wide collective labour agreements. While 
nearly 90 per cent of the collective labour agreements concluded in the 
private sector in 1995 were at the company level, this decreased to 65 per 








































































Figure 4 Annual percentage of company-level CLAs in relation to all CLAs in the 
Netherlands within the public sector, 1995-2009 (N = 1,197)
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ducadam dataset (1995-2009)
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sector since the mid-1990s. We must therefore reject our second hypoth-
esis. Despite a minor trend towards decentralisation in the public sector, 
a trend which is not statistically significant, the overall trend in collective 
bargaining in the Netherlands is towards more industry-wide collective 
labour agreements than company-level collective labour agreements on 
an annual basis. We turn to the implications of these findings in the con-
clusions.
4.3 Centralisation and risk sharing
Lastly, the final step in the analysis considers what the effects of this 
centralisation are for risk-sharing in CLAs. Are there differences in the 
protection of both work-life balance and occupational disability in indus-
try-wide and company-level CLAs? The results are presented in Table 2. 
Looking at the availability of part-time work, childcare and supplemental 
parental leave arrangements, we see that while company-level agreements 
initially provide more protection in terms of the right to part-time work, 
by the time legislation is passed in 2000, both company-level and indus-
try-wide collective agreements offer a similar degree of protection. In 
regards to childcare, company-level collective agreements appear to lag 
behind industry-wide agreements. Lastly, little difference can be found in 
Figure 5 Annual percentage of company-level CLAs in relation to all CLAs in the 










































































Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ducadam dataset (1995-2009)
** Two-tailed t-test shows a signifi cant decline in company-level CLAs across time (0.01 level).
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the share of industry-wide and company-level collective agreements that 
provide supplemental parental leave.
 In regard to disability protection, both company-level collective agree-
ments and industry-wide agreements offer a similar level of protection. 
Table 2 Share of disability arrangements in industry-wide and company-level 






















1995 IW 17.9 17.9 17.9 35.7 17.9 3.6
CL 1.9 1.0 1.0 45.9 32.9 1.4
1996 IW 5.9 3.9 3.9 29.4 47.1 2.0
CL 3.4 2.8 2.8 42.1 31.5 1.4
1997 IW 10.7 6.7 6.7 35.1 39.2 4.1
CL 5.8 3.0 3.0 43.0 29.3 2.7
1998 IW 23.5 22.4 22.4 42.9 40.8 4.1
CL 13.7 9.8 9.1 41.4 34.3 6.4
1999 IW 31.6 24.8 24.8 37.6 32.5 8.5
CL 28.4 20.6 19.8 42.6 34.6 7.5
2000 IW 59.7 50.0 49.3 49.3 54.5 15.7
CL 49.0 39.4 38.1 47.5 42.0 9.2
2001 IW 78.4 65.5 62.6 56.1 56.8 7.9
CL 80.4 61.5 59.5 55.2 54.0 10.5
2002 IW 79.7 67.7 64.7 59.4 65.4 12.0
CL 81.1 65.7 63.2 57.4 61.4 12.6
2003 IW 81.6 68.4 66.4 63.2 67.1 13.6
CL 79.0 60.5 56.7 56.5 60.9 11.3
2004 IW 85.8 73.6 56.1 61.9 77.9 13.7
CL 85.1 69.9 55.5 56.0 68.2 13.2
2005 IW 92.6 86.5 66.2 63.9 79.5 11.2
CL 92.4 87.0 70.3 60.0 75.7 12.1
2006 IW 99.0 96.0 66.7 64.6 72.4 12.4
CL 95.5 93.3 72.1 62.0 73.6 11.3
2007 IW 96.7 95.9 58.2 82.1 49.1 9.3
CL 98.0 97.0 73.0 75.8 49.9 16.3
2008 IW 99.0 98.1 67.0 93.5 62.0 19.6
CL 98.2 97.5 73.9 88.5 55.2 17.7
2009 IW 98.1 98.1 62.3 87.8 54.5 12.5
CL 99.5 98.9 71.0 88.3 46.7 18.3
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ducadam dataset (1995-2009)
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The share of agreements offering supplemental income in the first and 
second year of illness is minimally smaller in company-level agreements 
in comparison to industry-wide agreements. The only relatively large 
difference between company-level and industry-wide agreements in the 
protection of disability became visible following the most recent reform 
of disability legislation in 2006. While the share of industry-wide collec-
tive agreements supplementing income at a level of 70 per cent or higher 
declined after this point, the share of company-level agreements provid-
ing 70 per cent or higher income supplementation increased slightly and 
remains roughly 10 per cent higher than in industry-wide agreements. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are not confirmed. No major differences are found 
between company-level and industry-wide agreements, and no decentral-
isation is evident.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have focused on risk management in the Dutch welfare 
state, specifi cally addressing social risk management in relation to collec-
tive labour agreements. We analysed if work-family balance arrangements, 
which aim to cover so-called new social risks, and occupational disabil-
ity arrangements, covering traditional risks, were provided for in Dutch 
collective labour agreements from 1995-2009, in response to the absence 
of or decrease in coverage by the welfare state. Th e results show that in 
regard to both old and new social risks, collective labour agreements are 
likely to provide coverage in areas where the welfare state provides little 
to no protection or where protection has declined. Few diff erences exist 
between the public and private sector in this regard. In other words, in the 
new Dutch welfare settlement, collective agreements can compensate for 
a lack of or change in risk management in the welfare state. Furthermore, 
we have shown that decentralisation, measured as the number of com-
pany-level collective labour agreements in comparison to industry-wide 
collective labour agreements on an annual basis, is not occurring in the 
Netherlands. Th ere is evidence of centralisation taking place in Dutch col-
lective bargaining since the mid-1990s. Moreover, there are few diff erences 
between company-level and industry-level collective labour agreements 
in regards to social risk protection. Th e absence of diff erentiation likely 
points to the constraining eff ect of a corporatist welfare state; given strong 
collective coordination, it is plausible that company-level collective labour 
agreements diff er little from industry-wide collective labour agreements.
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 The data point to a number of possible implications of centralisation 
for our understanding of risk-sharing in the welfare state. One conse-
quence of this centralisation for risk sharing could include even greater 
coverage of work-family issues in collective labour agreements in the near 
future, given the larger increase in work-family balance arrangements in 
industry-wide collective labour agreements in comparison to company-
level collective labour agreements. Another consequence of centralisa-
tion is a growing convergence in risk coverage in collective agreements 
and the ability of collective bargaining agreements to compensate for 
welfare state policy.5
 In relation to the questions posed in Chapter one, these findings point 
to an important factor in social risk protection and welfare provision in 
general. We have shown that collective agreements can offer compen-
sation for cuts in or the absence of collective protection in the welfare 
state, a nuance often missing in more generalised studies of risk protec-
tion in welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999). 
In addition, this chapter shows the flexibility of the Dutch corporatist 
structure in providing collective coverage of new social risks (see also 
Yerkes 2011). In other words, the new Dutch welfare settlement, while 
developing along the lines of welfare and workfare, does not represent 
a shift towards a more liberalised welfare state, in the Anglo-American 
style. The importance of the interaction between collective welfare state 
protection and protection offered by collective agreements (or other 
sources) in countries beyond the Dutch case, requires further investiga-
tion. It is clear, however, that in the Netherlands, collective agreements 
play an integral role in social risk management.
 Notes
 Parts of this chapter are taken from Yerkes, M. and K. Tijdens, . “Social 
Risk Protection in Collective Labour Agreements: Evidence from the Neth-
erlands.” European Journal of Industrial Relations, (): -.
 Although the presence of ‘new’ social risks was obscured by the presence of 
strong, nuclear families and other institutional arrangements that absorbed 
these risks, these risks are not necessarily new. Taylor-Gooby, however, 
makes a useful distinction in this regard. New social risks are ‘significant 
but transitory and particular’ (Taylor-Gooby : ) and are most likely to 
affect young people, women, ethnic minorities and migrants as well as lower-
educated individuals (see also Yerkes ).
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 This number is slightly higher than in the previous analyses due to missing 
data on occupational disability and work-life balance arrangements.
 It should be noted that industry-wide agreements cover, on average, more 
employees than company agreements, but the data have not been weighted 
to account for this difference. If we were to focus on the share of employees 
covered, we would lose nearly one third of the data due to missing informa-
tion. We have information on  collective agreements and information 
on the number of employees for  collective agreements. The number of 
employees covered by a collective agreement in our database ranges between 
 (th percentile) and  employees (th percentile). 
 However, collective labour agreements, while in theory capable of provid-
ing social risk protection, are instruments outlining the rules of the game. 
The implementation of arrangements agreed upon within a collective labour 
agreement is largely dependent upon managers and/or organisational HRM 
policy (Yerkes ). How this implementation, or lack thereof, affects social 
risk protection, is an issue we leave for further research.
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7 Changing Labour Policies of Transnational Corporations
 The Decrease and Polarisation of Corporate Social 
Responsibility
 Johan Heilbron and Sander Quak
Social risks can be managed in different ways. The management of social 
risks is commonly discussed in relationship to welfare state institutions or, 
in a less common approach, in relation to the protection corporatist insti-
tutions provide through collective bargaining, as presented in the previous 
chapter. However, one of the central institutions active in risk manage-
ment, alongside the family, is the firm. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, firms took (some) responsibility for the well-being of their em-
ployees. In some welfare states, for example in the US, firms still play an 
important role in managing social risks, hence the term ‘corporate welfare 
state’, sometimes used to describe the US welfare state.
 In this chapter we focus on the essential function private corporations 
fulfil in the way social risks are defined and dealt with collectively. It is 
important to investigate the role of private corporations in the manage-
ment of social risks because firms become increasingly important in an era 
of economic globalisation. As markets open up and national states weak-
en, private corporations have more freedom to act. As companies become 
geographically and institutionally ‘footloose’, a process in the direction of 
reduced protection takes place, often called a ‘race to the bottom’ (Mishra 
1999; Castles 2004) in the direction of diminished corporate responsibility 
for employees, resulting in a shift of responsibilities from employers to em-
ployees (Hacker 2006).
 In this chapter, we investigate the development of labour policies in two 
transnational corporations. We learn that due to the fact that these corpora-
tions are embedded in diff erent national and transnational economic fi elds, 
the extent to which corporate responsibility for protection against social risks 
is diminishing varies from risk to risk, and that a polarisation is taking place 
in corporate responsibility between the responsibility taken for higher man-
agement and responsibility taken for lower levels of personnel.
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1 Introduction
Because the role of large firms has been unduly neglected in many de-
bates about the transformation of the welfare state, in this chapter we 
will explore the changes large corporations have gone through since the 
1980s and assess some of the consequences these have had for the redefi-
nition and redistribution of social risks. We will do so by considering the 
profound transformation in the way corporations managed their labour 
force during the last two decades of the twentieth century. The most sim-
ple and straightforward description of this transformation is that it has 
shifted from ‘personnel administration,’ carried out in primarily national 
settings, to a more transnational mode of ‘human resource management’. 
Our approach to this change differs from the standard economic analysis 
in which firms are seen as isolated actors that pursue their objectives in-
dependent of their relations to other actors. In contrast to such a view, our 
analysis is centred on the way in which firms are embedded in the context 
in which they operate. The various modes of embeddedness can be con-
ceived in terms of field dynamics, in the sense that Bourdieu (2005) and 
Fligstein (2001) have given to the concept. Economic actors are embedded 
in field structures, which define the constraints as well as the opportuni-
ties these actors confront. Such a field approach simultaneously allows 
a reformulation of the issue of globalisation. Contrary to the idea that 
globalisation leads to a practically unrestricted freedom for corporations, 
in the field approach, globalisation can be conceptualised as a process of 
shifting dependencies on national and transnational fields. Large firms 
continue to operate within the borders of national states and as such re-
main dependent on a variety of local and national institutional arrange-
ments, but they have indeed become significantly more dependent on 
transnational fields. In the present chapter we examine the consequences 
of this shift in dependencies for corporate labour policy.
 First, we will argue that a field approach is a fruitful way to understand 
how firms and their business strategies evolve. After elaborating what this 
approach entails, we will highlight the most salient changes occurring in 
transnational corporations since the economic crisis of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, and specify what the consequences have been for corporate 
labour policy. We will, in particular, argue that the rise and spread of ‘hu-
man resource management’ can be understood as part of the strategic 
reorientation of firms towards enhancing ‘shareholder value’. In the sec-
ond part of this chapter we will consider how these changes have played 
out in the case of two large and originally Dutch firms: the high-tech firm 
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Philips and the financial corporation ING. Here we will, in particular, ex-
amine how a balance is struck between the policies of ‘international hu-
man resource management’ and the continuous dependence on national 
institutional arrangements. In the conclusion, we reflect on the expecta-
tions derived from the presented approach and we will summarise the 
main consequences of the shift from ‘national personnel administration’ 
to ‘transnational human resource management’ in terms of labour policies 
and the management of social risks.
2 Dual embeddedness and its consequences
Following one of the basic principles of (economic) sociology, corpora-
tions and the policies they pursue need to be understood as being embed-
ded in sets of ongoing social relations (Granovetter 1985; Convert and 
Heilbron 2007). These social relations can be conceptualised as fields, 
as defined by Pierre Bourdieu and Neil Fligstein. Bourdieu conceived of 
fields as relatively autonomous social spaces in which actors compete for 
specific stakes. The relations between these actors are defined by the po-
sition they occupy in the field, and by the corresponding volume and com-
position of capital they dispose of. Besides the usual forms of economic 
and financial capital, firms also mobilise other forms of capital, especially 
technological, social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2005). Building on 
Bourdieu’s field theory and insights from organisational theory, Fligstein 
has proposed an analysis of North American corporations and their de-
velopment since the late nineteenth century (Fligstein 1990). In this sec-
tion, we take up Fligstein’s analysis of corporations in the United States 
(US), reformulate it in order to account for the increasing globalisation of 
firms, and then propose a number of expectations to explore empirically 
for the Dutch case in the second part of this chapter.
 Central to Fligstein’s field approach is the idea that actors make deci-
sions under conditions of uncertainty (Fligstein 2001). Given the uncer-
tainties of action and its consequences, corporations primarily strive to 
maintain a stable position in the field in which they operate. Price com-
petition and internal power struggles are the two most important threats 
to this stability, therefore, firms are in need of a strategic orientation that 
allows them to deal with these potential threats. As a result, firms rely on 
a certain ‘conception of control’ in their strategic decision making. Such a 
conception provides a vision of how to make the firm work internally and 
externally, in terms of how the firm interacts with its main competitors. 
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Historically, different conceptions of control have succeeded one another, 
each one of them related to structural changes in the economic field and 
the conditions under which it operates (Fligstein 1990). In addition, the 
competition between firms is regulated by the state, which assures prop-
erty rights and defines rules for economic exchange and proper gover-
nance.
 In his analysis of US corporations, Fligstein has argued that the domi-
nant strategy of US corporations since the 1970s and 1980s has been cen-
tred on creating ‘shareholder value’. Firms are no longer seen as diversified 
conglomerates that have to manage their relationships with a plurality of 
both stake and shareholders. In contrast, the conception of shareholder 
value has redefined the firm as a bundle of assets that managers deploy 
and redeploy in order to maximise the return for its shareholders (Flig-
stein 2001, Heilbron 2005). The shift from a managerial to a shareholder 
value perspective has taken place in a political context of deregulation 
and increasing internationalisation. As a consequence, companies have 
increasingly been forced to cope with what we call dual embeddedness: 
they are no longer primarily embedded in the national field of their home 
country, but are increasingly embedded in a transnational field as well. 
This transnational field is in a state of flux regarding specific rules and 
regulations that govern firms, both formally and informally, and has thus 
become a major source of change for transnational corporations.
 A number of expectations may be formulated about the development 
of corporate labour policy using these insights. In order to stabilise or im-
prove their position within the emerging transnational field, corporations 
have adjusted their strategy to its competitive requirements, and corpo-
rate policies may be expected to have undergone a certain degree of inter- 
or transnationalisation. Firms can be expected to have extended an over-
all corporate policy to be implemented by firm subsidiaries, regardless of 
their specific local circumstances and national context (first expectation). 
However, in comparison to other domains of corporate policy, such as 
production, finance and marketing, labour policies have continued to re-
main strongly dependent on institutional arrangements at the local and 
national level (local collective bargaining, national labour legislation, col-
lective labour agreements, consultative bodies). Therefore, it seems likely 
that the transnationalisation of corporate labour policy is more limited 
than the transnationalisation of corporate policy in other domains (pro-
duction, finance and marketing), thus resulting in a limited degree of con-
vergence and continuing path dependency. Labour policy continues to be 
shaped by institutional differences across sectors and countries (second 
CHANGING LABOUR POLICIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
expectation). The predominant way in which corporations deal with this 
dual embeddedness is by a) outsourcing production facilities to low-wage 
countries; and b) differentiating their labour policy. On the one hand, 
firms’ labour policy is likely to contain a centralised transnational com-
ponent, which specifically pertains to higher management and its inter-
national circulation (selection, training and performance). On the other 
hand, firms’ labour policy is likely to be made up of multiple national poli-
cies, aimed primarily at lower levels of company personnel (third expecta-
tion). Yet not all parts of corporate labour policy are equally dependent 
on national and local arrangements. It can therefore be expected that dif-
ferent parts will display various degrees of transnationalisation, with the 
department responsible for human resource management being the most 
transnational in character, followed by mobility policy, employee partici-
pation and rewards (fourth expectation). Finally, we expect that this dual 
embeddedness has provided firms with a rhetorical means to shift certain 
costs (such as unemployment insurance, health insurance, pension pre-
miums) from the firm level to other parties, in particular to individual 
employees (fifth expectation).
3 US corporations and the shareholder value conception of the fi rm
After almost three decades of high and relatively stable economic growth, 
transnational corporations faced a severe economic downturn during the 
latter half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s (Van Zanden 1997, 
Brenner 1998). North American firms in particular saw their profitabil-
ity decline due to growing competition from Japanese competitors and 
the combined effect of slow economic growth and high inflation (‘stagfla-
tion’). American corporations lost market shares in a number of indus-
tries, such as consumer electronics and cars, and high inflation simulta-
neously led investors to shift away from company stocks to government 
bonds, causing share prices to fall even further. These economic difficul-
ties were reinforced by uncertainties in the international economy caused 
by the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement (outlining fixed exchange 
rates) in 1971, and by the international oil crises of 1973 and 1979.
 The initial response to the economic downturn was defensive: manag-
ers cut costs, attempted to enhance efficiency, and some ventured to ob-
tain state support through subsidies, tax advantages, and protective mea-
sures. When the crisis turned out to be longer-lasting and deeper than any 
previous recession since the end of World War II, vivid debates emerged 
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about the need for structural reform. For example, Japanese management 
styles gained considerable interest for a short while. Eventually, however, 
the business strategy that triumphed over all others was that corpora-
tions should henceforth be managed for the purpose of creating ‘share-
holder value’. The predominant management conception after WWII re-
lied on managing trade-offs between different stakeholders. Shareholder 
value, in contrast, envisions that corporate executives should act in the 
interests of shareholders, and of shareholders only, thus ensuring that 
the firms’ resources return the highest possible profits to their owners. 
This idea of ‘maximising shareholder value’ emerged around 1980, and 
was initially advocated by relative outsiders to the business establish-
ment, namely corporate ‘raiders’ (Heilbron et al. 2011). Several corporate 
raiders made their fortune in the oil industry during the years of the oil 
crises, and their considerable financial resources allowed them to buy 
portions of stock in undervalued companies with the aim of restructur-
ing them and rapidly reselling them, whether in parts or as a whole. Raid-
ers like T. Boone Pickens were actively involved in the founding of the 
United Shareholders Association (1986) – characteristically abbreviated 
as USA – which was one of the first organisations to systematically op-
pose the creation of shareholder value to the perceived failings of man-
agement.
 Although the focus on shareholder value was initially resisted by many 
executives, the wave of ‘hostile’ takeovers in the beginning of the 1980s, 
together with other forms of pressure from activist shareholders, forced 
management to adapt to this new balance of power (Useem 1993). The 
decisive factor in this change was the unprecedented power of institu-
tional investors (pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies). 
These investors had gradually accumulated increasing portions of shares 
in publicly traded companies and organised themselves in the Council 
of Institutional Investors (1985), which collectively promoted the share-
holder value conception of the firm. The collectivisation of stock own-
ership and the new shareholder value tactics of small pressure groups 
of activist investors thus led to a shift from managerial to shareholder 
capitalism (Useem 1996, Fligstein 2001). With their large sums of capital 
and their financial expertise, institutional investors became a crucially 
important group for management to take into account. Institutional in-
vestors, for example, financed a sizeable proportion of takeovers during 
the 1980s (Baker and Smith 1998: 224). Unlike the more cautious company 
pension funds, civil servants’ pension funds were among the first to adopt 
a critical and activist stance with regard to management. The teachers’ 
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pension fund in California (CalPERS), for example, set up the Council of 
Institutional Investors, which coordinated the action of major sharehold-
ers (Davis and Thompson 1994). They promoted a business orientation 
consistently based on pursuing shareholders’ interests in publications, at 
shareholder meetings, and in regular consultations with managers. These 
activists sought a refocusing of corporate policy towards measures that 
would increase stock prices. Measures taken to increase stock prices in-
cluded a refocusing of the firm towards the ‘core business’ and selling or 
outsourcing other business ventures, improving transparency about the 
company’s strategy, raising dividends, introducing stock buy-backs, and 
considering mergers and takeovers. Companies that underperformed in 
these respects saw their share prices fall, thus increasing their vulnerabil-
ity of being targeted for a takeover.
 The increased dependency on investors and the stock market not only 
forced management to adapt to the new balance of power and to imple-
ment shareholder value tactics it simultaneously allowed management to 
secure better compensation packages for themselves. These compensa-
tion packages regularly included provisions for ‘golden parachutes’ in the 
event of dismissal, and together with share, option and bonus plans be-
came standard elements in executive contracts. With compensation di-
rectly related to the perceived interests of shareholders, increasing ‘share-
holder value’ became the primary objective. Strategies advocated by the 
proponents of shareholder value were widely implemented throughout 
the US in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. A clear indicator of this 
change is the fact that while the proportion of company profits paid out 
to shareholders had been decreasing for more than fifty years, US corpo-
rations paid higher dividends and reserved less for investment during the 
1980s and 1990s (O’Sullivan 2000: 192).
 An analysis of the American business media of this period (Heilbron 
et al. 2011) suggests that the shareholder value conception of the firm 
spread during the first half of the 1980s and became dominant during the 
second half of that decade, when corporate raiders were joined by vari-
ous other groups in advocating the sovereignty of shareholder interests 
(institutional investors, merchant banks, consultants). In comparison to 
similar reports in the British business media, the concept of shareholder 
value became dominant in the United Kingdom during the first half of the 
1990s, whereas in the Netherlands this seems to have been achieved only 
in the second half of the 1990s.
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4 Corporate labour policy during the era of shareholder value
Parallel to the strategic reorientation of US corporations towards share-
holder value, corporate labour policies underwent a related shift from 
‘personnel administration’ to ‘human resource management’. This change 
represented both a change in terminology, which occurred during the 
1980s, and a shift from an ‘administrative’ to a ‘managerial’ perspective 
in labour policy. The latter indicated a centralisation of labour policy, in 
which employee issues were more explicitly tied to the strategic objectives 
of the firm. This centralisation implied a redefinition of tasks. Managing 
personnel was no longer seen as an activity that took place outside of, 
or in addition to, the economic objectives of the firm. Rather, it became 
an integral part of the firm’s central objectives. Managing the workforce 
was no longer relegated to specialists in ‘human relations’, but was re-
conceptualised as being fundamentally similar to other managerial tasks. 
In addition, managing employees was now seen as a question of making 
optimal use of one of the firm’s resources. From this perspective, human 
resources are subject to investment and disinvestment decisions, just as 
physical and financial resources are, all of which are derived from the 
firm’s central objective: to enhance shareholder value.
 The major contributions to this new conception were developed in rap-
idly expanding business schools. In one of the founding statements of the 
new approach, it was typically argued that corporations need a ‘reason 
for being’ (mission) and a policy of how to display ‘materials, information 
and people to carry it out’ (Devanna et al. 1984). This strategic perspec-
tive regarding the proper use of (human) resources was a considerable 
change from more traditional labour policies. For most of the twentieth 
century, ‘personnel administration’ had been focused on ‘human rela-
tions.’ This approach was shaped intellectually in a rather eclectic fashion 
by contributions from psychologists, sociologists and organisation theo-
rists (Kaufman 2000 and 2007, Jacoby 2005: 78-100) and not by econom-
ics or economic and financial models of doing business. In other words, 
there was no consistent intellectual approach to personnel management 
within US firms, and it had no professional identity comparable to that of 
economists, engineers or accountants. The economic idiom of ‘resource 
management’ provided at least a rhetorical unification of management 
practice. This unification, which occurred in the broader context of neo-
liberal politics of the 1980s, was more specifically marked by the attempts 
of neo-classical economists to incorporate an ever expanding number of 
areas into their micro-economic framework of utility maximisation. Ap-
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plied to firms, this led to a theory of the firm (‘agency theory’) in which 
maximising shareholder value was considered to be the general objective 
of corporations, and the labour force was considered to be nothing but a 
means to that end (Whitley 1986, Fourcade and Khurana, forthcoming).
 Th e centralisation of corporate labour policy that occurred is well indi-
cated by the fact that by the year 2000, human resources managers in US 
fi rms reported directly to the CEO far more often than two decades earlier 
(Jacoby 2005: 132). It did not imply, however, that personnel management 
had obtained a higher status in corporate aff airs. Quite the contrary. While 
being more directly submitted to the imperatives of corporate strategy, 
human resource departments shrank in size and generally lost infl uence 
(Jacoby 2005: 91-95). Declining union membership, corporate downsizing 
and tighter alignment with Wall Street forced human resource managers 
to translate the focus on shareholder value strategy into labour policies 
that were designed to maximise benefi ts and minimise costs.
 Despite some variation by industry and firm, aggregate outcomes of 
shareholder value strategies for the US show a consistent pattern. While 
it is still a matter of dispute whether productivity and profitability have 
increased (for critical views see Baumol et al. 2003, Fligstein and Shin 
2007), consequences of new corporate labour policies show a clear pat-
tern of polarisation. While the upper levels of the corporate labour force 
have improved their position, for example through considerable raises in 
salary, special programmes and other benefits (including bonus, option 
and stock programmes), the position of middle and lower level employ-
ees has degraded. Due to the joint effect of corporate strategies and state 
policies (Soss et al. 2007), inequality in income and wealth has become 
significantly larger in the US and in other advanced economies since 1980 
(Wilterdink 1995, Atkinson & Piketty 2010). Employee benefits have gen-
erally been reduced and, in some cases, abolished. For example, the per-
centage of American firms that provide fully-financed health insurance 
to their employees declined from 56 percent in 1988 to 37 percent in 1996 
(Quadagno 1999). The proportion of workers covered by a pension plan 
has declined, and instead of so-called ‘defined benefit plans’ promising 
fixed retirement payments, employees are now commonly covered by ‘de-
fined contribution’ plans, thus shifting the risk and responsibility from 
employers to employees (Hacker 2006, Ghilarducci 2008). At the same 
time, the number of career jobs available within firms is smaller than it 
was before, the proportion of contingent employees (part-time, tempo-
rary and contract workers) has increased, and job security has declined 
(Hacker, 2006).
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 With the balance of power shifting from managers to investors, both 
the shareholder value conception of the firm and the redefinition of 
personnel management as human resource management spread rapidly 
throughout the economic field in the US. In 1989, the American Society 
of Personnel Administrators (ASPA) changed its name to the Society for 
Human Resource Management (SHRM). At about the same time, after 
the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the collapse of communism in East-
ern Europe, leaving the US as the only superpower, these new American 
business practices spread to other countries as well. Characteristically, 
the expression ‘International Human Resource Management’ was coined 
around 1990, the first conference on International HRM was held at the 
same time, and the leading professional journal, the International Journal 
of HRM, was established in 1991 (Bjorkman & Stahl 2006: 1-2). While the 
international spread of human resource management represents an un-
mistakable shift in meaning, its actual significance depends on the ways 
in which it has effectively been incorporated into national and local set-
tings. In order to examine this process of diffusion and adaptation, we 
will compare the changing labour policies of two large, originally Dutch 
corporations: Philips and ING.
5 The making of transnational fi rms: the cases of Philips and ING
During the past three decades, many large corporations have become in-
creasingly dependent upon the transnational field and have experienced 
a strategic reorientation towards enhancing shareholder value. At the 
same time, these developments have played out differently for various 
companies based on their individual historical background, sector-level 
differences and national context. From the 1980s onwards, both Philips 
and ING have become more transnational corporations; both have imple-
mented a transnational organisational structure as well as transnational 
policies and strategies. However, although both companies have devel-
oped in a similar direction, the timing, implementation and consequences 
of these changes display significant differences. The following description 
of these two companies is the result of interviews with employees of both 
organisations and a document analysis conducted as part of dissertation 
research by the second author (Quak, forthcoming).
 Philips was founded at the end of the nineteenth century in the Eind-
hoven region in the southern part of the Netherlands as a producer of 
light bulbs. In its first years, Philips was quick to compete with foreign 
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producers by exporting its products around the globe. During the first few 
decades of the twentieth century, Philips expanded both its product range, 
turning it into a producer of electronic equipment, as well as its foreign 
subsidiaries, thus increasing the number of employees both at home and 
abroad. But Philips was still primarily embedded in the Eindhoven region. 
When national governments started to intervene in the international 
economy following the Great Depression and WWII, Philips adopted a 
local-for-local strategy, with its factories around the globe producing for 
their individual local markets, and presented itself as a local producer.
 In the first three decades following WWII, Philips quickly expanded 
its operations, competing with a relatively small number of other produc-
ers of electronic equipment for a dominant position within these fields. 
Philips grew to become an industrial conglomerate with 400,000 employ-
ees across the globe and consequently, was now embedded in a plural-
ity of national fields. Despite this international growth, the Netherlands 
remained Philips’ centre of gravity. One quarter of its employees was still 
located in the Netherlands, and corporate headquarters as well as division 
head offices were located in the Netherlands. In addition, its management 
consisted of primarily Dutch nationals.
 By the 1970s and 1980s, however, the deregulation of international 
trade in reaction to the economic crises of the 1970s caused an increase of 
competition from foreign producers. Philips was no exception and expe-
rienced the full force of the rise of primarily Japanese companies during 
this period. Moreover, national economic fields began integrating into 
a transnational economic field. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, 
these developments caused Philips’ profit margins to decline slowly and 
by the end of the 1980s, Philips stood on the edge of bankruptcy. In re-
sponse to this development, Philips began a large scale restructuring pro-
gramme, consisting of the centralisation of its production capacity, the 
outsourcing of significant parts of the production process, the focus on a 
select number of product markets, the transnational reorganisation of its 
company structure and an increased focus on financial criteria.
 During this same period, Philips was already experiencing the conse-
quences of operating in an increasingly competitive, transnational field. 
In an attempt to improve efficiency and sustain its dominant position, 
Philips suspended its local-for-local production strategy and began cen-
tralising its production capacity. This process was started in the 1970s but 
still continues today. In addition, Philips was initially seen as the ‘embodi-
ment of the age of mass production’ (Sluyterman 2005: 129) during the 
first decades following WWII because of its clear integration both verti-
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cally and horizontally. But by the 1970s and 1980s, it became clear that in 
a time of increasing competition, Philips had to focus on what it did best. 
Many non-core activities, such as catering and security, as well as some 
core activities, such as parts of the production process, were transferred 
to external suppliers or outsourced to low-cost countries. When Philips 
announced a large scale restructuring plan in 1990, this plan included not 
only a scaling back of 45,000 employees (from a total of 280,000), but the 
plan also proposed a focus on a select number of products. In the highly 
competitive, transnational, electronics field, Philips was not able to com-
pete in all product markets. Following various acquisitions and divest-
ments during the 1990s, Philips decided to focus on lighting, consumer 
electronics and healthcare. Also, as noted above, Philips suspended its 
local-for-local strategy and instead introduced a transnational structure, 
including the implied transfer of responsibility for all marketing and pro-
duction decisions to transnational divisions. The transfer of power from 
the national to the transnational level is further illustrated by the fact that 
these transnational divisions and business units were given profit and loss 
responsibility. The transnationalisation of Philips continued during the 
1990s, resulting in an increasing number of non-Dutch nationals being 
appointed to executive positions.
 Finally, during the past two decades, Philips has increasingly focused 
on financial criteria, especially shareholder value, as a way of governing 
and controlling the company. Financial criteria had gained in importance 
by the late 1980s, but it was not until the second half of the 1990s, when 
Philips had the first-ever CEO recruited from outside the company, that 
shareholder value became a dominant business principle. By that time, 
Philips no longer compared itself to other producers of electronic equip-
ment; rather, it now compiled a list of companies for benchmarking pur-
poses, consisting of large corporations that were perceived to be generat-
ing large financial returns for their shareholders. Subsequently, instead 
of having national organisations making rather autonomous production 
and marketing decisions, Philips centralised these decisions to the trans-
national level during the 1990s and 2000s. Decisions about which prod-
ucts Philips will focus on, which consumers it tries to target, which dis-
tribution channels it will use, how the company positions itself vis-à-vis 
its competitors, and how Philips wants to position its brand, are now all 
taken by managers with transnational responsibilities. Moreover, these 
decisions are all made in the context of improving shareholder value in 
order to survive. In sum, throughout the past three decades, Philips, a 
large production company in the Netherlands, has becoming increasingly 
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transnational, reorganised its production capacity in line with the condi-
tions of the emerging transnational economic field, and increasingly fo-
cuses on shareholder value as its dominant business principle.
 Our second case study focuses on ING, a financial company in the 
Netherlands. Financial companies were generally much smaller than pro-
duction companies. But in anticipation of the integration of Europe’s fi-
nancial markets in 1992, the Dutch financial sector was characterised by a 
merger wave at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Banks 
and insurers merged or collaborated to form corporations that offered all 
possible financial services to all potential clients via all possible distribu-
tion channels in the Netherlands, and later also abroad, a financial ser-
vices concept often called all finance. One of the companies to come out 
of this merger wave was ING, a financial giant which would become the 
largest financial corporation in the world by the mid-2000s. ING is the 
result of a merger between the formerly state-owned Postbank, the NMB 
Bank, and the insurance company Nationale Nederlanden. Postbank it-
self was the result of a merger between two state-owned banks, which 
were established by the Dutch government at the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth century to create a nation-wide system of 
guaranteed cheques as well as to give every Dutch citizen the possibility 
of opening a savings account. The NMB Bank was founded at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century and primarily focused on providing credit 
to small and medium-sized businesses. Nationale Nederlanden was the 
result of a merger in the 1960s between the then two largest Dutch insur-
ers and offered both insurance as well as some banking products, such as 
mortgages.
 The large merger leading to ING was not immediate. First, in 1989, in 
an attempt to increase their market share and be able to offer financial ser-
vices to a larger target group, the Postbank and NMB Bank merged to form 
the NMB Postbank Group. At the time of this merger, both banks were 
Dutch firms. As a result of its previous status as a state-owned company, 
Postbank was legally bound to the Dutch market and employed around 
11,000 people, all in the Netherlands. In contrast, NMB Bank already had 
international aspirations by the mid-1970s, but by 1988, 90 per cent of 
its almost 12,000 employees were still employed in the Netherlands. The 
insurance company Nationale Nederlanden had similar international as-
pirations, but was more successful in achieving these than NMB bank. In 
the two decades prior to the merger between NMB Postbank Group and 
Nationale Nederlanden in 1991, Nationale Nederlanden had increased its 
international activities through a range of acquisitions. In 1972, almost 80 
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per cent of its employees were employed in the Netherlands, but this pro-
portion had dropped to 40 per cent by the time of the merger in 1991. As 
a result, when ING was formed, almost two-thirds of its personnel were 
employed in the Netherlands.
 ING was primarily engaged with the integration of its three Dutch 
subsidiaries during the first three years after its founding, but from 1995 
onwards it began a rapid process of internationalisation. As a result of 
bank acquisitions in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Eastern 
Europe and Turkey as well as insurance companies in North and South 
America, ING grew from 50,000 employees in 1991 to more than 120,000 
employees in 2008. ING’s international ambitions and expansion are best 
illustrated by the fact that during these years, the number of employees 
in the Netherlands remained around 30,000,1 whereas the number of for-
eign employees at ING expanded from 18,000 in 1991 to around 95,000 in 
2008. ING’s increasing presence in the transnational financial field is also 
reflected by the transnationalisation of its revenues. In 1991, more than 
60 per cent of ING’s revenues was earned in the Netherlands; by 2008, 
this had dropped to around 20 per cent. In addition, the geographical 
distribution of its outstanding shares shifted: in 2008, only 20 per cent of 
ING’s shares was owned by Dutch individuals or organisations; at the end 
of the 1990s, this was almost 50 per cent. Moreover, as was the case with 
Philips, ING also experienced the transnationalisation of its executive and 
supervisory board.
 With the transnational expansion of the company during the late 1990s 
and 2000s ING became restructured in line with the transnational field 
in which it had become embedded. Regional (European, American and 
Asian) and transnational structures were implemented to reflect changes 
in the organisational environment and responsibilities and power to make 
decisions were transferred to these levels. And even though it was rela-
tively minor in comparison to Philips, ING also outsourced some parts of 
the company, such as the mail department, for cost efficiency.
 Resembling the development at Philips, shareholder value became in-
creasingly dominant at ING during the 2000s. The transition to share-
holder value was evident by the end of the 1990s, when the term ‘embed-
ded value’ was introduced, a concept used within ING to measure the 
value of the organisation, which allows management to focus on maximis-
ing value within risk parameters. In addition, from 2000 onwards, share-
holder value obtained an increasingly prominent place in ING’s annual 
report. ING’s financial results increasingly became specified in terms of 
how much ING’s shareholder value had grown. In short, enhancing share-
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holder value became the central concern of ING during the mid-2000s; an 
‘American wind of change’ was clearly observable.
 In sum, like Philips, ING has restructured itself towards the transna-
tional level, even though it can be argued that the transnationalisation 
of ING was of a slightly lesser degree and slightly later. On the one hand, 
strategic corporate decisions are now made by managers with transna-
tional responsibilities. ING has also started to promote its brand around 
the globe during this past decade. But on the other hand, ING is inherent-
ly national because it provides services, and is therefore unable to relocate 
‘production capacity’ abroad. In other words, there has not been a trans-
nationalisation of production decisions on the same scale as we have seen 
with the case of Philips. Also, even though ING’s individual subsidiaries 
around the globe have been placed under division management, some of 
these divisions have only a regional role (e.g. Europe). Given that financial 
products continue to differ across the globe, individual subsidiaries have 
a much greater degree of autonomy.
6 Managing personnel in transnational fi rms
In the previous section, we have shown that although the exact timing and 
the degree to which transnationalisation has taken place differs among 
our case studies, both Philips and ING have experienced a transnational 
restructuring of their organisation since the 1980s. In this section, we will 
now investigate what the consequences of this development are for their 
corporate labour policy, focusing specifically on the organisational struc-
ture of the human resources (HR) department, employee participation, 
mobility, and rewards. We expect labour policies to be affected differently 
by transnationalisation. The more labour policy is influenced by national 
fields, the less transnationalised it will be, and vice versa. This will result 
in a differentiation or even polarisation of labour relations, with large dif-
ferences between higher and lower level company personnel, and in a shift 
of responsibilities from the firm level to individual employees.
6.1 Human Resources Department
As a result of the rapid decrease in the number of employees in the Neth-
erlands during the 1990s and 2000s, the HR department of the Dutch 
subsidiary of Philips significantly decreased in size. In addition, with the 
integration of the entire Philips organisation into ‘One Philips’, an pro-
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gramme which was set up to integrate Philips’ various subsidiaries around 
the globe, there has been a centralisation of tasks and responsibilities to 
the transnational level as well. With regard to their labour policies, these 
developments mean that the transnational corporate HR department cen-
tralised tasks previously conducted at the national level, by national HR 
departments. In recent years, so-called central competence centres have 
been created to deal with talent management, expatriation, performance 
management and rewards. Whereas the corporate HR department was 
previously primarily engaged with HR policies for the top of the organisa-
tion, during this past decade it began developing policies for a larger per-
centage of Philips’ total work force. The corporate HR department has not 
only developed its own transnational policies, it has steered the develop-
ment of Philips’ various national HR departments as well. The corporate 
HR department has developed a human resources model, which serves as 
a framework for national HR departments and their restructuring. This 
framework is evident, for example, in the Dutch HR department, where 
all transactional functions have been grouped into a shared service cen-
tre. Moreover, all recruitment activities of the various sectors and busi-
ness units in the Netherlands have been centralised into the national HR 
department. This human resources model can be conceived of as a service 
delivery model.
 ING’s personnel department experienced a similar development. The 
personnel departments of two of ING’s predecessors, the Postbank and 
Nationale Nederlanden, were referred to as Social Affairs (Sociale Zaken). 
In their annual report, these departments present themselves as organisa-
tions that take good care of their employees, and in return, their employ-
ees display a great deal of loyalty; words such as ‘individuals’ and ‘people’ 
are used often. A slight change in language took place during the 1980s. 
Social Affairs became ‘Personnel affairs’ and later, ‘Personnel and Organ-
isation’. The departments also began to refer to the ‘human potential’ of 
the organisation. For example, during the 1970s, ING’s other predecessor 
NMB published the average cost per employee in its annual social report. 
By 1983, this figure was accompanied by the average value added per em-
ployee. Then later during the 1980s, the position of labour underwent a 
dramatic shift from individuals who are taken care of by their employer 
to the human potential of the organisation, which is deployed and rede-
ployed by the organisation in a way that is most beneficial to the organisa-
tion. At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s this development 
was accompanied by a strong call for the flexibility of employees, employ-
ees were expected to help ING quickly adapt to changes in the economic 
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environment, for example by being mobile. When ING was formed at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the changed direction in human resource man-
agement was still evident. First, the personnel department was renamed 
Personnel and Organisation. Also, ING tried to integrate the personnel 
departments of its predecessors, but it took until the 2000s before this re-
ally took place. In the year 2000, the personnel department was once again 
renamed, this time it became HR Netherlands. At fi rst glance, this change 
can be understood in the context of an internationalising fi rm, whose cor-
porate language changed from the native Dutch language to English. But 
this name change was accompanied by a more fundamental change in the 
role of the human resources department within the organisation, namely 
from an administrative organisation which took care of the employees into 
a strategic business partner to company management. Th is change was ac-
companied by a reduction in the number of employees working in this 
department. Prior to this shift in 2000, ING maintained a ratio of approxi-
mately one personnel employee for every 30 employees working at ING in 
the Netherlands. However, in the beginning of the 2000s, ING conducted 
an international benchmark, both internally and externally, and discovered 
that this ratio was relatively high. Th is discovery led to a restructuring of 
the personnel department. ING not only reduced the number of employ-
ees working in the HR department, creating a ratio of 1 HR employee to 50, 
administrative tasks were now standardised and computerised and the HR 
department was also given an advisory role. Rather than being responsible 
for the initiation and implementation of labour policies, the administra-
tion of the work force and safeguarding the interests of employees within 
the organisation, HR became primarily concerned with advising line man-
agement in relation to the work force. In short, its role shifted from servic-
ing employees into servicing management.
 A new element in the organisational structure of ING closely related 
to the transnationalisation of the firm was the establishment of a trans-
national HR department in 2000. In the first years after its foundation, 
this department was primarily concerned with talent management and 
attempting to install a global personnel administration system. With the 
new transnational structure of the organisation in 2004, staff depart-
ments at the corporate, transnational level considerably increased in size 
and the corporate HR department was no exception to this. Besides talent 
management they became concerned with management development, ex-
ecutive pay, international mobility, governance and operations (global HR 
systems). Corporate HR and the newly installed HR departments of the 
global business lines began developing global guidelines and frameworks 
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for the local and national HR departments. The development of its HR 
department is in line with ING’s overall development.
6.2 Employee participation
Employee participation at work is institutionalised in the Netherlands, 
through the use of works councils. Philips and ING are no exception to 
this institutionalisation and both companies have installed various works 
councils at different levels within their organisations to facilitate discus-
sions between management and employees in the Netherlands. With the 
transnational expansion of both companies, Philips and ING have also 
implemented a new legal structure. Prior to this change in structure, the 
executive board of each company was the main representative of the cen-
tral works council. Following the new legal structure, the main represen-
tative is now the board of each company’s Dutch subsidiary. Philips imple-
mented this change in the beginning of the 1980s when they separated the 
management of their Dutch subsidiaries from company management. At 
ING, however, this change took place in 2003, around the time that ING 
installed a new transnational organisational structure.
 Works councils are not only institutionalised in the Dutch structure of 
employment, since the mid-1990s the European Union has begun regulat-
ing their existence. The EU created a directive in the mid-1990s making 
the instalment of European works councils mandatory for companies with 
more than 1000 employees in two or more countries within the European 
Union. In response to this directive, both Philips and ING installed such 
a works council. However, while these works councils have regular meet-
ings with the CEO and other executive board members, their position 
within the company remains weak. During the first few years of their ex-
istence, these European works councils were primarily a place where col-
leagues from different European countries met and discussed how things 
were done in their respective countries. But these ‘European’ works coun-
cils struggled as well, for example with language problems – not all mem-
bers spoke English, which turned these meetings into interpreter parties. 
Also, some members from Eastern European countries were appointed by 
local management rather than being elected by the employees, and not all 
members were always willing to come to meetings. Even now, the posi-
tion of European works councils remains relatively weak compared to the 
position of the Dutch central works council. European works councils are 
regularly informed by the executive boards on strategic matters but they 
have no real say in company affairs.
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6.3 Mobility
As indicated above, HR departments have developed from administra-
tive organisations, responsible for protecting employees’ interests, into 
the business partners of company management. At the same time, Philips 
and ING operate within the context of a transnational field, one that re-
quires companies to respond quickly to changes in this field, which means 
companies are constantly reinventing themselves to obtain and sustain a 
dominant. As a result of this development, the relationship between these 
companies and their employees has changed. Philips’ and ING’s employ-
ees have become responsible for the development of their own careers. 
The promise of lifetime employment has come to an end; employees are 
now expected to develop themselves in order to remain employable. This 
development has been stimulated by the foundation of mobility centres 
and the creation of an internal labour market. At the same time, given the 
increased embeddedness in a transnational field, we might expect that 
a transnationalisation of the labour force has occurred as well. But if we 
look at the work force composition at Philips and ING, we must conclude 
that this transnationalisation of the work force is limited to executive and 
specialist functions such as traders at ING and engineers at Philips.
6.4 Rewards
Rewards are an important component of corporate labour policy. In the 
Netherlands, many employees’ working conditions are agreed upon in 
collective labour agreements, negotiated by company representatives and 
trade unions. Philips and ING are no exception and their reward systems 
remain strongly embedded in the Dutch economic field. But this does not 
imply that their employees have not experienced the consequences of the 
increasing transnational embeddedness of these companies. Both Philips 
and ING have introduced a performance management system to align the 
remuneration of their employees with the strategic goals of the firm. In 
order to be successful in the transnational field, these companies want all 
their employees to contribute to the strategic goals of the company. They 
stimulate their employees to do so through by introducing financial in-
centives. The targets used to determine financial incentives depend upon 
the position of the individual employee. Executive board members, for 
instance, are rewarded on the basis of how well the company does finan-
cially, but desk employees from the local office (ING) or factory workers 
(Philips) are rewarded based on individual or group targets. For the av-
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erage employee, performance-based rewards vary between one and two 
months salary, but for employees at higher levels these rewards can be up-
wards of a full year’s pay or more. In short, rewards are still largely deter-
mined by collective bargaining negotiations between trade unions and the 
Dutch HR departments, but at the same time, the transnational, corporate 
HR departments have created guidelines to steer these negotiations.
 One interesting part of a company’s rewards system is pensions. Tradi-
tionally, pensions in the Netherlands are based on a defined benefits sys-
tem, a system present at both Philips and ING. This means that when em-
ployees retire, they receive a fixed amount of their last salary, depending 
upon the number of years they have worked for the company. Tradition-
ally this amount is increased every year to compensate for inflation. In or-
der to ensure there is enough money to cover all pensions, companies pay 
pension premiums for their employees (a certain percentage of the sal-
ary), which goes to the pension fund to be invested. If these investments 
are very profitable, companies can reduce their monthly premiums, but 
if these returns are less profitable, companies have to compensate these 
losses. Doing so poses a risk to companies, a risk which investors do not 
appreciate when considering their investment decisions. For this reason, 
both Philips and ING are in the process of changing their pension system 
from a defined benefits system to a defined contribution system.
 In sum, in the past three decades both Philips and ING have restruc-
tured various parts of their corporate labour policies on the transnational 
level, but differences between various parts and in timing can be distin-
guished. Where the HR department of both companies have experienced 
a certain degree of centralisation on the transnational level, Philips was 
the first to undertake this process, just as it was the first to restructure the 
company as a whole on the transnational level. Also at both companies, 
this restructuring also meant a change in the role of the HR department, 
from an administrative centre which also protected employees’ interests 
into a business partner to company management. Also, both Philips as 
well as ING have altered their legal structures resulting in their Dutch 
works councils being disconnected from company management, and 
instead being linked to both companies’ national boards, even though, 
again, Philips had this new structure in place two decades before ING. 
At both companies, employees themselves have become responsible for 
their career development. And finally, both companies have tried to align 
their reward systems with the strategic goals of the firm by implementing 
financial incentives and are in the process of transforming their pension 
systems.
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7 Conclusion
In the preceding analysis, we have focused on the changing embedded-
ness of firms in order to understand the development of corporate labour 
policy. We have shown, in particular, how a field approach can be used to 
understand the consequences of globalisation. Due to their international 
expansion, large firms increasingly experience a dual embeddedness; not 
only are they embedded in the national field of their home country, they 
increasingly operate in a transnational field as well. In order to gain access 
to or to improve their position in the transnational field, companies orga-
nise themselves in line with the structure and the constraints of this trans-
national field. This transnationalisation has resulted in the development 
and implementation of transnational policies in various domains, includ-
ing the domain of labour policy (first expectation). Due to the continu-
ing national embeddedness of labour, however, the transnationalisation 
of this part of the company’s policy is more limited than in other primary 
domains (such as finance, production and marketing). Companies must 
comply with national legislation, negotiate with local or national trade 
unions and are, in countries such as the Netherlands, dependent upon 
the outcomes of consultations between trade union confederations, em-
ployers’ organisations and the national government, which affects future 
developments of the local labour market (second expectation).
 Changing corporate labour policies can be understood as a way of deal-
ing with this dual embeddedness. To comply with the competitive condi-
tions in the transnational field, they outsource parts of the company that 
can be handled more efficiently in low-cost countries. They simultane-
ously formulate common goals such as enhancing shareholder value and 
general frameworks like human resource management, which are then 
implemented at the different national levels. In addition to the central-
ised, transnational component, other dimensions of the labour policy are 
left to management at the national and local levels (third expectation). 
One consequence of this differentiation is that a polarisation is observed 
between policies aimed at higher management and those aimed at lower 
levels of personnel. Policies aimed at lower-level employees are mostly 
initiated by local or national HR departments, whereas policies for higher 
management are the responsibility of global corporate HR departments. 
For the latter, transnational recruitment, reward and mobility policies are 
constructed in order to attract the most talented employees, offering them 
the opportunity of having an international career, an opportunity given to 
only a small proportion of the entire work force. In contrast, other parts 
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of the corporate labour policy are indeed more dependent upon national 
and local arrangements (fourth expectation). Transnational firms expe-
rience varying degrees of transnationalisation in different parts of their 
labour policy. The structure of HR departments is the most transnational 
in character, followed in descending order by rewards, mobility and em-
ployee participation.
 Finally, by referring to the dynamics of the transnational fields in which 
these companies have increasingly become embedded, they have indeed 
attempted to shift certain risks and responsibilities to their employees 
(fifth expectation). Employees themselves have become more responsible 
for their own careers. There seems to be little left of a ‘psychological con-
tract’ (Argyris 1960) governing their career development. Transnational 
firms also aspire to reduce their responsibility for employee pensions. 
However, given the embeddedness of the entire reward system in the na-
tional field, this change in pension systems has so far proved much more 
difficult to achieve than the transfer of career risk.
 Our analysis of corporate labour policies with two transnational firms 
has demonstrated that the hypothesis that globalisation fuels a race to the 
bottom is too simple. The idea of dual embeddedness makes clear that 
corporate labour policies have to meet expectations in both fields, which 
has implied a process of differentiation and polarisation of labour rela-
tions. Parts of the production process are outsourced to low-cost coun-
tries, which especially with Philips, has led to an important reduction 
in personnel. Labour policies for the remaining lower-level personnel, 
however, are still highly determined by national regulation. For higher-
level personnel, labour policies are dependent upon developments in the 
transnational field. This results in a reduction of corporate responsibility 
for the management of social risks. On the national as well as the in-
ternational level, labour policies are shaped by the conception of share-
holder value, resulting in a shift of responsibility from the company to 
individual employees. However, on the national level, this development is 
constrained by national regulation.
 Note
 This number decreased slightly after  due to the outsourcing of some 
projects.
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8 From Welfare to Workfare
 The Implementation of Workfare Policies
 Peter Mascini, Menno Soentken and Romke van der Veen
In this book we investigate the transformation of solidarity in modern wel-
fare states. We have learned that welfare state solidarity is still high, but 
also that it is changing towards more obligatory reciprocity and that it 
is becoming increasingly dependent upon the deservingness of recipients. 
In this respect, developments in public opinion are in line with develop-
ments in public policies. However, the extent of risk protection is not only 
dependent upon the policies of the welfare state, it is also dependent upon 
the risk management strategies of workers, unions, employers’ associations 
and companies, which we have investigated in the preceding chapters. We 
have learned that the risk management strategies of these actors interact 
with the way social risks are protected in welfare state arrangements and 
with the institutions of the (welfare) state. Combined with welfare state ar-
rangements, these strategies constitute the social risk protection provided 
to citizens.
 However, protection against social risks is also dependent upon the 
way in which social policies are implemented. There are two reasons for 
this. First, there is always a discrepancy between the formal (legal) real-
ity of arrangements and the daily practice of administration. Dahrendorf 
(1988) coined this as the distinction between entitlements and provisions. 
Entitlements alone do not tell us how well citizens are protected against 
social risks. The entitlements of citizens must be delivered as well. This 
can be done in a restrictive manner, but also in a more generous manner. 
Social protection is thus the result of formal entitlements and of the way in 
which these entitlements are provided for. Second, and more importantly, 
we have to look at implementation because welfare state arrangements 
have become increasingly focused on investment and activation in the last 
ten to fifteen years. This implies that the implementation of arrangements 
is increasingly directed at preventing people from becoming dependent 
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upon social security and on bringing people back into the labour market. 
However, this also implies that the outcome of welfare state arrangements, 
in terms of the protection they offer citizens, is becoming increasingly de-
pendent upon the activities deployed by administrative organisations in 
implementing activating social policies.
 Therefore, this chapter deals with the implementation of these activat-
ing social policies. What we learn in this chapter is that the provision of 
social services is indeed of more importance in a ‘workfare’ state. It often 
results in the unequal treatment of clients. Social investment will be con-
centrated on the most promising clients, and the disciplinary working of 
workfare policies – the conditionality of rights and associated obligations 
– will be concentrated on the least promising clients.
1 Introduction: from welfare to workfare
In the last few decades unemployment policy has shifted from income 
protection (through social security) to activation (through labour mar-
ket policy) in most European countries. This shift from income protec-
tion towards activation and participation is part of a broader transition 
from a welfare state towards a workfare state. In contrast to a welfare 
state, a workfare state is oriented towards recommodifying rather than 
decommodifying social policies. Decommodifying social policies reduce 
people’s dependency on the labour market. Social insurance and social 
provisions provided as a social right have this effect: they make people 
less dependent on their market value and are therefore decommodifying. 
Recommodifying social policies, on the other hand, strengthen the bond 
between social policies and the labour market, by helping people in need 
find a way to return to the labour market. Social policies in a workfare 
state promote work rather than social protection. They do this by increas-
ing the selectivity and the conditionality of social policies, and by provid-
ing services that help people return to employment (Gilbert 2002).
 Taylor-Gooby discerns a paradigmatic shift in the transition from wel-
fare to workfare, a new ideology of the welfare state which he describes 
as ‘new welfarism’. This new ideology is the product of socio-economic 
developments towards a post-Fordist economy. The ideology of new wel-
farism,
suggests that economic globalization, labour market fl exibility, more 
complex patterns of family life and the dissolution of traditional class 
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structures require a new welfare settlement. Since full employment, re-
distribution and expensive services are no longer seen as feasible, the 
new welfarism can only justify social spending as investment in hu-
man capital and the enhancement of individual opportunities (Taylor-
Gooby 1997: 171).
According to Taylor-Gooby, this new ideology affects all welfare states, 
because they are all driven in the same direction due to imperatives of 
international competition.
 Jessop (1993) provides a useful summary of the essential changes in 
social policies that are associated with a turn towards new welfarism. 
Whereas welfare policies in a traditional welfare system are redistribu-
tive, workfare policies are oriented at integration and productivity. Wel-
fare policies are based upon a safety net metaphor, whereas active provi-
sion in workfare policies is based upon a trampoline metaphor. Welfare as 
a safety net results in unconditional rights and few obligations in welfare 
policies as opposed to workfare and a trampoline effect, where condition-
al rights are linked to obligations. Workfare policies are, finally, expected 
to contribute to a future reduction of expenditures whereas welfare poli-
cies are expected to cause an increase in expenditures.
 In this chapter we will investigate the everyday reality of workfare poli-
cies.1 Workfare policies intend to contribute to the general willingness to 
share risks by emphasising individual responsibility and the obligations of 
welfare recipients as well as by providing services to welfare recipients in 
order to activate and reintegrate them into the labour market. Our goal in 
this chapter is to establish how these basic principles of workfare policies 
have been put into practice and whether workfare policies are an effective 
investment in human capital and individual opportunities. We do this by 
adopting a policy implementation perspective. Attention to the mecha-
nisms of policy implementation is important because gaps between for-
mal policies and their execution in practice are quite common (Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1984). This is particularly true in the case of welfare reform 
because of its complex and controversial nature (Lurie 2006). According 
to Lipksy (1980), policy is made during the process of implementation 
by officials who are in direct contact with welfare clients. This implies 
that in order to understand the effectiveness of policies it is necessary to 
pay attention to their implementation. As we will see, the implementa-
tion of social policies is known to follow specific mechanisms that can 
and often do produce unintended and unwanted effects. The first ques-
tion we address in this chapter is how are the basic principles of workfare 
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policy implemented in practice? More specifically, we want to determine if 
the unintended implementation mechanisms associated with the welfare 
state have continued to play a role since the workfare state took over, or if 
they have been replaced by other mechanisms.
 Workfare policies were introduced in the Netherlands during the 
1990s. After the introduction of the Work and Social Benefit Act (Wwb) 
in 2004, welfare agencies were obliged to outsource the implementa-
tion of workfare policies to private companies. Since 2006, however, this 
obligation to outsource their total share of workfare services has been 
abolished. Since then welfare agencies in the Netherlands can choose 
between outsourcing their services and providing them in-house. This 
policy change was made because of perceived problems connected to 
the mandatory outsourcing of workfare policies. This leads to a second 
research question, which pertains to the implementation of workfare 
policies in the Netherlands by public and private agencies. The second 
question of this chapter then is what effect did the abolishment of the 
mandatory outsourcing of workfare policies to private companies have on 
the unintended implementation mechanisms connected to the welfare and 
workfare state?
 In the next section we start with a general description of the implemen-
tation mechanisms associated with both the welfare state and the work-
fare state. In the subsequent section we answer the question whether and 
how these mechanisms have also occurred during the implementation 
of workfare policies. In the fourth section we analyse the implementa-
tion practice of workfare policies following the above mentioned policy 
change. We base this analysis on a comparative case study of the imple-
mentation styles of two public service agencies – a social security agency 
(Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, UWV) and a municipal 
social assistance agency – and one private company located in a large 
Dutch city. We compare the implementation styles of these three offices 
and study the workings of the unintended implementation mechanisms 
in public and private agencies. In the concluding section we shed light 
on the question of why unintended implementation mechanisms are so 
pervasive and how they affect the implementation of workfare policies. In 
this final section we will also analyse to what extent workfare policies are 
effective in emphasising individual responsibility and the obligations of 
welfare recipients and in activating and reintegrating them into the labour 
market.
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2 The implementation of social policy
2.1 Social policy implementation in the welfare state
From WWII until the 1980s, public policy was predominantly imple-
mented by centralised public administrations in the Netherlands. These 
centralised bureaucracies were deemed a solution to the vicissitudes and 
amateurism attributed to private, local social assistance offices that had 
played an important role in the implementation of social services dur-
ing the previous period (Terpstra and Havinga 2001). These centralised 
public administrations particularly strived for strict adherence to the law: 
enabling citizens to claim welfare services when they were entitled to re-
ceive them and excluding all others. The bureaucratic ideal of equal treat-
ment and strict adherence to the law implies that discretion was deemed 
problematic: officials were not supposed to interpret bureaucratic rules 
according to their personal views.
 However, street-level bureaucrats working in welfare administrations 
did, in fact, have ample discretion (Lipsky 1980). They used this discretion 
to cope with unfavourable working conditions, a coping strategy which 
resulted in a selection of clients. The selection of clients by street-level bu-
reaucrats was not necessarily in compliance with the administrative rules, 
but was based on informal notions of effectiveness and deservingness. 
This mechanism of selection is also known as ‘creaming’, which implies 
a selection of ‘the best’ clients. Who ‘the best’ clients are, is dependent 
on contextually defined notions of deservingness and effectiveness (Blau 
1960).
 Moreover, street-level bureaucrats were also known to focus on mea-
surable outcomes (Hasenfeld 1983). Work which produces measurable 
outcomes tends to drive out work which produces immeasurable output 
(Wilson 1989: 161). Hence, when the number and accuracy of claims pro-
cessed in a welfare office are readily observable, a less easily observed 
output – e.g. being helpful to clients – will be neglected. The tendency to 
focus on measurable outcomes results in a selective distribution of time 
and attention by street-level workers with regard to the different activities 
they are meant to undertake. Not only does it lead to a selection of clients, 
it also affects what workers do and do not do.
 Selection and focus on measurable outcomes are the two most impor-
tant unintended implementation mechanisms connected to the (regula-
tory) welfare state. They threaten its basic principles because they result 
in the unequal treatment of clients and in departures from the law.
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2.2 Social policy implementation in the workfare state
Ideas on implementation shifted in many Western countries during the 
1980s. Ideals associated with the welfare state such as equal treatment and 
strict adherence to the law were increasingly seen as inefficient, limiting 
freedom of choice and causing administrative organisations to become 
unresponsive (LeGrand and Bartlett 1993). Discretion in the practice of 
policy implementation was no longer deemed problematic. Rather, it was 
now perceived as a necessary condition for improved results: efficiency, 
responsiveness and entrepreneurship (Brodkin 2006: 6, 8). Furthermore, 
client selection was considered desirable because it would encourage the 
efficient spending of scarce public resources. Additionally, the outsourc-
ing of policy implementation to private agencies was deemed to solve the 
perceived inefficiency and inflexibility of public welfare agencies.
 However, the outsourcing of the implementation of public policy has 
been accompanied by a new unintended implementation mechanism re-
lated to the public control of private implementation agencies. It results 
from asymmetric information when a principal (in this case a public agen-
cy) hires an agent (in this case a private company). Information asymme-
try renders it difficult for the principal to control the agent and gives the 
agent the possibility to let his or her own interests prevail. Information 
asymmetry is a fundamental problem because market parties are profit-
seeking, which can lead to divergence from the public interest that princi-
pals are expected to serve. Principals respond to this problem by drafting 
detailed contracts in an attempt to prevent market parties from following 
their own course (Sol and Westerveld 2005: 392). However, contracts can-
not guarantee continued compliance, which means that public principals 
have to monitor the ‘good behaviour’ of private agents as well. These con-
trol measures stimulate bureaucratisation. According to Farrell and Mor-
ris (2003), bureaucracy therefore has not disappeared with the transfor-
mation from the welfare state to the workfare state, rather, it has shifted. 
The authors term the bureaucratisation resulting from an outsourcing of 
public services to private companies a shift to a ‘neo-bureaucratic state’.
 In short: selection practices and the focus on measurable outcomes 
are perceived to be particularly problematic in the welfare state because 
these implementation mechanisms threaten its ideals of equal treatment 
and strict adherence to the law, whereas bureaucratisation is perceived to 
be particularly problematic in the workfare state because it threatens its 
focus on efficiency, freedom of choice, and responsiveness. Hence, both 
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the welfare state and the workfare state wrestle with specific unintended 
implementation mechanisms because each kind of state aspires to differ-
ent ideals. Our goal in this chapter is to investigate to what extent these 
mechanisms determine the implementation of workfare policies – work-
fare being the new and dominant policy to manage social risks – and how 
these mechanisms affect the results of workfare policies.
3 The implementation of workfare policies
In this section we will investigate whether and how the three general im-
plementation mechanisms – selection, a focus on measurable outcomes 
and bureaucratisation – have manifested themselves in the implemen-
tation of workfare policies. This investigation is based on a secondary 
analysis of previous research on the implementation of workfare policies 
in Europe and the United States.
3.1 Selection
Many studies mention selection in the implementation of workfare policy. 
Based on an extensive review of previous research on workfare policies, 
Handler (2008) concludes that recipients with the most barriers to the la-
bour market are offered the fewest services. He states that ‘Programs will 
concentrate on those with the most skills, who are the most employable, 
who take the least amount of caseworker time and energy to meet statis-
tical goals and who will look like the programs are succeeding’ (Handler 
2008: 3). Next to formal program characteristics that lead to selection 
‘… caseworkers (will) use informal strategies to encourage enrolment 
among recipients who (are) most likely to meet agency goals, while dis-
couraging enrolment among applicants with multiple employment barri-
ers’ (Handler 2008: 16, for other references, see Grover 2009: 495).
 Selection processes in the form of creaming have proven influential 
in the Netherlands as well. There too, the weakest categories profit the 
least from active labour market policies (Van Uitert, Van Hoesel and Gri-
jpstra 2007). Hence, it may not come as a surprise that the effectiveness 
of workfare services in the Netherlands is found to be highest among 
those whose distance to the labour market is smallest (Kok, Holland-
ers, and Hop 2006). Rosenthal and Peccei (2006: 1647) find evidence of 
selection in British implementation practices as well. However, they find 
that British front-line service providers exert themselves the most for 
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the least successful clients because reintegrating them offered the largest 
rewards in terms of measured performance. In short, selection occurs in 
the implementation of workfare, but which client categories are favoured 
depends on incentive structures connected to the measurement of per-
formance.2
3.2 Focus on measurable outcomes
A focus on measurable outcomes is also manifest in the implementation 
of workfare policies. Studies show that case workers prioritise goals based 
on perceived accountability (Riccucci et al 2004). The more case workers 
believe they will be held accountable for the unlawful assignment of social 
assistance, the less attention they will pay to activating clients and chang-
ing their behaviour and vice versa. Case workers prioritise goals as well 
as actions not only on the basis of perceived accountability but also on 
the basis of actual performance measurement. For example, when specific 
quotas are used to measure the success of enrolling clients in work-related 
activities as well as starting up workfare trajectories, Brodkin observes 
that: ‘Under pressure to meet quotas, street-level workers focused on 
“making the numbers,” which often meant displacing quality for quantity. 
[…] caseworkers responded to narrowly constructed performance incen-
tives by pushing people into work programs with little attention to what 
actually happened once they got there’ (Brodkin 2006: 7; for the Neth-
erlands see Van Berkel and Van der Aa 2005). Another example pertains 
to the sanctioning of clients. In the United States, case workers are held 
accountable for the amount of hours worked by welfare clients, which can 
help explain why case workers are inclined to sanction clients even if this 
undermines the ‘work first’ principle (Lens 2008). For instance, clients 
who went to a job interview and therefore did not reach their target of 
hours worked were sanctioned despite the fact that a job interview en-
hances their chance of getting a job. Brodkin (2003: 159) also states that 
‘sanction use increased when front-line workers faced increased risk of 
being penalized by their managers for failing to catch case errors or when 
sanctions became easier to apply’.3 In short, case workers tend to focus 
on performance measures. ‘[…] Their practices are shaped by agency in-
centives and mechanisms that make staff accountable to clients and to 
the public. […] Caseworkers generally [seek] the path of least resistance, 
using discretion in ways most consistent with the logic imposed by the or-
ganizational pressures and incentives existing at the street level’ (Brodkin 
2003: 154, 159).
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 There is also evidence that a focus on measurable outcomes can be 
detrimental to the amount of attention paid to immeasurable outputs. For 
example, German and British non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
engaged in the implementation of workfare policy have been confront-
ed with a changing policy regime during the past few years (Aiken and 
Bode 2009). Their relationships with public principals have become more 
contractual: NGOs are increasingly required to account for their results 
and have to compete with each other as well as with market parties. As 
a result, it has become more difficult for these organisations to combine 
their workfare tasks with stimulating the well-being of deprived clients 
and to maintain contacts with their local network: ‘Economic pressures 
prompted the organizations to cream off the more job-ready, as well as 
to rely ever more on “regular markets”, and this crowded out the former 
broader integrative approach when social entrepreneurship was coupled 
with limited economic risk. […] To put it bluntly: public policies want to 
get “one plus two” but only pay for “one” ’ (Aiken and Bode 2009: 221).
 Furthermore, the focus on measurable outcomes has even resulted in 
the subordination of core tasks, such as diagnosing the strength of clients’ 
labour market positions, formulating a reintegration plan, coordinating 
services to execute the plan and controlling the implementation process 
of secondary tasks, such as searching for vacancies with local employers 
because the latter could be measured more easily than the former. Hill 
(2005) offers evidence of this coping strategy. He has shown, for example, 
that specialised offices were more successful in generating job opportuni-
ties for unemployed single mothers in the United States than integrated 
offices. This coping strategy may also explain why specialised offices were 
more successful in generating job opportunities for unemployed single 
mothers than integrated offices. Case workers were not triggered to focus 
on more easily measurable secondary tasks in offices that separated core 
and secondary tasks, as opposed to case workers who worked in offices 
where both tasks were integrated.
3.3 Bureaucratisation
Bureaucratisation emanating from the outsourcing of workfare policy to 
private companies is also found in a number of studies. A comparative 
study of the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands showed that 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of workfare policy perceived 
the short-term thinking of private companies as a serious problem (Lind-
say and McQuaid 2008). This tension was felt strongest in the Netherlands, 
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where outsourcing was obligatory. Social assistance and social security 
agencies believed that their dominant position as principal impeded the 
cooperation with private companies and feared that knowledge about the 
implementation of workfare policy had leaked to private companies. They 
also thought that the intensified control of private companies, invoked by 
the perceived problems with outsourcing, had caused bureaucratisation 
and high transaction costs. These latter findings were corroborated by 
a Dutch study from Svensson, Trommel, and Lantink (2008). A market-
driven network, in which employers outsourced the reintegration of sick 
and disabled employees to private companies, turned out to be more bu-
reaucratic than a corporatist network, wherein employers’ organisations 
and trade unions mutually arranged the implementation of workfare poli-
cy or a third network consisting of several equal parties. In a country like 
the Netherlands, bureaucratisation is particularly present because social 
assistance and social security agencies attempt to prevent private compa-
nies from deviating from their contractual obligations. In sum, policy im-
plementation mechanisms of selection, a focus on measurable outcomes, 
and bureaucratisation all occur in the implementation of workfare policy.
4 A comparison of the implementation of workfare policies by public 
and private agencies
In this section, we focus specifically on the Dutch case, comparing the 
implementation of workfare policies by public and private agencies. In 
2006, the policy with respect to the outsourcing of workfare policy in 
the Netherlands was changed in one important respect: municipalities 
are no longer obliged to outsource their total share of workfare services, 
meaning they are now free to choose between outsourcing implemen-
tation to a private agency or providing direct delivery of workfare ser-
vices themselves. In other words: municipal social benefit services are no 
longer fully dependent upon private companies in the Netherlands (for 
a comparable change in the United States see Warner and Hefetz 2008). 
Since then, municipalities have increasingly chosen to deliver services 
themselves because they want more control over their clients, they want 
to deliver more made-to-measure services and because they were dissatis-
fied with the price and results of private workfare services (Verveen and 
Van der Aalst 2006). Hence, this policy change can be seen as a reaction 
to the unintended consequences created by the obligation to outsource 
services, which had been in place until 2006.
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 We have investigated whether this policy change has affected the three 
implementation mechanisms of selection, a focus on measurable out-
comes and bureaucratisation. We did so by comparing the implementa-
tion of workfare policies by two public welfare agencies – a social security 
agency (UWV) and a municipal social service agency – with a private 
company in a large Dutch city. This comparative case study is based on 
eighteen in-depth interviews with managers and case workers as well as 
document analysis and observations in each organisation. The data were 
collected in 2008 by Menno Soentken (2009). We concentrate on the im-
plementation practices of case workers and managers. The implementa-
tion and enforcement of workfare policies is done by so-called job coaches 
in the social security agency, by case workers in the municipal social as-
sistance agency and by work consultants in the private company. These 
street-level workers are all involved with the intake of clients, the for-
mulation of workfare plans with them, monitoring the progress of these 
plans, and the provision of personal assistance to clients.4 In other words, 
we compare the salience of the three implementation mechanisms be-
tween the three agencies that execute more or less identical tasks.
4.1 Selection and a focus on measurable outcomes
There is a stronger focus on measurable outcomes in both the social secu-
rity agency and the social assistance agency than in the private company. 
In the so-called ‘grow and learn model for activation practices’ maintained 
by the social security agency, a focus on outcomes is described as one of 
the most important competencies of the workfare coach. Three core con-
cepts are discussed in the work manual: ‘cost-benefit analysis, the quick-
est, shortest way to work and the cheapest, most adequate process.’ Job 
coaches working in the social security agency are supervised by a mentor 
who concentrates in particular on the extent to which coaches focus on 
measurable outcomes. In both the municipal social assistance agency and 
the social security agency, targets and listings of individual performances 
are regularly disseminated. Furthermore, case workers are addressed by 
management when they do not reach their target. Consequently, employ-
ees of both agencies focus strongly on measurable outcomes in their work:
“Every week I pay attention to my results. I look at how many placements 
I make each week. If I don’t manage to reach the set target, I make sure 
that I fi x it. You constantly have to adjust what you’re doing in order to 
reach your goals.” Workfare coach four
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“Every two weeks we have to show what our targets are or the number of 
clients we have activated. If those numbers don’t match the target, then 
our manager will inquire about it.” Case worker two
Consultants working for the private company are less outcome-orient-
ed. Managers do not focus on the number of job placements and do not 
quantify the results of individual consultants. Managers and consultants 
catalogue results in lists, but only to make sure that reports are written 
on time. These lists do not serve as an instrument to control the num-
ber of clients placed back into the labour market by individual front-line 
workers:
“... the reason why we keep those lists has solely to do with the reports 
that have to be produced on time. If you serve a client and I don’t know 
who you’ve served, I’m not able to check if the report went out on time. 
From those lists, consultants can see who served how many clients, but 
that has nothing to do with competition. Far from it. For instance, I can 
be the one who has placed a client in a job, but then this result can be 
placed by someone else’s name. We’re not competitive about it.” Manager 
one, workfare company
The social security agency and the social assistance agency not only focus 
strongly on outcomes, they also select clients. Employees emphasise that 
they want to use the available means as efficiently as possible. They tend 
to offer more opportunities to younger clients or clients with a relatively 
short distance to the labour market because these clients are believed to 
be the easiest to activate and, hence, will deliver the best results in terms 
of performance measures:
“Th e managers want numbers and I certainly take them into account. 
So I focus on clients who have recently entered social assistance and 
clients younger than thirty instead of older people. Employers are not 
always excited about hiring older people, certainly not if they have been 
receiving social assistance for a long time. When you start with a group 
of clients and you have to make a choice, it’s logical to start with young-
er people who have better job opportunities. People who have been on 
social assistance for years stay in my caseload a bit longer than the 
rest. I will try to reach them by phone, but I won’t focus on them.” Case 
worker three
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Employees also spend more time, energy and available means on clients 
whom they consider to be motivated:
“For me, it’s important that somebody is motivated. Th at’s the most im-
portant thing. I make a selection on the basis of motivation, because it is 
not possible to serve 99 clients at the same time. I just pay more attention 
to motivated people. I engage in conversations and exert myself more 
when it comes to them.” Workfare coach three
These citations illustrate that in both the social security agency and the 
social assistance agency, creaming of the most promising clients takes 
place. Creaming also takes place in the private company, but in a different 
manner. Consultants exclude difficult clients from the outset. They rely 
on the public agencies only to supply clients who are ready to be activated. 
If consultants think there are too many barriers preventing a client’s re-
turn to work, they send the client back to the public principal:
“If I am certain that somebody is unable to work because, for instance, 
he or she speaks too little Dutch, he or she won’t enter my caseload. Im-
possible. Th en I can’t do anything. […] We have someone who checks out 
the paperwork of all clients entering this company. Th at has to be done 
because case workers can make mistakes too. For example, a person who 
enters the caseload and can hardly speak Dutch is unacceptable. Hence, 
we send him back – it’s the wrong registration, we can’t help him. Clients 
like that fi rst have to be sent to the naturalisation service by the case 
worker of the municipality or social security agency.” Consultant one
This exclusionary practice does not alter the fact that the tendency to 
cream is less present in the private company than in both public agencies. 
Within the private company, services meant to be applied to clients are 
specified contractually:
“We don’t have much to do with effi  ciency. Th e tendering procedure for 
workfare services specifi es which means we can use for which groups of 
clients. Th e municipality is in control: ‘You will get this group of people.’ 
Th e municipality specifi es the target for this group and what has to be 
done. It’s up to us to decide whether we want to work with these clients 
and whether we want to register for the tender. We calculate: ‘What will 
we get paid for them, can we make a profi t from them? Th en we know: 
‘X clients are registered and it is such or such a kind of group’. It is not 
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always possible to use instruments such as education in a tendering pro-
cess. So you have to activate them as it is.” Manager two, private company
Management within the private company explicitly states that consultants 
are not required to focus on outcomes. Rather, they consider timely re-
porting to be the core task of consultants:
“Consultants don’t deal with cost considerations. He or she is respon-
sible solely for deadlines. Th ey have to mind the client and nothing else.” 
Manager one, private company
In short: mechanisms of a focus on measurable outcomes and selection 
are highly salient in both public agencies, while they are subordinate to 
timely reporting in the private company. Hence, although the private 
company operates on the private market, its implementation style is less 
outcome-oriented than both public agencies.
4.2 Bureaucratisation
Employees in both public agencies now have more freedom than before 
in terms of how they execute their work. Prior to 2006 and the aban-
donment of mandatory outsourcing, case workers primarily had to ac-
count for complying with the rules. Nowadays, procedural accountability 
is subordinate to accountability for results. This shift is illustrated by the 
recently introduced management philosophy in the municipal social as-
sistance agency:
“Th ere is a new management philosophy. […] Th e essence of it is that we 
steer on the basis of results and not on the basis of process. We evaluate 
results in the sense that: ‘the fi nal results have to be this or that,’ but 
how you get there, left or right, doesn’t matter.” Manager one, social as-
sistance agency
Management in the social security agency also emphasises the impor-
tance of outcomes in service delivery:
“Th ey can do anything they want as long as they keep in mind: ‘What’s 
the added value of what I do?’ In order to activate clients, they can go 
to temporary employment agencies or other workfare companies. If they 
think they can do something in Groningen [a major city in the north of 
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the Netherlands], to help ten people, I will say: ‘Go!’ Th e only thing I ex-
pect is that they are critical of their actions and ask themselves: ‘What 
did I do and what did it lead to?’ And if the answer is: ‘Actually, nothing’ 
then they have to skip that activity the next time.” Manager Work one 
social security agency
This attitude implies that employees in both public agencies have the dis-
cretion to determine when they treat clients, which services they employ 
and how much time they spend on each client, as long as the choices they 
make have a positive effect on the outcome:
“How they fulfi l the question of ‘how to reintegrate clients’ is left to their 
own discretion and then the results will show whether or not they did this 
appropriately. Th is is how things work; if you manage your targets, then 
freedom comes naturally. But if you claim a lot of freedom and don’t 
achieve anything …” Manager Work one social security agency
In contrast, consultants working in the private company have little op-
portunity to act based on their own discretion. Clients must be treated 
in order of arrival and which service they employ is determined by the 
specific stage a client is in. For example, during the third week of the 
activation process, clients are required to attend competency training 
whereas someone who is in the second month of this process is required 
to do an internship. The choice between services is made on the basis of 
fixed criteria. The same holds true for the amount of time consultants are 
allowed to spend on a client and the moment upon which a client has to 
be outplaced.
 The emphasis placed by management on rule compliance does not 
follow primarily from a preoccupation with justice, but has to do pre-
dominantly with the manner in which the company generates income. 
Income is generated by charging a fee for the various stages of workfare 
trajectories. Each stage – from signing the contract to an eventual job 
placement – is invoiced to the social security agency or the municipal 
social assistance agency. Although the company receives a bonus for 
the final phase of job placement, this bonus is not the main source of 
income for private companies. Furthermore, management in the pri-
vate company continually stresses the timely processing of reports be-
cause it thinks timely reports are expected from them by their public 
principals:
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“Th ere are many kinds of reports. It diff ers per contract what the prin-
cipal demands from us. You have to draw up an initial report; there 
are reports on premature endings, reports on endings based on a lack of 
motivation, and reports on job placements. Th ere are numerous reports 
to keep your principal up-to-date on the latest developments, the latest 
events. If you have dismissed a client due to a lack of motivation, then 
you have to inform your principal and therefore, you have to hand in 
your reports on time.” Manager two, private company
The application of sanctions is a final indication that the implementa-
tion style is more bureaucratic in the private company than in both pub-
lic agencies. Sanctions can only be imposed by employees of the public 
agencies. However, private companies provide information which is used 
by public agencies to determine whether or not to apply a sanction. The 
management in the private company encourages consultants to report 
‘non-cooperative’ clients as quickly as possible. This strict enforcement 
of the rules concerning the reporting of ‘non-cooperative’ clients is finan-
cially motivated. The time span within which clients must be outplaced 
is formalised contractually. When clients are not motivated, the risk of 
missing deadlines increases. If deadlines are not met, the company loses 
its fee. Hence, the private company uses sanction procedures as an incen-
tive to change the behaviour of unmotivated clients so that they are ready 
to proceed to the next stage of the activation process:
“We have six months…within those six months we have to prepare the cli-
ent, and then, if the client is motivated, the process of activation starts. If 
the client is not motivated, then the sanction procedure starts in order to 
make sure certain behaviour is changed, which allows us to start direct 
mediation again.” Manager one, private company
However, in both public agencies, the rules sanctioning ‘non-cooperative 
behaviour’ and the ‘refusal of suitable jobs’ are applied flexibly. Employees 
forego sanctions if they are convinced that sanctions go against their at-
tempts to focus on job placement and motivating clients:
“Legislation is often rather rigid and we, as job coaches, have to deal with 
the reality that people are in when they lose their job. If I always applied 
the law as strictly as possible, many clients would not feel as if they were 
being helped. Th erefore, I have to balance enforcing the law and meet-
ing the client’s needs. For instance, I know for sure that if I would rigidly 
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enforce the rules regarding suitable work, many clients would feel disre-
spected when they have to apply for jobs beneath the level they are used 
to.” Job coach four
In sum, in both public agencies, bureaucratic control is subordinate to 
focusing on the outcomes of workfare policies, while in the private com-
pany, the focus is primarily on the steering of the activation process and 
a strict enforcement of rules concerning non-cooperative clients. The bu-
reaucratic implementation style is not chosen freely by the private com-
pany but is imposed by its public principals. Public agencies require pri-
vate companies to account for their actions in detail in order to prevent 
the company from shirking the public interest, which the principals are 
meant to serve. This need for accountability means that a bureaucratic 
implementation style is prevalent in the private company not despite its 
operating on a private market, but precisely because of it. In other words, 
the tendency of the public principal to impose detailed accountability 
practices is reinforced because the private company operates on a market 
governed by profit-seeking norms rather than public interest. This con-
clusion contradicts the empirically grounded, common sense idea that 
managers in public agencies believe they deal with more red tape than 
managers in private companies (Feeney and Bozeman 2009).5 However, 
it corroborates Brodkin’s (2006: 14) assumption that private agencies 
that lack strong countervailing constituencies or the powers of resistance 
available to public bureaucrats, risk being transformed from an alterna-
tive to government into an arm of government.
4.3 Interpreting the diff erences in policy implementation by public and 
private agencies
The latter conclusion explains our finding that the private company oper-
ates more bureaucratically than both public agencies. But how can we un-
derstand why both public organisations are more outcome-oriented and 
that their implementation style induces more selectivity than the private 
company? A possible answer to this question can be derived from institu-
tional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer, Scott, and Deal 1983). The 
starting point of this theory is that organisations are not closed systems. 
Rather, their survival is dependent upon their conformity to the normative 
expectations of their social environment. This mechanism is assumed to 
be of less importance for organisations operating in a technical environ-
ment than for organisations operating in an institutional environment. 
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The survival of the former mainly depends on efficient production within 
a market, while survival of the latter mainly depends on congruence be-
tween their functioning and the normative expectations imposed on them 
by the state. The transformation of the welfare state is connected to the 
expectation that the state mirrors the market; the ideology of the ‘welfare 
state’ is replaced by the ideology of an ‘entrepreneurial state’ (Smit and 
Van Thiel 2002).
 In this respect, it is understandable that both public agencies attempt 
to place their market-oriented implementation style in the foreground 
more so than the private company. After all, the public agencies operate, 
to a larger extent, in an institutional environment characterised by a mar-
ket ideology. Unlike the private company, the social security agency is not 
dependent upon the sales of their services on the private market, but is 
dependent upon the allocation of means by the state. Moreover, although 
the municipal social assistance agency is financially accountable for its 
results, it cannot go bankrupt. The frequent use of business-like termi-
nology indicates that both the social security agency and the social as-
sistance agency have implemented business-like principles. For instance, 
the quality control employee of the social assistance agency emphasises 
the importance of entrepreneurship:
“As a case worker, you are in fact an entrepreneur. You have your prod-
uct, which is that you reach your target. How do you handle that? Th at’s 
the job of a case worker, his entrepreneurship, like running a shop.” Qual-
ity control employee social assistance agency one
In another interview, a case worker observes that the mentality in the so-
cial assistance agency has become more business-like:
“How you approach things has become more business-like. In 2000, the 
culture was softer in the sense of: ‘Well, I feel pity for that person and 
hence I won’t take harsh measures’. What you see too is that a new type 
of colleague has entered the organisation. Th e old generation has either 
picked up the new culture or has left the organisation. By 2001 and 2002, 
many workers had left: they’ve gone to other municipalities or have gone 
on to social work, to debt recovery. Job selection is increasingly centred on 
service provision rather than social work. Th is attracts a diff erent kind of 
people. Not the social work type but the more business-like, service type, 
like you fi nd in a bank. It is no longer feasible to focus on impediments 
and say: ‘Oh dear, oh dear, what a pity.’ It is now more an attitude of: ‘We 
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recognise your impediments, but we ignore them and look at what you 
can do’. Th at shift, I mean.” Case worker two
In the social security agency, employees have to draw up business plans. 
The manager checks the progress of these plans and discusses it with his 
subordinates:
“Th e business plan is what matters. Th at determines the actions of job 
coaches and they have to see it as such. Th at’s how you evaluate the ac-
tions of the job coaches. Th ey have specifi ed what they are going to do in 
their business plans. Th e expected results are also specifi ed in the plan. I 
look at them and evaluate to what extent targets are met and discuss that 
with them. If a coach takes action, he continuously has to think: ‘What 
does that mean for my business plan?’ or: ‘I see an opportunity, do I have 
to adjust something in my plan?” Manager one, social security agency
This business-like terminology contrasts strongly with that of the private 
company, where people speak of ‘procedures’, ‘timely processing’, ‘reports’, 
‘enforcement’ and ‘accountability’. In this organisation, individual listings 
of results are not passed around and management does not mention ‘en-
trepreneurship’, ‘holding a business-like attitude’, ‘cost-benefit analyses’ or 
‘business plans’.
 In short: the reason why we have observed a stronger business-like 
orientation – with a focus on measurable outcomes and selection – in 
both public agencies than in the private company may be the larger extent 
to which public organisations operate in an institutional environment. 
Hence, these public agencies are under more normative pressure to con-
form to business-like practices than the private company, which operates 
in a more technical environment. The private company is under more 
pressure to adopt a bureaucratic implementation style given the market 
they operate on.
5 Conclusion and discussion
5.1 The implementation of workfare policies
Our first conclusion is that the unintended implementation mechanisms 
of selection and focusing on measurable outcomes, previously problema-
tised in the welfare state, play an even greater role in the implementation 
of welfare policy in the workfare state because of the greater emphasis be-
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ing placed on accountability. The focus on accountability induces cream-
ing of the most promising clients and a focus on activities for which street-
level bureaucrats are held accountable. However, seen from the policy 
perspective of the workfare state, these implementation mechanisms are 
not really problematic because they do not hamper its valued efficiency. 
However, what is problematic in the light of the workfare ideology is that 
the transition from welfare to workfare does not automatically decrease 
bureaucracy and hence impedes the flexibility and responsiveness valued 
in the workfare state as well. On the contrary, principal-agent problems 
invoked by the outsourcing of workfare policy to private companies have 
reinforced bureaucratic tendencies. These bureaucratic tendencies are 
the unintended consequence of the policy of public organisations to pre-
vent opportunistic behaviour by private companies. Partially contracting 
back in does not seem to terminate this mechanism: the implementation 
style of the private company in our study is still mainly bureaucratic.
 Our second conclusion is that selection and a focus on measurable out-
comes are even more salient in both public service organisations than 
in the private company, while the reverse is true with respect to bureau-
cratisation. The former may occur because public organisations operate 
in a more institutional environment, while private companies operate in 
a more technical environment. Hence, public agencies are under more 
normative pressure to conform to business-like practices than a private 
company, while private companies are under more pressure to adopt a 
bureaucratic implementation style because the principals they depend on 
for work demand this from them. This leads to the paradox that public 
organisations operate in a more business-like manner, while private or-
ganisations operate more bureaucratically.
5.2 The eff ectiveness of workfare policies
The final question to be answered is how the workings of the mechanisms 
of selection, a focus on measurable outcomes and bureaucratisation af-
fect the results of workfare policies. In this respect, our first conclusion 
is that, as is also observed by Handler (2008) and Brodkin (2006), the 
increased role of the mechanism of selection and a focus on measurable 
outcomes will lead to a socially selective implementation of the normative 
ideals of workfare policies. Social investment, or the provision of activa-
tion and reintegration services, will be concentrated on the most prom-
ising clients. The disciplinary working of workfare policies – the condi-
tionality of rights and associated obligations – will be concentrated on 
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the least promising clients (see also: Jewell 2007). Our second conclusion 
regarding the effectiveness of workfare policies is that the workings of 
these mechanisms, particularly the mechanism of bureaucratisation, limit 
the responsiveness of the implementation of workfare policies. Made-to-
measure services, important in the implementation of result-oriented 
workfare policies, will hardly be developed either because of a neglect of 
the needs and interests of the most deprived clients or because of a focus 
on contract compliance.
 In sum: the welfare state has supposedly been transformed into what is 
alternately designated a workfare, enabling or investment state. All these 
terms suggest the management of social risks boils down to facilitating 
the unemployed to find jobs themselves and, hence, increase their agency. 
However, when one takes the implementation of workfare policy into ac-
count, the image of a facilitating, enabling or activating state is not as 
bright and shiny as it sounds. It basically applies to the unemployed who 
need it the least, while privatisation puts pressure on the promised flex-
ibility and responsiveness of service delivery because efforts directed at 
profit making need to be curtailed by continuous monitoring.
 Notes
 We conceive of workfare policies in the same broad sense as Jessop does, in-
cluding all activation, reintegration and sanctioning measurements intended 
to get people (back) to work. 
 According to Handler (: ), selection not only takes place with regard 
to facilitating reintegration, but also with regard to the sanctioning of clients. 
He posits that the least successful clients are most likely to be punished: ‘The 
lack of access to childcare, reliable transportation, and the need to care for 
disabled family members increases the risk of being sanctioned’. Lens () 
contests this line of thinking. She argues that the sanctioning procedure is 
dominant in the United States and is applied equally to all clients.
 The focus on measurable results can even lead to fraud (Grover : /). 
Handler (: /) cites a study by DeParle () who examined the “Wis-
consin Works” programme. This programme appeared to be a reintegration 
success story, even on an international level. However, the focus on measur-
able results ‘led to corruption and mismanagement on the part of the state 
and local officials and willful ignorance or concealment on the part of the 
state and local officials. Private agencies were evaluated (and paid) on the 
basis of the number of clients with employability contracts and whether re-
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cipients were assigned to “a full slate” of activities. To meet these goals, front-
line workers employed a variety of methods, from creating and mailing em-
ployability contracts to clients without consulting them to simply putting the 
information in the computer. A subsequent state evaluation demonstrated 
dismal results. Although all clients were supposed to be involved in some sort 
of work activity, paid or community service,  per cent of clients at Maxi-
mus, Inc., one of the principal for-profit contractors, did not have a work 
assignment. At one point, an internal report showed that although Maximus 
advertised  per cent of the caseload in paid work, in fact only eight per 
cent were employed’ (Handler : ).
 Case workers are responsible for numerous tasks related to the implemen-
tation of workfare policy. Two of these tasks are excluded here in order to 
enhance the comparability of the case studies: tasks associated with the out-
sourcing of services and tasks associated with the judicial aspects of benefits. 
These tasks are therefore excluded from comparison because they only take 
place within the public organisations, in this case the social security agency 
and municipal social service agency.
 However, the study by Feeney and Bozeman lacks the crucial comparison 
for us between the perceived red tape of street-level bureaucrats working 
for public, non-profit agencies and private, for-profit agencies, who perform 
identical tasks.
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9 Towards a New Welfare Settlement?
 The Transformation of Welfare State Solidarity
 Romke van der Veen and Mara Yerkes
1 Introduction
In the introductory chapter we distinguished three social foundations of 
the welfare state. In the first place, there has to be an awareness of the so-
cial nature of risks. We defined social risks as risks that do not result from 
individual choice but as risks that are (also) produced by the social system 
of production. We discussed the risk of occupational disability in an in-
dustrial economy as an example of a social risk. In the second place, there 
has to be a willingness to share these social risks. Because social risks are, 
to some extent, risks that are produced by the system of production, there 
has to be a willingness to handle the negative consequences of these risks 
(poverty, sickness) collectively. In the third place, the welfare state rests 
on a number of social institutions intended to manage social risks, such as 
social insurance, labour market regulation, collective labour agreements 
and so forth. In the debate about changing welfare states, the emphasis 
is often on political theories of the welfare state and institutional change 
because processes of retrenchment or the restructuring of welfare states 
are highly political in nature. In contrast, we speak of the social founda-
tions of the welfare state and concentrate on sociological theories of the 
welfare state and of social change in this book because we believe that the 
primary cause of the transformation of the welfare state is to be found in 
processes of social change.
 Our sociological approach to the changing welfare state departs from 
quite recent sociological theories on social change, which take the con-
cept of risk and risk perception as their starting point. Sociologists such 
as Luhmann (1991), Beck (1987), Giddens (1994) and many others have 
developed theories on social change that accentuate the changing nature 
of risks and/or risk perception. These theories all predict either implicitly 
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(Lumann) or explicitly (Beck, Giddens) fundamental changes to the social 
foundations of the welfare state and thus in the way welfare states deal 
with these risks; the welfare settlement so to say.
 In a review of recent literature on risk theory, Wilkinson (2001) dis-
tinguishes between broad, encompassing sociological theories of risk 
and risk perception that try to conceptualise social processes of chang-
ing risks and risk perceptions and the more mundane, psychometric 
approach that primarily intends to measure the individual conception 
of risks and the way individuals react to these risks. Concerning socio-
logical theories, Wilkinson (2001: 2) concludes ‘that the appeal of (such) 
theories lies more in their polemical function than in the extent to which 
they have detailed clearer conceptions of the social reality in which peo-
ple acquire and create interpretations of (...) risks’. On the other hand, 
he is of the opinion that psychometric research into risk perception is 
hampered by a realist perspective on risks, which is blind to the socially 
constructed character of the ‘objective facts’ about risk. Psychometric 
research tends to isolate respondents and ‘records snapshots of risk 
judgements outside the specific social contexts in which people live (...) 
perceptions of risks are by no means constant, rather they change in 
different social settings and in relation to new knowledge and experi-
ence of life events’ (Wilkinson 2001: 9). Wilkinson is not unique in his 
criticism and it is this criticism that we try to answer in this book. All 
the studies that have been reported in this book take sociological theory 
as their starting point and try to extract testable, empirical hypotheses 
from these theories. We not only try to test these theories in empirical 
sociological research, we also try to interpret the results of our enqui-
ries in terms of the consequences they have for the sociological theory 
we started with. Although we have often, like psychometric researchers, 
questioned our respondents about risks selected by the researchers, we 
have tried to contextualise our research, thus creating the opportunity 
to see the socially constructed and contextual character of risk percep-
tions.
 In this concluding chapter we will explore the consequences of our re-
search findings for sociological theory on the welfare state and for the 
welfare state itself. We start by giving a bird’s eye view of the context of 
our research: the Dutch welfare state.
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2 From decommodifi cation to recommodifi ction: policy change in the 
Dutch welfare state from 1980 to 2010
After the economic crisis of the 1970s and the end of the ‘golden era’ of the 
welfare state, the Dutch welfare state underwent a long period of reform 
and policy change. Beginning in the early 1980s, modest, programmatic 
reform of the Dutch welfare state occurred. Once the economic crisis 
abated, it became clear that a limitation on welfare state expenditures was 
insufficient and serious problems remained. Rampant long-term unem-
ployment and the perverse effects of generous welfare programmes such 
as sickness and disability benefits continued to afflict the Dutch welfare 
state, causing reforms to continue well into the 1990s. These reforms led 
to a market-driven managed liberalisation of the welfare state (Van der 
Veen and Trommel 1999). As a consequence, the universal entitlement to 
social rights remained but the content and the provision of social rights 
changed.
 This new paradigm of managed liberalisation appears, at first, rather 
paradoxical. On the one hand, it implies a centralisation of control over 
the administration of welfare state programmes. On the other hand, it 
implies a decentralisation of responsibility. The centralisation of control 
resulted in a stricter definition of citizens’ rights and responsibilities, in 
more conditionality and obligatory reciprocity, and in a focus on rule en-
forcement. The decentralisation of responsibility led to increased respon-
sibility for employers and employees, an increase in administrative re-
sponsibilities of municipalities, and to the partial privatisation of welfare 
state administration, in particular reintegration efforts.
 The transformation of the welfare state has been described by Gil-
bert as a transformation from a welfare state to a social investment state 
(2002). He distinguishes four trends: privatisation, increased selectivity, 
activation and an increase in disciplining; each of these trends can be 
observed in the transformation of the Dutch welfare state. First, a certain 
degree of privatisation of public services is visible. Although social rights 
to services often remain intact, these services (for example, reintegration 
services) are increasingly delivered by private companies. Privatisation 
within social security also takes place through the decentralisation of 
risks to employers, for example with Dutch disability arrangements (Yer-
kes 2011). It should be noted that the privatisation of services is subject to 
strict conditions. In other words, privatisation is a form of managed liber-
alisation, to ensure that public interests are met and are not subordinated 
to the private interests of firms.
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 A second effect of the transformation of the welfare state is an in-
creased selectivity of benefits (Gilbert 2002). In the Dutch case, we have 
witnessed this increased targeting of benefits but social protection still 
takes place within a universal system of welfare. In other words, a univer-
sal system of social rights remains but entitlement has become more con-
ditional and provision has become targeted towards specific, vulnerable 
groups. Third, Gilbert points to the shift from welfare states providing 
income protection to welfare states emphasising improved labour mar-
ket participation. In the Netherlands, most social security arrangements 
have been reformed in this manner, with a focus on reintegration and 
activation.
 The final trend evident in the Dutch case1 is a development towards 
the strict enforcement of rules and regulations, particularly in the case 
of social assistance and social insurance recipients. Social protection in 
the Dutch welfare state has developed along the lines of a disciplinary 
mechanism – as a result of increased selectivity in benefits and insur-
ance as well as more stringent definitions and enforcement of rights and 
responsibilities of benefit recipients. This shift is evident, for example, 
in the application of sanctions, the increased use of financial incentives 
and the demands placed on citizens. As a result, there is a great empha-
sis on reciprocity. The sum of these four trends of policy change is a shift 
from a decommodifying to a recommodifying welfare state. Efforts are 
not primarily directed at protecting citizens against the risks of a (post-)
industrial economy, but at making citizens autonomous, that is: self-
sufficient.
 In this context, we reflect upon our research findings in this con-
cluding chapter. We start by giving a summary of our research con-
cerning risk perception and solidarity, concentrating on the theoretical 
implications of our research in section three. Next, we will give a sum-
mary of our research on risk management strategies and on the conse-
quences of our research for theories on institutional and welfare state 
change in section four. Finally, in section five we will end the chapter 
by discussing the consequences of our observations for the foundations 
and development of the welfare state. To what extent can we speak of a 
gradual development towards a ‘new welfare settlement’? Because our 
empirical research has mainly been executed in the Netherlands, our 
discussion of the new welfare settlement will focus on the Dutch wel-
fare state.
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3 Risk perception and welfare state solidarity
Sociological theory on welfare state change departs either from processes 
of globalisation or from processes of individualisation. Globalisation af-
fects the system of production, networks of economic and social interde-
pendencies and the capacities of nation states to control economic and 
social processes that take place within their boundaries. The capacity of 
nation states to control these processes is important because the twen-
tieth-century welfare state is organised within the boundaries of nation 
states and around the political, economic and social institutions of the na-
tion state. Individualisation affects the way actors see their world, because 
the social institutions and social bonds that limit the ‘freedom’ to act are 
losing their defining and binding power. Individualisation may also affect 
the level and content of social solidarity in a community because the so-
cial bonds between individuals are weakening. Our research has not been 
directed at these processes of globalisation and individualisation itself, 
but on the hypothesised consequences of these processes.
 In Chapter two we started by investigating the idea of social solidarity. 
Solidarity is the backbone of the welfare state and is based on the extent to 
which people are willing to share risks. We investigated two claims in this 
chapter. First, a claim is often made that welfare state support is dimin-
ishing, hypothesised as the unavoidable consequence of social processes 
of individualisation and globalisation. However, we find that in reality, 
welfare state support is not decreasing. Rather, it is constant or even in-
creasing. Given the fact that welfare state policies are changing, what does 
this high level of welfare state support mean? Does high support indicate 
support for the transformations occurring in the welfare state or, as is 
often assumed, the contrary: that high support indicates popular feeling 
is not on par with the transformation most European welfare states are 
going through? To answer this question, we investigated the nature of 
social solidarity: under which circumstances and with whom are people 
willing to share social risks? Our conclusion is that traditional notions 
of deservingness, need and kinship still determine the level of solidarity 
people express. However, we also find that the extent to which people 
trust benefit recipients is low. This low level of trust expresses itself in 
a high and growing support for obligatory reciprocity within the welfare 
state. People are willing to share risks on the condition that their solidar-
ity is matched (reciprocated) by the obligations of benefit recipients. The 
support for obligatory reciprocity can be found with voters of both left 
and right-wing parties. This means that support for norms of reciprocity 
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is independent from the opinions people have about distributive justice. 
As Mead (1992) put it: the ‘politics of conduct’ are becoming more im-
portant at the expense of the ‘politics of class’. Our conclusion is thus that 
the welfare state is still firmly supported in public opinion because the 
developments in social policies are in line with developments in public 
opinion. Both are developing in the direction of more conditionality and 
obligatory reciprocity.
 Having reached the conclusion that welfare state support is still high 
in the Netherlands and that support for the welfare state in transition is 
based on an increasingly shared normative ideal of obligatory reciprocity 
as well as on perceptions of deservingness, we investigated the conse-
quences of the social process of individualisation for welfare state sup-
port. Individualisation is expected to undermine welfare state support. 
However, our findings in Chapter two do not confirm this assumption. 
Chapter three investigated the relationship between individualisation and 
risk perception and the willingness to share risks. We made a distinction 
between cultural or normative individualisation, that is, a process of di-
minishing social control and increasing individual freedom on the one 
hand, and structural individualisation, the weakening of the social bond 
and social relations, on the other hand. Cultural individualisation results 
in a post-materialist culture as defined by Inglehart (1977). Structural 
individualisation results in Bowling Alone as characterised by Putnam 
(2000). We discovered, contrary to our expectations, that individualisa-
tion does not necessarily undermine welfare state support. Processes of 
structural individualisation undermine welfare state support, but cultural 
individualisation does not. People with low levels of social integration 
are less supportive of the welfare state – irrespective of their economic 
interests, whereas people who cherish individuality – cultural individual-
ists – support the welfare state. Their support, however, is related to their 
economic interests: it increases when their own socio-economic position 
weakens. Because we find a positive relationship between cultural indi-
vidualisation and welfare state support, we conclude that individualisa-
tion not only strengthens the normative ideals of freedom and self-actu-
alisation, it also makes people more aware of their vulnerability. It is this 
awareness that feeds welfare state support.
 In Chapter four we further investigated this relationship between 
vulnerability and welfare state support. We once again investigated risk 
perception and the willingness to share risks in relation to processes of 
individualisation. In Chapter four, however, we focused on the most im-
portant process of individualisation in relation to social security: the in-
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crease of labour flexibility. We asked workers with flexible employment 
contracts and workers with flexible jobs/tasks how they perceived social 
risks and to what extent they sought protection from these risks. As was to 
be expected, we found that as people experience job insecurity, this spurs 
support for unemployment insurance. The opposite is also true: work se-
cure people, that is, people who expect to find employment easily when in 
need of a job, show less support for unemployment insurance. However, 
we find no evidence for the hypothesis that flexibilisation weakens the 
social bond between workers, which consequently undermines their will-
ingness to share risks, as suggested for example by Sennett (1998). So, the 
changing nature of work shapes workers’ perceptions of risks, fostering a 
growing need for risk reduction through social insurance. This conclu-
sion confirms our hypothesis that individualisation – in this case in the 
labour market – can strengthen welfare state support and thus the will-
ingness to share risks because (in this case) labour market flexibilisation 
makes people more aware of their vulnerability.
 Our conclusions thus far do not unconditionally confirm or reject so-
ciological theory on risk perception and welfare state solidarity. What we 
observe is more complex. We hardly observe a decreasing perception of 
the social nature of risks. What we do see, is a change in the way people 
think we have to deal with social risks. Trust is low and the unemployed 
are held more accountable for their situation. So, the hypothesised in-
creasingly manufactured nature of social risks does not appear to cause 
a rejection of solidarity through the sharing of risks. Rather, it appears to 
spur an increasing conditionality of support for the welfare state in reac-
tion to a decrease in trust and perceived deservingness. The same conclu-
sion can be drawn concerning the consequences of individualisation. All 
in all, individualisation appears to spur a willingness to share risks rather 
than the other way around. While the willingness to share risks is indeed 
diminishing among some groups, a more important effect of individu-
alisation seems to be the exact opposite. We conclude that the perceived 
increased vulnerability of actors in an individualised world is the cause of 
this willingness to share risks. In short, social solidarity does not conflict 
with individualisation, rather, it facilitates it. The increased insecurity in 
other spheres of social life, resulting from individualisation, is compen-
sated by creating a collectively organised safety net through social secu-
rity. To some extent, this confirms Luhmann’s thesis that the awareness of 
risks will increase in a risk society.
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4 Social risks and risk management: the changing strategies of social 
protection
Perceiving risks as social risks and being willing to share social risks is 
one thing, being able to transform these perceptions and willingness into 
actual policies is another. This process is dependent, among other things, 
upon the institutional environment in which these policies have to be de-
veloped and is dependent upon the organisations – firms and administra-
tive agencies – in which they are to be implemented.
 Institutional theory on policy change in the welfare state concentrates 
heavily on mechanisms of path dependency that limit the capacity to ad-
just policies once they are introduced (Pierson 1994). Increasing returns, 
resulting from established policies and the administration created to im-
plement these policies, combined with politics of blame avoidance and 
the veto power of established interests, limit the possibilities of program-
matic change (Pierson 2000). Policy change is often achieved via the de-
tour of what is called systemic change, in other words changes in funding 
or in the governance of policy fields that result in programmatic change 
in the long run (Van der Veen, Trommel and de Vroom 2000). We have 
not investigated the political process of policy change in our research; 
instead, we have focused on actual practices of risk sharing and risk man-
agement in firms, unions and employers’ organisations, corporatist bar-
gaining institutions and in the daily implementation of social policies. In 
the end, it is in these practices that policy change must become visible. 
We wanted to determine to what extent changing perceptions of social 
risks and the willingness to share risks affects the strategies of risk man-
agement in these organisations and institutions.
 Our first attempt to open up the black box of changing strategies of 
risk management concerned the introduction and implementation of the 
notion of employability. The idea behind employability is that in a new, 
post-industrial service economy, the Fordist employment relationship has 
withered away. In an industrial economy, social security was the product 
of job security realised through stable employment relationships com-
bined with employment insurance when one experiences adversity. From 
the employability perspective and in a service economy, social security 
should mainly be the product of strategies to remain employable. By in-
vesting in individual capacities and skills and by being flexible and mobile, 
job security is increased. The concept of employability, which originated 
in the US, was introduced during the 1990s in the Dutch welfare state and 
gradually became an important issue in collective labour agreements. As 
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is the case with social security initiatives, the strategy of enhancing social 
security by investing in employability is hindered by collective action prob-
lems once it becomes more than an individual investment. Since employ-
ability was seen as an instrument in social security and employment poli-
cies in the Netherlands, it became a collective action problem in fi rms as 
well as in the negotiations between unions and employers’ organisations. 
Th e problem is: why invest in the employability of workers if one runs the 
risk of losing one’s investment to the competitor? Th e traditional solution 
to this problem of ‘poaching’, binding the employee to the fi rm, confl icts 
with the fundamental values of employability: fl exibility and  mobility.
 Having investigated the development of the policy discourse, the in-
troduction of employability in collective labour agreements and the prac-
tice of employability policies in firms in Chapter five, we concluded that 
in reality, actors were able to overcome these collective action problems 
with the help of institutions existing within the Dutch corporatist welfare 
state: the tradition of collective bargaining and the workings of collec-
tive labour agreements. In collective bargaining, employer investments 
in employability were exchanged for the acceptance of increased labour 
market flexibility by unions. Collective labour agreements helped to over-
come the collective action problems raised by employability within firms. 
The facilitation of gradual policy change by corporatist institutions can 
be explained by the institutional complementarity that exists in the Dutch 
corporatist welfare state between the norm of job security and the norma-
tive ideals of the strategy of enhancing employability.
 In sum, we found that ‘old’ institutions not only hinder policy change 
due to mechanisms of path dependency and increasing returns, they can 
also facilitate policy change through their problem-solving capacities, 
thus making gradual policy change possible. In other words, corporatism 
can cause a standstill in policy processes when collectively organised ac-
tors and the state are unwilling to cooperate, so-called corporatist immo-
bility, but corporatism can also facilitate policy change when bargaining 
and exchange is possible: responsive corporatism (Visser and Hemerijck 
1997; see also Yerkes 2011). We further investigated the workings of cor-
poratist institutions in Chapter six. In this chapter, we analysed the cover-
age of ‘old’ and ‘new’ social risks in collective labour agreements and the 
interplay between the policies of the state and the policies of the social 
partners (trade unions and employers’ organisations). We once again find 
that corporatist institutions can facilitate policy change. On the one hand, 
it is often suggested that the mechanisms of path dependency limit the 
transformation of welfare state institutions to respond to new social risks 
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(see for example, Bonoli 2005). What we find, however, is that there is 
an interplay between policies executed at the level of the state and poli-
cies developed by the social partners in collective bargaining (see also, 
Trampusch 2006). This interaction can take the form of compensation 
in collective bargaining, for example when risk coverage is limited by 
the state, or the form of new provision when the social partners cre-
ate protection against (new) social risks not covered by the state. We 
conclude that the centralised, corporatist character of the Dutch welfare 
state makes this interplay possible. Therefore, whereas the centralised 
character of Dutch corporatism is often seen as a cause of immobility, 
in our research, this centralised character of Dutch corporatism makes 
innovation and responsiveness possible, leading to the protection of 
new social risks (work-family balance arrangements) in collective labour 
agreements. Undoubtedly, the social acceptance of these issues makes 
corporatist institutions responsive rather than immobile (see Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997).
 In Chapter seven we return to the level of the firm. In this chapter, we 
investigated the development of labour policies within two ‘transnation-
al’ firms, an industrial firm and a firm in the service sector. We wanted 
to know how firms handle their labour policies in a globalising, post-in-
dustrial economy. In the discussion on the welfare state in a globalising 
economy, it is suggested that economic globalisation spurs a ‘race to the 
bottom’ and that firms become ‘footloose’ (Mishra 1999, Castles 2004). 
Firms are forced to make their labour policies increasingly subordinate to 
profit-making because of the heightened competition inherent through 
globalisation and thus they will move to the ‘lowest point’. In a globalised 
economy, ‘shareholder value’ reigns.
 For the research presented in this chapter, we took a different starting 
point. The idea of ‘embeddedness’ as introduced by Fligstein (2001), com-
bined with the social field approach of Bourdieu (2005) suggests that the 
rationality of firms is not only directed at maximising profit, but is always 
dependent on their history and the fields they operate in. Therefore, the 
economic rationality of the firm is contextual. In the case of the transna-
tional firms studied here, their embeddedness in different social fields 
implied that their labour policies were not simply caught up in a race to 
the bottom, rather they were characterised by differentiation, polarisation 
and individualisation. In the industrial firm, outsourcing of production 
took place, which might indeed stimulate a race to the bottom, but at 
the same time we saw that in both firms labour policies were still highly 
dependent on national regulation, which prevented a race to the bottom. 
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Differentiation in labour policies occurred because labour policy in the 
transnational field primarily consists of the strategic objectives of the 
firm and pertains to the higher-educated and internationally mobile la-
bour force. In contrast, labour policy situated in the national field is heav-
ily influenced by national labour markets and social security regulation 
and is primarily aimed at lower-level personnel. However, this national 
labour policy also appears to be used in an increasingly strategic manner 
whereby personnel are increasingly perceived and treated in an instru-
mental fashion. The shift to the shareholder-value conception of the firm 
has facilitated this shift from personnel policy towards human resource 
management, which implies a shift of risks from the company level to 
individual employees. This individualisation of labour policies implies a 
diminishing corporate responsibility for workers, for example as observed 
in pension policies. Here we saw that risks were shifted from the employer 
to the employee. This shift in risk responsibility was made possible due to 
the limited influence of national labour policies on firm pension schemes. 
The chapter on the labour policies of transnational firms makes clear that 
in an environment where institutional limitations are weakening, firms 
are still embedded in different fields, which limits their freedom of action. 
Therefore, labour policies tend to differentiate and polarise. In general, 
labour policies have become instrumental, spurring a development in the 
direction of the individualisation of labour policies.
 In our last chapter we turned to the implementation of social policies 
by administrative agencies. Risk management and the protection against 
social risks is not only dependent on the strategies that workers, unions, 
employers’ organisations and firms develop vis-à-vis the arrangements 
of the welfare state; it is also dependent upon the daily administration 
of social policies. The daily practice of administration has become more 
and more important for risk management and risk protection because 
welfare state arrangements have become increasingly focused on activa-
tion. This suggests that the implementation of arrangements is increas-
ingly directed at preventing people from becoming dependent upon 
social security and bringing people back into the labour market. This 
development makes the outcomes of welfare state arrangements, in par-
ticular the protection they offer citizens, increasingly dependent upon 
the activities deployed by administrative organisations in implementing 
activating social policies.
 We found that the informal mechanisms of selection and creaming of 
clients, which are already present in the traditional administration of wel-
fare policies, play an even bigger role in the implementation of activation 
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policies. This is not surprising because activation policies are primarily 
directed at efficiency and successful reintegration. What is problematic, 
however, is that the focus on measurable performance and accountability, 
which is part and parcel of activation policies, can stimulate bureaucrati-
sation and impede flexibility and responsiveness in the implementation of 
activation policies. This is particularly the case when activation policies 
are outsourced to private companies.
 The implementation processes that lead to selection, creaming and bu-
reaucratisation in the daily administration of activation policies, lead to a 
socially selective implementation of activation policies that can be coun-
terproductive. Activation policies will be directed at the most promising 
clients, but these policies will become disciplinary policies when directed 
at the least promising clients, including the use of sanctions, the condi-
tionality of rights and a strict implementation of obligations (cf. Handler 
2008). Secondly, the mechanisms of creaming, selection and bureaucrati-
sation will prevent the development of made-to-measure services, which 
are important in social policies directed at activation and reintegration. 
This is an important observation because the outcome of welfare state 
arrangements in terms of the protection they offer citizens is becoming 
increasingly dependent upon the activities deployed by administrative or-
ganisations in implementing activating social policies.
 Having summarised our main findings we now turn to a discussion 
of the consequences of our research for the development of the (Dutch) 
welfare state. We do this along two lines: first we will give attention to 
processes of policy change that have taken place in the Netherlands and 
discuss the institutional logic of these processes. Secondly, we will try to 
answer the question whether we are moving towards a new welfare settle-
ment, and, if so, what this new settlement is.
5 Towards a new welfare settlement?
As noted earlier, the dominant view on the transformation of the wel-
fare state is that policy change is limited because of various mechanisms 
that promote path dependent changes (for an exception to this, see Yer-
kes 2011). However, as has been observed before, this view of stagnation 
and path dependency does not apply to the Dutch welfare state. Visser 
and Hemerijck (1997) have shown how corporatist institutions facilitated 
change during the 1980s and early 1990s, transforming the Dutch disease 
of the 1980s into the Dutch miracle of the 1990s. Following Katzenstein 
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(1985), the flexibility of the Dutch welfare state is also due to the fact that 
the Netherlands has an open economy and is a small state, and is therefore 
more vulnerable in the global market.
 The research we have presented in this book underscores the power 
of accommodation present in the Dutch welfare state. And once again, it 
illustrates the role of corporatist institutions in this process of accommo-
dation. Old institutions facilitate new solutions and gradually, new forms 
of social risk management have emerged. Gradual change occurs as struc-
tural barriers to reform decline (Hacker 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005) 
and as the feedback effects of policies cease to become self-enforcing 
(Hacker 2005). However, structural barriers and feedback mechanisms 
are not only broken down by the accommodating mechanisms of corpo-
ratist institutions, they are also high or low, dependent on the social and 
political acceptance of policy change. We have illustrated in this book 
that, contrary to what is often suggested, the social acceptance of policy 
change in the direction of a recommodifying welfare state based on nor-
mative principles of obligatory reciprocity is high. The legitimisation of 
policy change in this direction is further strengthened by processes of 
individualisation and flexibilisation that, again contrary to what is often 
thought, make people aware of their vulnerability and spur the need for 
welfare arrangements that fit an individualised society and a flexible la-
bour market.
 Therefore, a new welfare settlement appears to be gradually develop-
ing – one based on continued support for sharing social risks, which also 
extends to new social risks; one based on a notion of social solidarity that 
emphasises (obligatory) reciprocity and which is stimulated by bargaining 
and exchange practices and the accompanying culture of the reconcilia-
tion of conflicting interests associated with a corporatist welfare state. 
This new welfare settlement is characterised by a focus on social security 
issues focused on participation rather than income protection, through 
the increase of individual responsibility and the development of new poli-
cies of reciprocity.
 The shift from decommodifying to recommodifying welfare states has 
been noted by several scholars, termed alternatively a shift to a social 
investment state, the enabling state or a push towards new welfarism 
(Esping-Andersen 2000; Gilbert 2002; Taylor-Gooby 1997). In his article 
on the new welfare settlement in Europe, Taylor-Gooby (2008) concludes 
that this new welfarism is characterised by a supposed focus on social 
investment, but that the reality is often deregulation, targeting and re-
strictions to benefits. He argues that European welfare states are pri-
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marily successful in negative activation – preventing the take-up of ben-
efits through financial incentives. In a similar vein, Hudson and Kühner 
(2009) contend that the supposed shift to a social investment state is 
empirically untenable. In an analysis of 23 OECD countries, the authors 
find that welfare states are not shifting from protective to productive 
modes of provision, rather that quantitative evidence points in the op-
posite direction.
 The evidence presented in this volume on the Dutch case suggests a 
different interpretation of the shift towards a new welfare settlement. 
We disagree with Taylor-Gooby and Hudson and Kühner that invest-
ment does not take place and that activation is only negative activation. 
Although the Dutch welfare state has been retrenched, at the same time 
a shift towards a new welfare settlement is taking place. This shift is to 
be found first and foremost in the gradually changing normative founda-
tion of the welfare state, which is by and large supported by the Dutch 
public and is, secondly, also gradually introduced in its main institu-
tions: social security, employment policy and collective bargaining. Tar-
geting and restrictions to benefits are part of this new welfare settlement 
and are not to be interpreted too easily as signs of merely negative ac-
tivation. They are, thirdly, intended to prevent welfare dependency and 
should be accompanied by, fourth, social investments. In Chapters five 
and six we have illustrated that Dutch collective bargaining institutions 
have responded to changes in social risks allowing for an investment 
in human capital across the life course. Chapters seven and eight have, 
however, illustrated the vulnerability of the investment strategy. In other 
words, while we are moving towards a new welfare settlement, we have 
not reached it yet.
 Note
 This differs from Gilbert (), who argues that the fourth trend is a change 
in the concept of citizenship. Citizenship is no longer an encompassing con-
cept based on solidarity and cohesion in national communities. Rather, ac-
cording to Gilbert, citizenship has now become a concept of membership 
– membership of a specific group, inclusive of community feeling and values 
attached to citizenship.
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